PREM

13

EAST MIDDLE 1967

1623

PRIME MINISTER

Middle East (Policy)
(Israel/Arab Dispute)

Part 7 ends:-

Moscow to F.O. 1802

30.10.67

Part 8 begins:-

Paris to F.O. 1086

2.11.67

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet Documents

Reference	Date
OPD((67)71	13.9.67
CC(67)54 conclusions, minute 2	7.9.67
CC(67)55 conclusions, minute 2	14.9.67
CC(67)57 conclusions, minute 2	28.9.67
OPD(67)32nd conclusions, minute 2	10.10.67
CC(67)58 conclusions, minute 2	11.10.67
CC(67)61 conclusions, minute 3	26.10.67

SECRET

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 900 1 August, 1967

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 900 of 1 August.
Repeated for information to: Washington, Amman, U.K.Mission New York

Your telegram No. 8380 to Washington: Jordan-Israel.

I saw Mr. Eban in Jerusalem today and spoke verbatim to him according to paragraph 3. I added the following points:

(a) You had pointed out to Mr. Remez as long ago as 16 June that the annexation of Jerusalem would never be acceptable to the Arabs and would block any general settlement. You had described such a move as unwise and unjust. Nevertheless the Israelis had gone ahead with their 'municipal' legislation which had not only made the position at the United Nations much more difficult but had prejudiced the possibilities for constructive action;

(b) I had not failed to observe that even in the period of my absence in London the Israelis had begun to run into difficulties with the Arab populations of Jerusalem and the West Bank (my telegram No. 899). So Israel not only faced the economic liabilities of administering the occupied territories but politico/security problems as well. The longer a settlement was delayed the greater the danger of Israel falling into the quasi-colonial position which even Britain had in the end found untenable;

(c) You had been very disappointed that Mr. Eban had not been able to fulfil his undertaking made to you on [gp.undec.] July (your telegram No. 1668, not to all);

(d) You had been interested in what Mr. Eban had said about the possibilities of a negotiation with Egypt being more simple to achieve than one with Jordan. The opening of the Suez Canal was of prime importance to us and although we were not talking about it, so as not to encourage Arab intransigence, Mr. Eban should be under no illusions as to the economic harm being done to our vital interests. We would hope that the opening of the Canal would be one of the first matters to which attention could be given, possibly in the Security Council and we should expect the Israelis not to make things more difficult. Here again the question of Jerusalem had become a matter not only for King Hussein but a symbol for the Arab world as a whole - not least President Nasser. While everything was frozen by the attitudes of all those concerned in the recent fighting (and this was to the detriment of our vital interests) you yourself did not see why you should take decisions over such matters as the Centurions.

/(e)

(e) I asked what was the latest position on refugees. We were beginning to doubt whether the Israelis really meant business. There were only nine days left to 10 August and there was still a wrangle going on about forms. Meanwhile I understood since my return that the outward flow was continuing at some hundreds a day.

2. For Eban's reply see my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office pass Washington, Amman and U.K.Mission New York as my telegrams Nos. 202, 245 and 189.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1934Z 1 August
Recd. 2117Z 1 August

[Repeated as requested]

FILES

ADVANCE COPIES SENT
Eastern Dept,
D.D. & P.U.S.D.
Private Secretary
Private Secretary's Dept.
Minister of State (Mr. Thomson)
P.U.S.
Sir D. Allen
Sir R. Beaumont
Mr. Brenchley
Head of Planning Staff

=====

Israel, PR 72

S E C R E T

Cypher/Cat.A.

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 901 1 August, 1967.

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 901 of 1 August.
Repeated for information to Washington, Amman and UKMis New York.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Mr. Eban said he would like to consider the full record of my remarks at leisure and would hope to give you a more considered reply.

2. He then ran over much the same ground as he had covered with you on 23 June in London.

3. He said that he was afraid your remarks suggested a wrong approach. The situation with Jordan was one of immense complexity. It was unlikely that the Israel Cabinet would be considering the problem as a whole or coming to any hard and fast conclusions. It was a continuing process and situations were changing on both sides. For the first time since the war the Israelis had a period in which they could sit down and consider the future. Up to now the time had been consumed by the public debate in the United Nations. In due course there might be a clearer vision of what to do about Jordan and when definitive conclusions were arrived at, even piecemeal, you and other friendly Powers would certainly be kept informed and consulted. But there were many options open at the moment. There were also considerations of domestic politics and of international politics. It might well be that the only decision reached would be to keep all the options open. Israel was not prepared to conduct a sort of preliminary negotiation with America or ourselves and then go into negotiation with Jordan nor did he see how it could be in Britain's real interest to become involved in a preliminary negotiation on King Hussein's behalf. If, however, there was at some time a direct Jordan-Israel negotiation, it was only then that the direct interplay of interests could be assessed and decisions taken in the light of the negotiating position of each side as it emerged. Meanwhile the Israel public for the first time for years was out of range of any hostile weapons and this security situation was of its own value. It was impossible to see how things would work out now either in Israel or in her Arab neighbours but doubtless matters would develop their own momentum.

/4.

S E C R E T

4. With regard to King Hussein he felt that his position was not really Israel's problem. If he was so insecure, Israel might well find she had given him extremely generous terms in order to reach a settlement, but [? grp. omitted] he was toppled next day or after a short period during which the Jordan-[? grps.omitted] would have taken what had been offered territorially only again to assume a posture of belligerence. King Hussein was unrealistic to think that the beginning of negotiations could be based on the position as it was on 4 June, it would be on the situation pertaining on the day of the opening of negotiations.

5. I said that the obverse of what he said was that the Israelis recognised that a stable and secure King Hussein was to their advantage since it was only he who could negotiate a settlement that would stick.

6. On Jerusalem Mr.Eban said he did not understand why Britain which had no particular status with regard to the Holy Places seemed to be so much more forward in opposition than countries with traditiional protective interests such as Italy or even France. He was afraid that your speech in the United Nations had set up currents in the Arab world. Nevertheless he would say that as far as a settlement was concerned any problem could be 'discussed'. The question of custodianship, access and so on would be interlocked with the territorial settlement with Jordan since access, in particular, would depend to a large extent on where the frontiers lay. He must, however, state again the Israel position which was that there could not be two sovereign jurisdictions in what was now a united city.

7. With regard to the Canal he said that his remarks about a negotiation with Egypt had not been intended to convey that the opening of a negotiation would be more likely or more easy than with Jordan. He had merely meant to convey that if the unlikely position were reached where President Nasser was prepared to talk to Israel the issues were much more clear cut and much more easily soluble. It was not Israel who was keeping the Canal closed and if the Egyptians cared to remove the obstacles in it the Israelis would certianly not prevent them from doing so. Nor would Israel be opposed to Britain or any of the other Powers coming to some separate arrangement with Egypt for the opening of the Canal. The facts of the matter, however, were that you could not get a realistic settlement with Egypt without account of Israel's interests too since she was sitting on one of the banks of the Canal. She was, therefore, in a position to claim from Nasser her own rights with regard to shipping through the Canal should there be an international agreement with the Egyptians for the renewed passage of shipping.

8. He claimed that the Israelis had discussed with Mr. Gussing the question of refugees and that the latter was quite satisfied with Israel's planned arrangements for the reception of those who wished to return. He also said that he was satisfied that Israel was in no way taking action designed to drive out those who were still on the West Bank. These were going for a variety of reasons - not least propaganda put out by the Jordanians. Did the Jordanians really wish the West Bankers to stay put and to return the refugees on the East Bank? Or were they once more toying with the Arab idea of using the refugee problem as a stick with which to beat Israel? The Red Cross had now arranged for a discussion between Israel and Jordan to see what sort of forms would satisfy the Jordanians, but the Jordanians had asked for a delay of 36 hours before these talks took place. With regard to the terminal date of 10 August, he was quite sure that the delays that had arisen would lead to an extension of this date.

Foreign Office pass to Washington 203, Amman 246 and UKMis New York 190.

Mr. Hadow Sent 2201Z 1 August.
Recd.2258Z 1 August.

[Repeated as requested]

FILES

F.O. Eastern Dept.
D.D. & P.U.S.D.
Private Secretary.
P.S.'s Dept.
Minister of State (Mr. Thomson)
P.U.S.
Sir D. Allen
Sir R. Beaumont
Mr. Brenchley
Head of Planning Staff

44444

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT 'A'
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 2513 1 AUGUST 1967
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2513 OF 1 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK, PRIORITY TO AMMAN, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV.

FOLLOWING FROM TOMKINS.

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 2498: UNITED NATIONS AND MIDDLE EAST.

IN THE ABSENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR IN LOS ANGELES GLASS AND I MET WITH SISCO AND BATTLE THIS MORNING. EXPANDING ON GLASS'S TALKS WITH PEDERSEN IN NEW YORK YESTERDAY, SISCO MADE A NUMBER OF COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSALS IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 8365. THE GIST OF HIS COMMENTS IS IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

2. SISCO AND BATTLE HAD JUST COME FROM DISCUSSIONS ON THIS WITH MR. RUSK, BUT SISCO EMPHASISED THAT HE WAS NOT REPEAT NOT YET IN A POSITION TO GIVE THE CONSIDERED VIEWS OF HIS GOVERNMENT. DECISION ON HOW TO TACKLE THE NEXT ROUND ON THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE U.N. INVOLVED CAREFUL REASSESSMENT OF THE MAJOR FACTORS ALL OF WHICH WERE UNCERTAIN QUANTITIES, FOR EXAMPLE THE ATTITUDE OF THE RUSSIANS, THE ARABS, THE ISRAELIS, THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND EVEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY. MY I.F.T. SHOWS HOW UNCERTAIN THE AMERICANS ARE OF THEIR GROUND AT THE MOMENT AND THIS EXPLAINS WHY THEY THINK WE SHOULD BOTH PONDER VERY CAREFULLY BEFORE THE NEXT MOVE.

3. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD MUCH APPRECIATE OUR ADVICE AND IF POSSIBLE OUR COOPERATION IN THE NEXT MOVE AND THEY THEREFORE SUGGESTED, AS BEAUMONT HAS ALREADY BEEN INFORMED BY TELEPHONE, THAT SINCE THE ISSUES WERE SO IMPORTANT THERE SHOULD BE A HIGH LEVEL ANGLO-AMERICAN MEETING IN WASHINGTON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE NEXT WEEK WHICH WOULD IN FACT BE THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TALKS ON U.N. QUESTIONS WHICH HAD TO BE PUT OFF SINE DIE (SINE DIE) IN JUNE. THEY COULD BE SO PRESENTED FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION IN THE EVENT OF PRESS ENQUIRIES.

/4. THE AMERICAN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 2513 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

- 2 -

4. THE AMERICAN TEAM WOULD CONSIST OF GOLDBERG, SISCO AND BATTLE WITH ROSTOW AND RUSK PERHAPS LOOKING IN. THEY SUGGESTED THAT THEY WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO SEE ON OUR SIDE (APART FROM SUITABLE REPRESENTATION FROM THIS EMBASSY) MR. GEORGE THOMPSON, LORD CARADON AND FRANK BRENCHLEY. BOTH TEAMS MIGHT BE FURTHER SUPPORTED BY OTHER STAFF FROM OUR RESPECTIVE MISSIONS IN NEW YORK.

5. THE AGENDA MIGHT BE:

A) NEXT STEPS AT THE U.N. ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

B) MAJOR ISSUES LIKELY TO ARISE AT THE 22ND GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN SEPTEMBER (SELECTED FROM THE AGENDA ORIGINALLY AGREED FROM THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TALKS).

6. THEY SUGGESTED THE TALKS MIGHT TAKE AT MOST TWO DAYS OF WHICH THE FIRST WOULD BE DEVOTED TO THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS. (MY OWN VIEW IS THAT IT WOULD BE WISE TO ALLOW FOR TWO DAYS, WITH TIME FOR OVERNIGHT CONSULTATION WITH YOUR ON THE MIDDLE EAST).

7. I REALISE THAT THE PROPOSED MEETING MAY BE INCONVENIENT AT THIS TIME BUT IT WOULD GIVE US THE CHANCE TO INFLUENCE U.S. POLICY ON A NUMBER OF MAJOR ISSUES CONNECTED WITH THE MIDDLE EAST WHILE IT IS STILL IN THE FORMATIVE STAGE AND I FEEL THAT ON BALANCE THE ADVANTAGES OF SUCH A MEETING WOULD FAR OUTWEIGH ANY POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES. SEEN FROM HERE THEREFORE IT WOULD SEEM MOST DESIRABLE TO SET IT UP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND TO SEND THE STRONGEST TEAM WE CAN. GLASS AGREES.

8. THE AMBASSADOR WILL BE BACK TOMORROW MORNING AND MAY WISH TO COMMENT FURTHER.

F O PASS PRIORITY AMMAN 85, MOSCOW 185, TEL AVIV 98.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT 0008 2 AUGUST

RECD 0008 2 AUGUST

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

? file

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO U.K.MIS. NEW YORK

TELNO 4035 3 AUGUST, 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO UK MIS NEW YORK TEL NO 4Ø35 OF 3 AUGUST REPTD FOR INFMN TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW TEL AVIV AND AMMAN.
MY TELS 8365 AND 8366 TO WASHINGTON: MIDDLE EAST: SECURITY COUNCIL.
PLEASE NOW GIVE THE SECRETARY GENERAL THE MESSAGE IN MY SECOND TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, AS AMENDED IN MY LAST PARAGRAPH BELOW.
2. IN DOING SO PLEASE TELL U THANT THAT WE INTEND TO KEEP THE FACT OF THIS MESSAGE VERY CONFIDENTIAL. IF YOU THINK IT DESIRABLE, YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT MY PROPOSAL IS THAT U THANT SHOULD DO A RECOGNAISSANCE WHICH MIGHT MAKE THE TASK OF A SUBSEQUENTLY APPOINTED REPRESENTATIVE EASIER. IT IS CERTAINLY NOT THE INTENTION TO ASK HIM TO EMBARK ON AN ENTERPRISE IN WHICH HE MIGHT RISK A REBUFF OR FAILURE.
3. AS YOU KNOW (MY FIRST TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, PARAGRAPH 7), WE ARE NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT U THANT WILL GO. BUT WE HOPE THAT THE RESULT MAY BE TO PLANT IN HIM THE IDEA THAT HE SHOULD BE MORE ACTIVE ON THIS FRONT, AND, ESPECIALLY, SHOULD WORK MORE ACTIVELY FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO HAVE HIS REACTIONS BEFORE U.K./U.S. TALKS IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. AS TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, WE WOULD BE INTERESTED TO KNOW WHETHER U THANT THINKS THIS WOULD BE PROFITABLE IF NO SPECIFIC TERMS OF REFERENCE ARE SET (WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 2514, PARAGRAPH 7). HAS U THANT HIMSELF ANY CANDIDATE IN MIND? WE OURSELVES CONSIDER JARRING A STRONG CANDIDATE ESPECIALLY AS HE APPEARS TO BE U.S./U.S.S.R. FRONTRUNNER.
4. TEXT IN MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 8366 SHOULD BE AMENDED AS FOLLOWS: SECOND PARAGRAPH: AMEND 2ND SENTENCE TO READ QUOTE..... PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL..... UNQUOTE. FIFTH PARAGRAPH THIRD SENTENCE, DELETE QUOTE YOURSELF UNQUOTE.

SOSFA SENT 1730Z 3 AUGUST

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

EASTERN DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

You will not wish to have any more Top Secret material in your box. But you may care to know that the latest I have seen about China confirms the continuing state of internal confusion and widespread disorder; and the uncertain extent to which the Chinese army is really responsive to control from Peking. On the whole, they do seem still to be under control but much will depend on the extent to which their obvious exasperation grows with the disciplinary role they are expected to play in the increasing conditions of chaos resulting from the "Cultural Revolution". The conclusion is that if Mao is to maintain control he may have to go slow on the revolution and the prospects of an outright Maoist victory seem to be becoming progressively worse.

There is also a report about Soviet relations with the Arabs which confirms Soviet reluctance to give either the Egyptians or the Syrians fresh supplies of arms beyond their strictly defensive needs; and that they are, therefore, trying to avoid putting the Arabs in a position to ~~support~~ start another round with Israel.

RW

August 4, 1967

Top Copy on China, June, 1966.

file

CONFIDENTIAL

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION - 12 AUGUST 1967

CYPHER/CAT. A ✓

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO. 2585 9 AUGUST 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2585 of 9 AUGUST
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMISSION NEW YORK, MOSCOW TEL AVIV AND AMMAN.

MIDDLE EAST: UNITED NATIONS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REVISED RESOLUTION GIVEN TO US TODAY BY MR. GOLDBERG (SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM)

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

HAVING FURTHER CONSIDERED THE GRAVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

BEARING IN MIND THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AND PROPOSALS CONSIDERED AT THE 5TH EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND HAVING TAKEN NOTE OF THE RECORDS OF THAT SESSION,

CONSIDERING THAT THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST MERITS THE ATTENTION OF ALL MEMBER STATES AND INDEED REQUIRES THE FULL PARTICIPATION OF ALL MEMBERS TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND LASTING PEACE,

1. DECLARES THAT PEACE AND FINAL SOLUTIONS TO THIS PROBLEM CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

2. AFFIRMS THE PRINCIPLE UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER OF:

A. WITHOUT DELAY WITHDRAWAL BY THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT OF THEIR FORCES FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY THEM IN KEEPING WITH THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE CONQUEST OF TERRITORY BY WAR:

B. WITHOUT DELAY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY ALL MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE AREA THAT EACH ENJOYS THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL STATE OF ITS OWN AND TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY, AND RENUNCIATION OF ALL CLAIMS AND ACTS INCONSISTENT THEREWITH:

3. DETERMINES TO WORK DIRECTLY WITH THE PARTIES AND UTILIZE A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AN APPROPRIATE AND JUST SOLUTION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM, IN PARTICULAR BRINGING TO AN END THE LONG-DEFERRED ONE OF THE REFUGEES AND GUARANTEEING FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS

4. REQUESTS ACCORDINGLY THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL APPOINT A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ASSIST HIM IN SEEKING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION IN AGREEMENT WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED:

5. DECIDES TO CONTINUE EXAMINING THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO KEEP THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADVISED OF THE PROGRESS AND RESULTS OF THE CONSULTATIONS BY THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE WITH THE STATES CONCERNED.

F.O. PASS ROUTINE MOSCOW 193 TEL AVIV 107 AND AMMAN 94.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT 0343Z/10 AUGUST
RECD 0343Z/10 AUGUST

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

U.N. DEPT.

SSSSS

file

CONFIDENTIAL

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION - 12 AUGUST 1967

CYPHER/CAT A

ROUTINE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2586 9 AUGUST 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 2586 OF AUGUST 9TH 1967 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV AND AMMAN.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM: MIDDLE EAST: UNITED NATIONS.

AT OUR MEETING THIS AFTERNOON MR. GOLDBERG GAVE US IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. AS YOU WILL SEE, THIS FOLLOWS CLOSELY THE TEXT IN U.K. MISSION NEW YORK YOUR TELNO 1833, WHICH MR. GOLDBERG AGAIN CONFIRMED HAD BEEN AGREED WITH THE RUSSIANS. THE DIFFERENCES ARE:

(A) NECESSARY AMENDMENTS TO ADAPT THE ORIGINAL TEXT FOR USE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

(B) INCLUSION OF PROVISION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE:

(C) THE TRANSFER OF THE REFERENCE TO CONTINUED EXAMINATION OF THE SITUATION FROM OPERATIVE PARA 3 TO OPERATIVE PARA 5.

ALTHOUGH MR. GOLDBERG HAD APPARENTLY CONSIDERED THIS A DRAFTING CHANGE, HE AGREED WHEN WE SUGGESTED THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT POSSIBLY SEE IT AS ONE OF SUBSTANCE.

2. MR. GOLDBERG ASKED US TO TREAT HIS TEXT VERY CONFIDENTIALLY, SINCE IT HAD NOT BEEN FULLY CLEARED EVEN WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT. HE WANTED IT TO REMAIN BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS FOR THE TIME BEING. HE WOULD FIRST WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON THE TEXT. THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE FOR THE AMERICANS TO DISCUSS IT WITH THE ISRAELIS (WHICH WOULD NOT BE EASY) AND THEN WITH THE RUSSIANS.

3. OUR DISCUSSION CENTRED CHIEFLY ON OPERATIVE PARA 3 OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. WE SUGGESTED THE INSERTION BEFORE QUOTE FREEDOM OF TRANSIT UNQUOTE OF THE WORDS QUOTE FULL ENJOYMENT OF THE RIGHTS OF UNQUOTE, BUT GOLDBERG WAS DOUBTFUL ABOUT ANY SUCH ALTERATION. FIRSTLY, HE SAID THAT THE WORD GUARANTEE MEANT GUARANTEE OF THE ENJOYMENT OF THE RIGHTS OF TRANSIT, SECONDLY, HE WAS MOST RELUCTANT TO TAMPER WITH WORDS ALREADY AGREED WITH THE RUSSIANS. THE AMERICANS SAY THAT THE PRINCIPLE AFFIRMED IN OPERATIVE PARA 2 (B) PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR THE OPENING OF THE CANAL BUT GIVEN THE TORTUOUS HISTORY OF THE SUEZ CANAL THEY HAD DELIBERATELY INSERTED OPERATIVE PARA 3 AS AN EXTRA GUARANTEE. THE AMERICANS ARE SATISFIED THAT THE WORDING OF OPERATIVE PARA 3 DOES NOT LINK THE PROBLEMS OF THE CANAL AND OF REFUGEES.

/FOREIGN

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS ROUTINE MOSCOW 194, TEL AVIV 108 AND AMMAN 95.

SIR P. DEAN SENT 0450Z 9 AUGUST

RECD 0450Z 10 AUGUST

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

U.N.DEPT.

NNNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION 12 AUGUST 1967

CYPHER/CAT A

FROM IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 2587 DATED 9 AUGUST 1967

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2587 OF 9 AUGUST

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UK MIS NEW YORK MOSCOW TEL AVIV AND AMMAN

MY TELEGRAMS NO 2585 AND 2586: MIDDLE EAST: UNITED NATIONS.

DURING THIS MORNING'S MEETING MR. GOLDBERG SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH ON THE THEME THAT IT MIGHT WELL SERVE U.S./U.K. INTERESTS TO DO NOTHING AT ALL AND LET THE SITUATION WORK ITSELF OUT. MR. ROSTOW AND HIS STATE DEPARTMENT TEAM DID NOT SUPPORT HIM. THEY DID HOWEVER GIVE THE FOLLOWING REASONS WHY THEY JUDGED ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DIFFICULT IN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE WEEKS:

(A) THE RUSSIANS WILL WANT TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF THE ARAB SUMMIT;

(B) THE ISRAELIS ARE ACTIVE ON THEIR OWN ACCOUNT AND ARE CONFIDENT THAT THEY CAN CONTAIN ANY THREAT OF GUERILLA ACTIVITY;

(C) THE ARABS ARE STOCKTAKING;

(D) THE AMERICANS ARE CONVINCED THAT NO RESOLUTION SHOULD BE PUT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNTIL BROAD AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON IT AND CALCULATE THIS MUST TAKE SOME WEEKS.

2. AFTER LUNCHEON WE SET OUT IN RESTRICTED SESSION THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS FOR US OF THE CLOSURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL. THE AMERICANS EXPRESSED SOME UNDERSTANDING OF OUR REASONS FOR ATTACHING TOP PRIORITY TO GETTING THE CANAL OPEN. WE DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING A PARTIAL SOLUTION, GIVING PRIORITY TO THE CANAL.

/ THE AMERICANS

CONFIDENTIAL

THE AMERICANS, HOWEVER, ARGUED STRONGLY THAT NEITHER THE ARABS OR THE ISRAELIS WOULD ACCEPT THIS AND THEY THEREFORE THOUGHT IT IMPRACTICABLE.

3. IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT MR. GOLDBERG GAVE US HIS REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION. HE COMMENTED THAT THERE WERE GOOD TACTICAL REASONS FOR STICKING TO THE PAPER TO WHICH THE RUSSIANS WERE COMMITTED. MR. ROSTOW ADDED THAT THE AMERICANS CONSIDERED THE APPROACH THEY PROPOSE AS THE QUICKEST AND SUREST WAY TO SOLVE THE SUEZ PROBLEM. PARAS 1 AND 2 COVERING THE PRINCIPLES ARE BACKED BY SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE FREEDOM OF TRANSIT IN PARA 3. THE AMERICANS WOULD SUPPORT US IN URGING THAT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL CALLED FOR IN PARA 4. SHOULD MAKE THE OPENING OF THE CANAL A PRIORITY TASK. HAVING A UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE ACTIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST DURING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WOULD HELP TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION. THE AMERICAN TIME-TABLE IS, THEREFORE, TO AIM AT THE PASSAGE OF A COMPOSITE RESOLUTION IN ABOUT THE SECOND WEEK OF SEPTEMBER.

4. IT IS VERY SATISFACTORY THAT THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES WANT A RESOLUTION WHICH IMPROVES ON THE DOBRYNIN TEXT ADOPTED ON A TIME-TABLE SO CLOSE TO OUR OWN IDEAL. TO JUDGE BY THE DISCUSSION TODAY AND SIR L. GLASS'S RECENT TALK WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL (U.K.MIS. NEW YORK TELEGRAM 1908) I DO NOT THINK WE CAN HOPE FOR ANYTHING BETTER. I THEREFORE HOPE THAT YOU WILL AUTHORISE ME TO WELCOME THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AND THE PROCEDURE THE AMERICANS PROPOSE AND TO PROMISE OUR FULL SUPPORT.

5. GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS BY 10.00A.M. WASHINGTON TIME TOMORROW IF POSSIBLE.

F.O. PASS ROUTINE MOSCOW 195 TEL AVIV 109 AND AMMAN 96.

SIR P DEAN

SENT 0359Z/ 10 AUGUST

RECD 0359Z/ 10 AUGUST

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW & TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

U.N. DEPT.

PPPPP

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO. 8766 10 AUGUST 1967 (UP)

CONFIDENTIAL.

YOUR TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 2585, 2586 AND 2587 MIDDLE EAST: UNITED NATIONS.

WE SHALL NOT BE ABLE TO CONSULT THE SECRETARY OF STATE UNTIL THE WEEKEND, AND IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT YOUR TALKS ARE AD REFERENDUM. SUBJECT TO THIS, AND TO THE COMMENTS BELOW, WE AGREE THAT THE GENERAL LINE OF WHAT THE AMERICANS PROPOSE COMES AS CLOSE TO MEETING OUR REQUIREMENTS AS WE ARE LIKELY TO GET AT PRESENT.

2. AS REGARDS THE GOLDBERG TEXT, WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:
(A) THE INCLUSION OF PARAGRAPH 4 FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS CERTAINLY AN IMPROVEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR WISHES:
(B) NOTWITHSTANDING THE AMERICAN JUDGEMENT THAT THE WORDING OF PARAGRAPH 3 DOES NOT LINK THE PROBLEMS OF THE CANAL AND REFUGEES, AND THAT QUOTE GUARANTEE UNQUOTE MEANS QUOTE GUARANTEE THE ENJOYMENT OF THE RIGHTS OF TRANSIT UNQUOTE, WE STILL HAVE SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THIS FORMULATION. WE REGARD IT AS ESSENTIAL NOT TO EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF PROCEEDING STEP BY STEP. WE THEREFORE THINK THAT THE AMERICAN TEXT SHOULD BE ALTERED TO READ:-
QUOTE.....IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE BEGIN UNDERLINING APPROPRIATE AND JUST SOLUTIONS CEASE UNDERLINING OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM, IN PARTICULAR BRINGING TO AN END THE LONG DEFERRED ONE OF THE REFUGEES AND UNDERLINE FOLLOWING WORD ENSURING FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS UNQUOTE.

/ THESE CHANGES

THESE CHANGES WOULD REMOVE ANY POSSIBILITY OF INTERPRETING THE CLAUSE AS MEANING (I) THAT ALL ASPECTS MUST BE SETTLED AS PART OF A SINGLE PACKAGE: AND (II) THAT FREEDOM OF TRANSIT IS NOT AN ESTABLISHED LEGAL RIGHT IN THE PARTICULAR CASES INVOLVED UNTIL EITHER A GENERAL SETTLEMENT OR A PARTICULAR SETTLEMENT ON THIS POINT HAS BEEN REACHED. ALTHOUGH WE CAN UNDERSTAND GOLDBERG'S RELUCTANCE TO TAMPER WITH THE WORDS ALREADY AGREED WE THINK THAT THESE CHANGES ARE SUFFICIENTLY SMALL THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY ACCEPT THEM.

3. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE ASK THE AMERICANS TO INCORPORATE THESE SUGGESTIONS IN THE TEXT AND SAY THAT ON THAT BASIS WE SHOULD RECOMMEND IT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE. NEVERTHELESS, EVEN IF THIS IS THE ONLY PRACTICABLE MOVE AT THE PRESENT MOMENT, WE SHALL WISH TO KEEP OPEN AND UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER STEPS, WHETHER IN PARALLEL OR ALTERNATIVE, TO GET THE CANAL OPEN.

4. AS REGARDS PROCEDURE ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WE SHOULD PREFER NOT TO BE FULLY COMMITTED AT THIS STAGE E.G. TO JOINT LOBBYING OR SPONSORSHIP. WE ALSO QUESTION WHETHER THE AMERICANS ARE WISE AS A MATTER OF TACTICS TO CLEAR THE DRAFT WITH THE ISRAELIS BEFORE SHOWING IT TO THE RUSSIANS.

SOSFA SENT 1.31OZ 10 AUGUST

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. U.N.D.
EASTERN DEPT.
N.E.A.D.

C.O. M.E.W. AND U.N.D.

file

CONFIDENTIAL

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION - 12 AUGUST 1967

CYPHER/CAT. A

PRIORITY WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO. 2601 10 AUGUST 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2601 OF 10 AUGUST
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMISSION NEW YORK, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV AND AMMAN.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 8766 MIDDLE EAST: UNITED NATIONS.
THANK YOU FOR THESE PROMPT INSTRUCTIONS.

2. AT OUR MEETING THIS MORNING, I PUT THE AMENDMENTS IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 2(B) TO MR. GOLDBERG. HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD GIVE THE AMERICANS NO DIFFICULTY. HOWEVER, SPEAKING AS A PROFESSIONAL JURIST HE STILL THINKS THAT "ENSURING" IS LESS STRONG THAN "GUARANTEEING" (WHICH HAS AN ELEMENT OF ADDITIONAL OBLIGATION) AND ASKED US TO CONSIDER THIS CHANGE AGAIN. HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD THINK THAT THE REFERENCE TO "JUST SOLUTIONS" WEAKENED THE TEXT, SINCE THEY DISLIKE THE IDEA OF ANY PARTIAL SOLUTION.

3. REVERTING TO THE CANAL, MR. GOLDBERG SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED TO RULE OUT ANY POSSIBILITY OF A SELECTIVE OPENING OF THE CANAL, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE, IT APPEARS, ALREADY PUT FORWARD A SUGGESTION BY WHICH IT MIGHT BE OPEN BY STAGES, THE FIRST OF WHICH WOULD MEAN THAT IT WAS OPEN TO ALL EXCEPT ISRAEL, THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM. PERHAPS, HE SAID, WE NEEDED A PROTOCOL TO STRENGTHEN THE CONSTANTINOPLE CONVENTION:

4. MR. GOLDBERG TOLD US OF THE FOLLOWING AMENDMENT WHICH THE AMERICANS HAVE MADE TO THEIR TEXT. THE ORDER OF THE FIRST AND SECOND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS IS REVERSED AND THE NEW FIRST PARAGRAPH BEGINS "BEARING IN MIND RESOLUTION 2256 ADOPTED AT THE FIFTH EMERGENCY SESSION...". THE REASONING BEHIND THIS IS THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WILL FOLLOW THAT ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH ITSELF REFERS TO THE PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS AND PROPOSALS. THE NEW SECOND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH THUS CONFIRMS THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS DONE WHAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAD ASKED IT TO DO. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THESE WERE IMPROVEMENTS.

5. AS A RESULT OF THE PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT OF OUR TALKS, THE ISRAELIS LAST NIGHT ASKED THE AMERICANS WHETHER WE WERE DISCUSSING TEXTS. MR. GOLDBERG THEREFORE GAVE THEM THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (AS AMENDED IN MY PRECEDING PARAGRAPH) BEFORE OUR MEETING TODAY. HE ASKS, HOWEVER, THAT IT SHOULD STILL REMAIN

/STRICTLY

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL BETWEEN OURSELVES, THE ISRAELIS AND THE AMERICANS.

6. THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT YET CONSIDERED SPONSORSHIP BUT MR. GOLDBERG THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE BEST IF THIS WERE BROADLY BASED AND COMPRISED NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT WAS NOT HIS IDEA THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PROPOSE THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT BE PREPARED TO DO SO IF NO OTHER SPONSORS COULD BE FOUND. THEY WOULD WANT THE SPONSORSHIP TO BE SUCH AS TO ENSURE THE PASSAGE OF THE RESOLUTION. THE QUESTION OF BRITISH SPONSORSHIP IS THEREFORE NOT LIKELY TO ARISE. BUT, IN THE LIGHT OF SENSITIVITY SHOWN YESTERDAY BY MR. GOLDBERG ABOUT OUR SUPPOSED INACTIVITY ON THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION, THE AMERICANS WOULD CLEARLY TAKE IT AMISS IF WE FAIL TO LOBBY MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THEIR RESOLUTION IF IT IS TABLED.

7. WE SAID THAT WE WOULD SEEK CLEARANCE OF THE AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION DURING THE WEEKEND AND IT WAS AGREED THAT WE AND THE AMERICANS WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 196 TEL AVIV 110 AMMAN 97.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT 0210Z/11 AUGUST 1967
RECD 0210Z/11 AUGUST 1967

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

U.N. DEPT.

SSSSS

file

EN CLAIR
ROUTINE UK MISSION NEW YORK

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1955

DATED 11 AUGUST 1967.

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 1955 OF 11 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, AMMAN AND SAVING TO CAIRO JERUSALEM AND BEIRUT.

OBSERVATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS ISSUED A REPORT (S/8053 ADD/1 OF 10 AUGUST 1967, COPIES BY BAG) ON THE OBSERVATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE SUEZ CANAL SECTOR COVERING THE PERIOD FROM 11 JULY TO 5 AUGUST 1967. AFTER OUTLINING THE EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE STATIONING OF THE U.N. OBSERVERS ON THE BANKS OF THE CANAL HE GIVES THE PRESENT POSITION. THIS IS THAT THERE ARE NOW 16 MILITARY OBSERVERS ON EACH BANK OF THE CANAL OCCUPYING THREE OBSERVATION POSTS ON THE WESTERN SIDE, AND FOUR OBSERVATION POSTS ON THE EASTERN SIDE, WITH CONTROL HEADQUARTERS AT ISMAILIA AND EL QANTARA. THE OBSERVERS ARE ALLOWED TO MOVE FREELY UP AND DOWN THE CANAL BANKS. THEIR COMMUNICATION PROBLEM, HOWEVER, HAS ONLY BEEN PARTIALLY RESOLVED, IN THAT THE CONTROL CENTRE ON EACH BANK MUST REPORT INDIVIDUALLY TO HEADQUARTERS UNTSO, AND OBSERVERS ON ONE SIDE MAY NOT COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH OBSERVERS ON THE OTHER. ONLY THE TWO CONTROL CENTRES MAY IN AN EMERGENCY COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER DIRECTLY. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL RIGHTLY POINTS TO THIS AS AN UNNECESSARY HANDICAP ON THE FUNCTIONING OF HIS OBSERVERS.

2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL STATES THAT HE HAS BEEN ADVISED BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF UNTSO THAT THE PRESENT NUMBER OF MILITARY OBSERVERS IS INSUFFICIENT AND HE IS THEREFORE PROPOSING TO SECURE URGENTLY, ON THE SAME TEMPORARY BASIS AS THE ORIGINAL TWENTY FIVE, THE SERVICES OF AN ADDITIONAL TWENTY ONE OBSERVERS. THIS WILL MEAN THAT THE OBSERVATION IN THE SUEZ CANAL SECTOR WILL BE CARRIED OUT

/BY

6. FINALLY, MR. ANUG SPOKE BRIEFLY ABOUT VISITS OF M.P.S TO THE MIDDLE EAST. HE KNEW THAT WE WERE ADVISING M.P.S VISITING ISRAEL TO SEE SOMETHING OF JORDAN AND THE ARAB SIDE AS WELL. HE HOPED THAT WE WERE GIVING SIMILAR ADVICE TO M.P.S GOING TO ARAB COUNTRIES ABOUT THE NEED TO LEARN SOMETHING ABOUT ISRAEL AT FIRST HAND. MR. THOMSON ASSURED HIM THAT WE WERE DOING THIS. MR. ANUG ASKED WHETHER THE OCCASION COULD NOT BE TAKEN TO STOP THE FARCE OF A SEPARATE PASSPORT FOR ISRAEL. IF IT WAS IN JORDAN'S INTEREST THAT M.P.S SHOULD LEARN SOMETHING OF THEIR CASE, THEY MUST SURELY BE EXPECTED TO AGREE TO WELCOME THEM EVEN WITH PASSPORTS INCLUDING ISRAEL STAMPS. MR. THOMSON SAID THAT THE MOMENT WAS NOT OPPORTUNE FOR TRYING THIS ON: THE ARAB CAPACITY FOR CUTTING OFF THEIR NOSES TO SPITE THEIR FACES WAS ALMOST LIMITLESS

SCS FA SENT 2006Z/17 AUGUST

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
N.E.A.D.
U.N.D.
GENERAL DEPT.
D.D. & P.U.S.D.
ARABIAN DEPT.
OIL DEPT.
C.O. M.E.W. & U.N.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

TELNO 1808 17 AUGUST, 1967 (E)

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO. 1808 OF 17 AUGUST AND TO AMMAN
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW
SAVING TO CAIRO BEIRUT

THE ISRAEL MINISTER (THE AMBASSADOR HAD ONLY JUST RETURNED FROM ISRAEL) CALLED ON MR. THOMSON YESTERDAY TO DISCUSS THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION GENERALLY. HE SAID THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT TO PROBE H.M.G.'S POSITION ON THE NEXT STAGE AT THE UNITED NATIONS. HE EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN ABOUT THE AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION (A COPY OF WHICH HE HAD WITH HIM) ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT DEMANDED IMMEDIATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND OFFERED VERY LITTLE IN RETURN. ISRAEL'S IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH HER RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY. ISRAEL WOULD PREFER TO LET MATTERS TAKE THEIR COURSE SO THAT THE ARAB COUNTRIES WERE FORCED TO FACE THE FACTS OF THE SITUATION, AND TO RECOGNISE THAT THEY COULD NOT ACHIEVE ANY CHANGE IN IT EXCEPT BY NEGOTIATING WITH ISRAEL. IF THERE HAD TO BE A RESOLUTION, ISRAEL WOULD PREFER SOMETHING MUCH SHORTER, DEALING ONLY WITH THE APPOINTMENT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF A REPRESENTATIVE TO GO TO THE AREA.

2. MR. THOMSON SAID THAT IN OUR VIEW IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO HOPE FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES. THE ONLY HOPE FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT LAY IN USING THE MACHINERY OF THE U.N. AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS DEPENDED ON A MEASURE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PRESENT DRAFT SEEMED THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE THAT COULD BE DEVISED AND H.M.G. SUPPORTED IT. MR. ANUG ARGUED THAT THERE WAS NO REAL COMMUNITY OF INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION AND THAT ONLY THE RUSSIANS WERE LIKELY TO GAIN FROM ENDING THE PRESSURES ON THE ARABS INHERENT IN ALLOWING THE PRESENT SITUATION TO CONTINUE. THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT IF WE DID NOT HURRY MATTERS, THE EGYPTIANS WOULD THEMSELVES OPEN THE SUEZ CANAL. THE ONLY

HELPFUL ROLE FOR THE U.N. WOULD BE TO BRING ABOUT CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. MR. THOMSON POINTED OUT THAT THE CLOSURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL PRESENTED A GRAVE PROBLEM FOR US AND THAT WE MUST PURSUE OUR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS AS WE THOUGHT FIT TO SECURE ITS EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPENING.

3. MR. ANUG THEN TURNED TO JERUSALEM. HE SAID THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD CERTAINLY SEE TO IT THAT THIS QUESTION CAME UP AGAIN IN THE U.N. THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW FAR H.M.G. WOULD GO IN PURSUING THEIR PRESENT COURSE ON JERUSALEM AND, IN PARTICULAR, WHETHER THE U.K. WOULD SUPPORT SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL ON THIS ISSUE IF ANY ARAB STATE WERE TO CALL FOR THIS STEP. MR. THOMSON SAID THAT CONSIDERATION HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN TO THIS VERY HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION AND HE COULD NOT, THEREFORE, GIVE ANY ADVANCE COMMITMENT ABOUT H.M.G.'S ATTITUDE. HE ADDED THAT THE MORE WE SAW OF DEVELOPMENTS OVER JERUSALEM, THE MORE WE THOUGHT ISRAEL WAS ILL-ADVISED IN THE ACTIONS TAKEN. OUR ATTITUDE ON JERUSALEM WAS NOT, AS ISRAELIS SOMETIMES SUGGESTED, BASED ON TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF IMPROVING OUR POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD: IT WAS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE FOR US. WHILE WE UNDERSTOOD THE DEPTH OF ISRAELI FEELINGS ABOUT JERUSALEM, WE BELIEVED THAT STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ISSUE WAS NOT NEGOTIABLE WERE A VERY REAL OBSTACLE TO ANY POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT NEGOTIATION WITH THE ARABS. IN PARTICULAR, THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT ISRAEL'S HARD POSITION ON JERUSALEM HAD MADE MUCH MORE REMOTE ANY POSSIBILITY THAT KING HUSSEIN MIGHT HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL. RECENT ISRAELI STATEMENTS PARTICULARLY THOSE OF GENERAL DAYAN AND MR. ALLON, HAD CREATED THE IMPRESSION THAT ISRAEL WAS DETERMINED TO HANG ON TO THE FRONTIERS SEIZED BY MILITARY ACTION.

IF THEIR VIEWS REALLY REPRESENTED THOSE OF THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT, THIS COULD CREATE A SERIOUS CRISIS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER FRIENDS. AS REGARDS SANCTIONS, THE U.K. WAS IN GENERAL AGAINST THIS FORM OF ACTION, EXCEPT IN VERY SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES AS IN RHODESIA. AS MR. ANUG KNEW, WE HAD RESOLUTELY RESISTED THE APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS TO SOUTH AFRICA, MUCH AS WE DETESTED APARTHEID.

4. MR. ANUG SAID THAT ONLY STATEMENTS FROM MR. ESHKOL AND MR. EBAN WERE AUTHORITATIVE ON THE QUESTION OF FRONTIERS. MR. EBAN HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT NEW FRONTIERS WOULD HAVE TO EMERGE FROM THE GIVE AND TAKE OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT UNTIL SUCH NEGOTIATIONS HAD TAKEN PLACE, ISRAEL WOULD STAY WHERE SHE WAS. REVERTING TO THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM, MR. ANUG ASKED WHETHER HE COULD TAKE IT THAT THE BRITISH DELEGATION WOULD NOT SUPPORT A SPECIAL DEBATE ON JERUSALEM. MR. THOMSON REPLIED THAT H.M.G. HAD NO REASON OR WISH TO EXPLOIT THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM IN A WAY HARMFUL TO ISRAEL. HE REITERATED, HOWEVER, THAT OUR VIEW ON THIS ISSUE WAS BASED ON PRINCIPLE.

5. THE CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO THE REFUGEE QUESTION. MR. ANUG CONFIRMED THAT 31 AUGUST WAS AT PRESENT THE FINAL DATE FOR THE ACTUAL RETURN OF THE REFUGEES AND NOT SIMPLY FOR THE RECEIPT OF APPLICATIONS. HE SAID THAT THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT DESERVED SOME PRAISE FOR STILL GOING AHEAD WITH RETURN PLANS DESPITE THE VERY UNFAVOURABLE CLIMATE CREATED BY JORDANIAN ATTACKS ON ISRAEL AND REFERENCES TO THE REFUGEES RETURNING TO CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE. FOR A DAY OR TWO THERE HAD BEEN SOME LET-UP IN THESE ATTACKS BUT THEY HAD NOW BEEN RENEWED. IF THEY CONTINUED, THERE WAS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF ANY CHANGE IN THE TERMINAL DATE. IF, HOWEVER, CURRENT JORDANIAN PROVOCATION AND INCITEMENT CEASED, MR. ANUG HAD LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT WOULD BE READY TO BE MORE ELASTIC ABOUT THE DATE. MR. ANUG SAID THAT IN GENERAL THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT WERE NOT WORRIED ABOUT THE RETURN OF REFUGEES FROM JORDAN, PROVIDED THAY EXCLUDED KNOWN SECURITY RISKS, BECAUSE THEY KNEW THAT THESE PEOPLE WERE VERY DISSATISFIED WITH THE WAY THEY HAD BEEN TREATED IN JORDAN.

(PROVIDED HE SEES NO OBJECTION, H.M. AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN SHOULD REPRESENT URGENTLY TO KING HUSSEIN THE NEED TO AVOID VERBAL INCITEMENT OF A KIND CALCULATED TO MAKE THE ISRAELIES RIGID OVER THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR REFUGEE RETURN. WE REALISE THE PRESSURES UNDER WHICH HE IS ACTING BUT IT CANNOT BE IN HIS INTERESTS TO GIVE THE ISRAELIS AN EXCUSE TO LEAVE HIM HAVING TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE NEW REFUGEES).

/6.

BY FORTY SIX TEMPORARY OBSERVERS AND FOUR REGULAR UNTSO OBSERVERS.
3. HE NEXT DEALS WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE MOVEMENT OF BOATS IN THE SUEZ CANAL, OUTLINING GENERAL BULL'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE U.A.R. AND ISRAELI AUTHORITIES WHICH LED TO THE ACCEPTANCE BY BOTH PARTIES OF AN AGREEMENT NOT TO ALLOW ANY MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE SUEZ CANAL (INCLUDING THE MOVEMENT INTO THE CANAL OF BOATS AND CRAFT) FOR A PERIOD OF ONE MONTH BEGINNING ON 27 JULY 1967 AT Ø8ØØ HOURS G.M.T. EXEMPTED FROM THIS AGREEMENT ARE VESSELS BELONGING TO COMMERCIAL FIRMS WHICH PROVIDE SUPPLIES TO THE SHIPS STRANDED IN THE CANAL AND THOSE WHICH INSURE THEIR SAFETY. ALL OF THESE ARE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE CANAL AUTHORITIES.

F.O. PASS TELAVIV 366, AMMAN 236 AND SAVING TO JERUSALEM 23, BEIRUT 82 AND CAIRO 132.

SIR L. GLASS

DESP. 1954Z 11 AUGUST 1967.
RECD. 2Ø17Z 11 AUGUST 1967.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

U.N.DEPT.

NNNNN

RV

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 9032 17 AUGUST, 1967 (E)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 9032 OF 17 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV AMMAN UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW AND SAVING TO BEIRUT AND CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM NO 1808 TO TEL AVIV: ISRAEL MINISTER'S CALL ON MR THOMSON.

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY HAVE NOW GIVEN US AN ACCOUNT OF ISRAELI REACTIONS, CONVEYED TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV, TO THE PROPOSED DRAFT RESOLUTION. THEIR ACCOUNT COINCIDES IN THE MAIN WITH WHAT MR ANUG SAID TO MR THOMSON HERE, WITH SOME DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE ISRAELIS EXPRESSED STRONG OBJECTION TO THE PHRASE ''THE INADMISSABILITY OF THE CONQUEST OF TERRITORY BY WAR'' ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY HAD EVERY RIGHT TO HOLD ON TO THE TERRITORY THEY HAD OCCUPIED UNTIL SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE TO GUARANTEE THEIR SECURITY:

(B) THEY OBJECTED SPECIFICALLY TO THE REFERENCE IN THE DRAFT TO ''A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE'' ON THE GROUNDS THAT A U N PRESENCE ONLY SERVED AS AN OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS:

(C) THEY WERE NOT PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN AN INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE OF THEIR FRONTIERS SINCE THEY WERE NOW FULLY ABLE TO LOOK AFTER THEIR OWN SECURITY:

(D) THEY DID NOT SAY, AS ANUG SAID TO MR THOMSON, THAT THEY WOULD PREFER NO U N RESOLUTION AT THE PRESENT TIME, BUT EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE U S WOULD GO BACK TO THE ORIGINAL AMERICAN RESOLUTION OF JUNE INCLUDING PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FIVE POINTS.

(E) THEY DID NOT REGARD THE APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR AS APPROPRIATE

/AT

AT THE PRESENT TIME, THOUGH THEY THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE SCOPE FOR SUCH AN APPOINTMENT AFTER THE FORTHCOMING U N DISCUSSIONS, PROVIDED THAT THE MEDIATOR WAS NOT TIED BY SPECIFIC TERMS OF REFERENCE.

2. ALTHOUGH THERE MAY HAVE BEEN THESE DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS, BOTH ACCOUNTS SUGGEST THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL STONGLY RESIST ALL ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN THEIR APPROVAL FOR A RESOLUTION ON THE LINES PROPOSED. THE BALL NOW, THEREFORE, SEEMS TO BE FIRMLY IN THE AMERICAN COURT.

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET]

SOSFA SENT 2155Z/17 AUGUST

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
U.N.D.
N.E.A.D.
D.D. & P.U.S.D.
C.O. M.E.W. & U.N.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT.A.

FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON.

TELNO.9062 18 AUGUST 1967 (E)

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 9062 OF 18 AUGUST AND TO
U.K. MISSION, NEW YORK.
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV, AMMAN, MOSCOW.

MY TELEGRAMS NOS. 1808 TO TEL AVIV AND 9032 TO WASHINGTON

MIDDLE EAST: UNITED NATIONS.
THE ISRAELI RESPONSE APPEARS TO BE ENTIRELY NEGATIVE. IF THIS IS CONFIRMED BY REPORTS GIVEN YOU BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT OR U.S. MISSION, YOU HAVE AUTHORITY TO SAY THAT YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO URGE THAT THEY BE FIRM WITH THE ISRAELIS. ISRAELI POSITION SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO HOLD UP NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PRESENT DRAFT RESOLUTION, STILL LESS TO WATER DOWN THE TEXT AGREED EARLIER WITH THE RUSSIANS. MR. GOLDBERG HIMSELF COMMENTED LAST WEEK THAT PRESSURE HAD NOT YET BEEN APPLIED TO ISRAEL: THIS SEEMS TO BE THE TIME TO BEGIN

SOSFA SENT 1500 18 AUGUST 1967

FO/CO/WH/DISTRIBUTION:

EASTERN DEPT.

VVVVV

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

Cypher/Cat A
PRIORITY CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 832 18 August, 1967
RESTRICTED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 832 of 18 August
Repeated for information Saving to:- Washington, Moscow, Paris and certain Arab Posts.

Tito Visit.

Following is our translation of text of substantive joint statement issued here last night.

(a) The two Presidents exchanged points of view on the crisis in Middle East and internal situation. Discussions also took on questions appertaining to the development of relations and cooperation between the two countries in all fields. The two sides paid particular attention to the efforts being made to remove the traces of Israeli aggression against Arab States and both sides affirm that situation arising from aggression is a matter which cannot (repeat cannot) be permitted to continue and constitutes a serious violation of the rights, interests and integrity of Arab States and a direct threat to peace in Middle East and in the World. They also affirmed that it is not (repeat not) possible to arrive at a solution of this crisis except by respecting the rights and just interests of Arab peoples. The two sides especially affirm that interests of the peace and freedom loving States cannot (repeat cannot) permit the creation of a dangerous precedent which permits an aggressor to enjoy the fruits of his aggression and in this respect the two sides consider that United Nations should be required to face up to the grave challenge which will have a special effect on the future of the role played by the non-aligned and other progressive and peace loving States who are facing in this crisis a serious test.

The two sides affirm the necessity for help to the States to enable them to compensate for the losses resulting from the war and to consolidate their economic and defensive strength in order to be able to resist any further attempt at aggression.

The two sides discussed the positive measures which must be taken to this effect on the bilateral and multilateral levels.

/The

The two sides consider that these discussions constitute a new major contribution towards the mutual understanding and sincere friendship which binds the two countries. The discussions will strengthen the joint efforts which the two sides are making to participate with nonaligned and peace loving States on behalf of the just cause of Arab States and the freedom and independence of their peoples and towards peace and progress in the World.

President Josip Broz Tito has invited President Gamel Abdel Nasser to visit Yugoslavia. President Gamel Abdel Nasser has accepted the invitation with thanks.

Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington 25, Moscow 26, Paris 26 and certain Arab Posts.

Mr. Tesh Sent 1015Z 18 August, 1967

Recd 1359Z 18 August, 1967

[Repetition to Arab Posts referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts].

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

Northern Dept

bbbbb

file

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT 'A'
PRIORITY WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 2707 19 AUGUST 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2707 OF 19 AUGUST
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV AND
UKMIS NEW YORK.
YOUR TEL. 9062 MIDDLE EAST: UNITED NATIONS.
AFTER THE MINISTER HAD GIVEN AN ACCOUNT OF MR. THOMSON'S DISCUSSION
WITH THE ISRAELI MINISTER IN LONDON (YOUR TEL. 1808) TO POPPER
AND DAVIES, THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT UNDER-SECRETARIES FOR UNITED
NATIONS AND NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS RESPECTIVELY IN THE STATE
DEPARTMENT, POPPER OUTLINED THE LATEST AMERICAN EXCHANGES WITH
THE ISRAELIS.
2. BITAN IN HIS RECENT TALK WITH AMBASSADOR BARBOUR IN TEL AVIV
(YOUR TELEGRAM 9032) HAD APPARENTLY BEEN VERY NEGATIVE AND
TRUCULENT. AT A FURTHER MEETING WITH EVRON AND RAFAEL IN THE
STATE DEPARTMENT ON 17 AUGUST MR. GOLDBERG HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT
THE ISRAELI RESPONSE AS CONVEYED BY BITAN WAS SCARCELY
ACCEPTABLE.
3. AT THIS MEETING THE ISRAELIS COVERED MUCH THE SAME GROUND
WITH THE AMERICANS AS ANUG WITH MR. THOMSON, EXCEPT THAT THERE WAS
NO REFERENCE TO JERUSALEM AND THE QUESTION OF A U.N. MEDIATOR WAS
LITTLE DISCUSSED ALTHOUGH THE ISRAELIS DID INSIST THAT HE SHOULD
NOT BE GIVEN ANY TERMS OF REFERENCE.
4. THE ISRAELIS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY THOROUGHLY DISLIKED THE
PROPOSED DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH THEY REGARDED AS A FUNDAMENTAL
DEPARTURE FROM THE PRESIDENT'S FIVE POINTS OF JUNE 20. FOR THEM THE
KEY POINT WAS THE RECOGNITION OF THEIR ESTABLISHED FRONTIERS.
THEY WERE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW TO PREVIOUSLY NEGOTIATED LINES, BUT
THERE WOULD BE NO WITHDRAWAL IN ADVANCE OF OR WITHOUT A NEGOTIATED
PEACE SETTLEMENT AND UNLESS THEY COULD NEGOTIATE DIRECT WITH
THE ARABS THEY WOULD SIT TIGHT. THEY DID NOT WISH TO GO IT ALONE
BUT WOULD DO SO IF NECESSARY: IN THIS CONTEXT RAFAEL USED THE PHRASE
/QUOTE DIGGING

CONFIDENTIAL

QUOTE DIGGING IN FOR PEACE UNQUOTE . HE SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS REGARDED THEMSELVES AS FULLY JUSTIFIED IN HANGING ON TO TERRITORY THEY HAD ACQUIRED IN RESISTANCE TO AGGRESSION UNTIL THERE WAS A PEACE SETTLEMENT WHICH MET THEIR ESSENTIAL SECURITY NEEDS. POPPER COMMENTED THAT THE ISRAELIS SEEMED TO BE READY TO SIT TIGHT FOR YEARS.

5. GOLDBERG AND GENE ROSTOW TOOK A STRONG LINE WITH THE ISRAELIS, BUT APPARENTLY WITH LITTLE SUCCESS. THEY REAFFIRMED THE AMERICAN ADHERENCE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FIVE POINTS, DENIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY DEPARTURE FROM THEM OR FROM THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES IN THE 19 JUNE AMERICAN RESOLUTION AND SAID THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION NOW PROPOSED OFFERED THE BEST HOPE OF PROGRESS. THEY STRONGLY DISPUTED THE ISRAELI THESIS THAT, IF THEY SAT TIGHT, EVENTS WOULD NECESSARILY MOVE IN THEIR FAVOUR AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE WEAKENING OF BOTH THE SOVIET AND NASSER'S POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IN PARTICULAR GOLDBERG ASKED THEM NOT TO UNDER-ESTIMATE THE CAPACITY OF THE RUSSIANS TO ENLARGE THEIR FOOTHOLD IN THE ARAB WORLD TO THE DETRIMENT OF ISRAEL OR SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO SHORE UP NASSER ECONOMICALLY AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. HE ALSO DISPUTED THE ISRAELI VIEW THAT THE ONLY ROAD TO PEACE LAY THROUGH DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES.

6. THE AMERICANS HOPE TO RENEW THE DISCUSSION WITH THE ISRAELIS IN THE WEEK BEGINNING 28 AUGUST. THEY REJECT THE BASIC ISRAELI CONTENTION THAT A FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATED DIRECTLY WITH THE ARABS IS THE ONLY SOLUTION AND THEY SEEM DETERMINED TO PURSUE THE POLICY AGREED WITH US AND IN PARTICULAR TO GET THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL IF THEY CAN.
AT THE NEXT MEETING THEY INTEND TO GO THROUGH THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WITH THE ISRAELIS PHRASE BY PHRASE. THEY THINK THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE NOT SAID THEIR LAST WORD AND THAT IN THE INTERVENING PERIOD THEIR TRUCULENCE MAY HAVE SUBSIDED, AND THEY HOPE THAT GOLDBERG'S REPRESENTATIONS TO RAFAEL AND EVRON WILL HAVE HAD TIME TO SINK IN. POPPER THOUGHT IT MIGHT THEN BE POSSIBLE TO QUOTE DRAG THE ISRAELIS KICKING AND SCREAMING UNQUOTE IN THE DIRECTION OF

/ACTION

ACTION AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

7. THE AMERICANS NEEDED NO ENCOURAGEMENT FROM US TO BE TOUGH WITH THE ISRAELIS. THEY ARE RESENTFUL AT THE TRUCULENT ISRAELI ATTITUDE AND THEY ARE CLEARLY NETTLED BY THE INITIAL ISRAELI REACTION TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. THEY BLAME THE ISRAELIS FOR LEAKING THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AGREED AT OUR RECENT TALKS AND REGARD THIS AS AN ATTEMPT TO SABOTAGE THE WHOLE OPERATION. THEY ALSO FEEL STRONGLY ABOUT THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE JEWISH LOBBY HERE AND ABOUT OFFICIALLY INSPIRED ATTACKS IN THE ISRAELI PRESS ON THE STATE DEPARTMENT, WHO ARE ACCUSED OF DEFENDING NARROW SECTIONAL INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY CERTAINLY SEEM IN NO MOOD TO ALTER THEIR PRESENT STAND, WHICH THEY ARE CONVINCED IS RIGHT. THEY THEREFORE INTEND TO GO ON TAKING A STRONG LINE WITH THE ISRAELIS. THEY ASSURED US THAT THIS GOES FOR GOLDBERG TOO. TOMKINS ASKED WHAT PRESSURES COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE ISRAELIS, BUT NEITHER POPPER NOR DAVIES HAD ANYTHING TO SUGGEST EXCEPT REFUSAL TO SUPPLY ARMS. ECONOMIC PRESSURES WOULD BE NULLIFIED, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM, BY THE HUGE SUMS OF MONEY RAISED BY THE JEWS IN THIS COUNTRY. THEY SEEM TO SEE NO OTHER COURSE BUT TO GO ON DOING WHAT THEY ARE DOING.

8. POPPER CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER WORD FROM THE RUSSIANS SINCE THE EXCHANGES WITH DOBRYNIN.

F O PASS PRIORITY TO AMMAN 104, MOSCOW 205 AND TEL AVIV 116.

SIR P. DEAN GRS 800 SENT 1714Z/19
RECD 1714Z/19

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POST]

DJE

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

EASTERN DEPT.

SSSSS

File

4

SECRET - GUARD

✓

CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2728 22 AUGUST
SECRET
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2728 OF 22 AUGUST
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO BELGRADE, CAIRO AND UKMIS
NEW YORK.
GUARD
TITO'S VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST.
DON BERGUS NOW IN CHARGE OF THE U.S. INTERESTS SECTION IN CAIRO, HAS HAD AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE U.A.R. FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE EFFECT THAT TITO HAD A QUOTE PRAGMATIC PLATFORM UNQUOTE FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WHICH HE WOULD BE CONVEYING TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON. THE MAIN POINTS IN IT WERE:
(I) THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES:
(II) THE RESTORATION OF U.N.E.F.:
(III) A FOUR-POWER GUARANTEE, PREFERABLY THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL, OF THE BORDERS BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL.
2. ACCORDING TO THE MINISTER'S MESSAGE THE EGYPTIANS HAD RESERVATIONS, PRINCIPALLY REGARDING REFUGEES AND SUEZ, BUT TO PROVE THEIR PEACEFUL INTENTIONS THEY WOULD EXPLORE TITO'S PROPOSALS EVEN THOUGH THIS WOULD CAUSE THEM PROBLEMS WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE ALGERIANS. THE MESSAGE REITERATED AN EARLIER ASSURANCE GIVEN TO BERGUS ON 14 AUGUST THAT THE U.A.R. WAS WORKING FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE YEMEN AND SOUTH ARABIAN PROBLEMS.
3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT VIEW ALL THIS WITH SOME SCEPTICISM FOR THE MOMENT. THEY CONFIRM THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS NOT YET RECEIVED THE LETTER FROM TITO TO WHICH AL AHRAM REFERRED ON 16 AUGUST.
F O PASS SAVING BELGRADE 7 AND CAIRO 21
SIR P DEAN

SENT AT 22/2346Z AUG
RECD AT 22/2346Z AUG

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

SSSSS

SECRET - GUARD

En Clair

TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 988 4 September, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.988 of 4 September, Repeated for information to Amman, Benghazi, Bahrain, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Tripoli, Rabat, Tunis, Cairo, Algiers, Beirut, HC Aden, Washington and UKMIS New York.

Khartoum telegram No.493 of 2 September.

Arab Summit Conference.

After the Cabinet Meeting on Sunday, 3 September, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol issued the following statement commenting [? gp omitted] the Arab Summit Conference:

"After the war and the beginning of the cease-fire, the Israel Government announced its wish to come to peaceful terms with the Arab States and its readiness to open negotiations with its neighbours without delay. This announcement of the Israel Government had no response from the Arab Rulers. Now that the Arab Heads of State have convened at Khartoum, they have announced that they are resolved not to come to peaceful terms with Israel. They have also decided not to recognize the fact of our existence or to open negotiations with us. This irresponsible decision ignores the true interests of the people of the Middle East and runs counter to the principles of the United Nations Charter".

"The Government of Israel points to this grave fact which delays the prospect of peace in the area and notes the political and security implications involved".

"This stand of the Arab Heads of State reinforces the Israel Government's decision not to permit the return of such conditions that enable our enemies to undermine our security and to plot against our sovereignty and existence".

"Israel will not refrain from efforts to come to peaceful terms with its neighbours. We will be strict regarding the execution of procedures agreed upon in the cease-fire resolutions".

"In the face of the aggressive intentions of the Arab Rulers who refuse to negotiate peace with us, we will hold firm to our positions which are of vital importance to the security and undisturbed development of Israel".

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1055Z/4 September
Recd 1350Z/4 September

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
Eastern Dept.

88888

CYPHER CAT A.
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO 2739

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
23 AUGUST 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDSD TO F O TELNO 2739 OF 23 AUGUST REPTD FOR INFMN PRIORITY TO UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO AND MOSCOW AND SAVING TO UKDIS GENEVA.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO 9193: MIDDLE EAST AND U.N.
FOLLOWING FROM TOMKINS.
I SPOKE TO GENE ROSTOW THIS MORNING. HE CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FURTHER EXCHANGES WITH THE RUSSIANS. I EXPLAINED THAT YOU WERE BEGINNING TO FEEL SOME CONCERN AT THE LACK OF PROGRESS. NEARLY A MONTH HAD GONE BY SINCE KOHLER HAD SEEN DOBRYNIN AND TIME WAS BEGINNING TO GET SHORT IF ACTION WAS TO BE TAKEN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MET. WE STILL HAD NOTHING FIRM ON WHICH TO BASE OUR PLANS AND WE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL TO FIND OUT WHAT THE PRESENT RUSSIANS POSITION WAS. SO LONG AS WE WERE UNCERTAIN ABOUT THIS THERE WAS LITTLE POINT IN DISCUSSING THE U.N. ASPECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION IN THE NATO COUNCIL AS THE AMERICANS HAD SUGGESTED.
2. ROSTOW SAID THAT HE QUITE UNDERSTOOD OUR WORRIES AND INDEED SHARED THEM., BUT HE ADDED THAT OPINION IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS DIVIDED. THE SOVIET EXPERTS IN PARTICULAR FELT THAT FOR TACTICAL REASONS IT WAS DESIREABLE NOT TO DISPLAY TOO MUCH ANXIETY TO MAKE PROGRESS OR CONCERN AT DELAY. THEY FELT THAT SINCE BREZHNEV AND KOSYGIN WERE BACK IN MOSCOW SOME RUSSIAN MOVE WAS TO BE EXPECTED FAIRLY SOON. ROSTOW ALSO SAID THAT TITO HAD BEEN TOLD IN GENERAL TERMS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION WHICH THE AMERICANS HOPED COULD BE PUT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND SO HAD THE INDIANS AND THE LEBANESE. IT WAS THEREFORE FAIRLY WIDELY KNOWN THAT THE AMERICANS WERE PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS OF AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AS WORKED OUT AT THE END OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL

/ASSEMBLY

ASSEMBLY. IT WAS THE AMERICAN HOPE THAT AS TIME WENT BY IT WOULD BE PROGRESSIVELY MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE RUSSIANS TO DRAW BACK FROM THEIR POSITION, ESPECIALLY AS THE ONUS OF REPUDIATING THE AGREEMENT WOULD REST ON THEM. FINALLY HE SAID THAT THEY HAD HEARD FROM THEIR REPRESENTATIVE IN CAIRO(MY TELEGRAM NO 2728) WHO HAD RECENTLY HAD SEVERAL EXCHANGES WITH THE EGYPTIANS THAT TITO MIGHT HAVE SOME PROPOSALS TO MAKE AND THAT THEY WERE ANXIOUS TO SEE THESE BEFORE DECIDING WHAT THEIR NEXT MOVE SHOULD BE. INDICATIONS FROM CAIRO WERE THAT THE UAR STILL HOPED TO AVOID ANY REFERENCE TO THE END OF BELLIGERENCY AND THAT THEY WANTED TO GET AWAY FROM THE PRINCIPLES JOINTLY AGREED BY THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS AS A BASIS FOR FUTURE ACTION.

3. ROSTOW AGREED HOWEVER THAT THERE WAS AN URGENT NEED TO PREPARE FOR ACTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND HE SAID THAT A MEETING WAS BEING HELD THIS AFTERNOON IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AT WHICH GOLDBERG WOULD BE PRESENT IN ORDER TO DECIDE WHETHER ANY APPROACH SHOULD BE MADE TO THE RUSSIANS. HE SAID HE WOULD INFORM ME AS SOON AS A DECISION HAD BEEN REACHED.

F.O. PASS UKDEL NATO 235(PRIORITY) MOSCOW 206 (Priority) AND SAVING UKDIS GENEVA 35.

SIR P DEAN

SENT AT 24/0100Z/8/67
RECD AT 24/0100Z/8/67

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW,
REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION,
REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS.]

FO/CO DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

PPPPP

RVM

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A.
PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO 2741

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
23 AUGUST 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDSD TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 2741 OF 23 AUG REPTD FOR INFMN UKMIS NEW YORK AMMAN AND TEL AVIV.
MY TELEGRAM NO 2707: MIDDLE EAST AND UNITED NATIONS.
GENE ROSTOW TOLD ME THAT THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR HAD INVITED HIM TO LUNCH YESTERDAY TO DISCUSS FURTHER THE QUESTION OF THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE OPENED BY EXPRESSING HIS REGRET ABOUT THE TONE IN WHICH THE EXCHANGES HAD BEEN CONDUCTED SO FAR. HE THEN EXPLAINED THAT ISRAELI ANXIETIES CENTRED MAINLY ON THE TERM '' INADMISSABILITY OF THE CONQUEST OF TERRITORY BY WAR''. ACCORDING TO THE AMBASSADOR EBAN HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS WOULD BE TOTALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ISRAELIS TO ACCEPT IF IT MEANT A RETURN TO THE SITUATION AS IT WAS ON 4 JUNE. HE ENQUIRED WHETHER THE AMERICANS INTENDED THE PHRASE TO CARRY THAT IMPLICATION. ROSTOW SAID THAT THE AMERICAN POSITION REMAINED AS DEFINED BY THE PRESIDENT ON 19 JUNE IN WHICH HE HAD REFERRED TO ''RECOGNISED FRONTIERS''. IN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO TITO THE TERM USED HAD BEEN '' AGREED AND SECURE FRONTIERS'' BUT HE ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT NEITHER OF THESE PHRASES WAS INTENDED TO CARRY THE IMPLICATION WHICH THE ISRAELIS FEARED.
2. THE NEXT QUESTION WHICH THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WAS WHETHER THE AMERICANS INTENDED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE RUSSIANS REGARDLESS OF POSSIBLE ISRAELI OBJECTIONS. ROSTOW DUCKED THIS QUESTION HE POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS NOT KNOWN DEFINITELY WHERE THE RUSSIANS STOOD, WHETHER THEY WOULD STICK TO THEIR AGREEMENTS WITH THE AMERICANS OR WHETHER THEY WOULD WISH TO WITHDRAW FROM IT OR TO SUGGEST AMENDMENTS. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE U.K. HAD VIEWS ON THE QUESTION WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THE POSITION

/ WAS THEREFORE

WAS THEREFORE TOO VAGUE FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO GIVE A PRECISE ANSWER TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION.

3. THE AMBASSADOR HAD THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JORDAN. HE THOUGHT THAT KING HUSSEIN SHOULD HAVE ENTERED INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS WITHOUT DELAY. HE WOULD HAVE GOT BETTER TERMS TWO MONTHS AGO THAN HE COULD GET NOW AND HE WOULD GET BETTER TERMS NOW THAN HE WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN IN THE FUTURE. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS ROOM FOR NEGOTIATION ON JERUSALEM. IF THIS PROBLEM WERE CONSIDERED LAST IN A GENERAL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN AFTER THE SOLUTIONS HAD BEEN AGREED FOR ALL THE OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES, THE ISRAELI CABINET WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE PREPARED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. THE AMBASSADOR DID NOT ELABORATE ON THIS STATEMENT AND ROSTOW DID NOT APPARENTLY PRESS HIM TO SO SO.

F.O. PASS AMMAN 106, TEL AVIV 118.

SIR P DEAN

SENT 0245Z 24 AUGUST 1967
RECD 0245Z 24 AUGUST 1967

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
N.E.A.D.
U.N.DEPT.
AMERICAN DEPT.
NEWS DEPT.
J.I.P.G.D.

C.O.
M.E.W. & U.N.D.

EJH

NNNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2757

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
24TH AUGUST 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 2757 OF 24TH AUGUST 1967
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO AND MOSCOW
AND SAVING TO UKDIS GENEVA
FOLLOWING FROM TOMKINS
MY TELNO 2739, PARA 3: MIDDLE EAST AND U.N.

I HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY GENE ROSTOW'S OFFICE THAT IT WAS DECIDED AT YESTERDAY'S MEETING TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE ARAB SUMMIT MEETING BEFORE MAKING ANY APPROACH TO THE RUSSIANS: THE APPROACH WOULD THEN BE MADE IN MOSCOW.

F O PASS PRIORITY UKDEL NATO 236 MOSCOW 207 AND SAVING TO UKDIS GENEVA 37
SIR P DEAN

SENT AT 25/0100Z
RECD AT 25/0100Z

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

FO/CO DISTRIBUTION

EASTERN DEPT.

PPPPP

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
AND [redacted]Y BAG

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 9313 25 AUGUST 1967 (E)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 9313 OF 25 AUGUST AND TO NEW YORK REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO AND UKDIS GENEVA.

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 2739: MIDDLE EAST: UNITED NATIONS.

I WOULD BE GLAD IF YOU COULD MAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY OF SAYING TO MR. RUSK (OR IN HIS ABSENCE TO GENE ROSTOW) THAT I PERSONALLY FEEL STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD BE MOVING FORWARD TOWARDS THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE BASIS OF THE AGREED DRAFT RESOLUTION. I WOULD HOPE THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN APPROACHING THE RUSSIANS IF THE RUSSIANS DO NOT MOVE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

2. IF LORD CARADON THINKS IT USEFUL TO MAKE THE POINT ALSO TO MR. GOLDBERG, I WOULD BE GLAD IF HE WOULD DO SO.

3. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 2757. YOU SHOULD NEVERTHELESS LET THE U.S. GOVERNMENT KNOW, AT A SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY, OF THE IMPORTANCE THAT I ATTACH TO MAKING SOME EARLY PROGRESS.

SOSFA SENT 2122Z 25 AUGUST

FO/CO DISTRIBUTION

EASTERN DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

JB

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 2053 25 AUGUST 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2053 OF 25 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW AND SAVING TO UKDIS GENEVA AND UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 9313 TO WASHINGTON: MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING ON MOROSOV'S TALK WITH LESLIE GLASS (HIS LETTER 10613/24 OF 7 AUGUST TO MORRIS) I HAVE SEVERAL TIMES BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE MIDDLE EAST WITH HIM IN RECENT DAYS, AND HE APPEARED TO AGREE THAT A RETURN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD NOT BE LONG DELAYED. MOROSOV FOLLOWED THIS UP TODAY BY SPEAKING TO HOPE. HE EXPLAINED TO HOPE THAT HE WISHED TO EXPAND ON WHAT HE HAD SAID TO ME.

2. MOROSOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION WERE DEPRESSED THAT THEY HAD HAD NO APPROACH RECENTLY FROM THE UNITED STATES ON THE MIDDLE EAST. AMBASSADOR BUFFUM HAD TALKED TO MOROSOV YESTERDAY ABOUT NON-PROLIFERATION BUT HAD NOT MENTIONED THE SUBJECT. HE REALISED THE AMERICANS WERE IN DIFFICULTIES BECAUSE OF THEIR FORTHCOMING ELECTION BUT THEY SHOULD NOT BE THE PRISONER OF TWO MILLION JEWISH VOTERS. IT WAS THUS VERY NECESSARY FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM TO TAKE A HAND AND USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE AMERICANS.

3. MOROSOV STRESSED THAT IT WAS CLEARLY WRONG FOR THE ISRAELIS TO REMAIN INDEFINITELY IN POSSESSION OF CONQUERED TERRITORY. IN UNITED NATIONS TERMS THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE AND IN PRACTICAL TERMS IT COULD ONLY PREVENT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LASTING PEACE. MOREOVER BOTH THE BRITISH AND THE RUSSIANS WANTED THE SUEZ CANAL OPENED. WE WERE BOTH THEREFORE SUFFERING AND BOTH FACING DANGERS.

4. RUSSIAN CONVERSATIONS WITH THE ARABS HAD BEEN DIFFICULT BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE. THE ALGERIANS AND THE SYRIANS HAD BEEN EXTREME AND

.../ V ERY HARD

CONFIDENTIAL

VERY HARD TO DEAL WITH. THE U.A.R. HAD BEEN MORE REASONABLE BUT COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO TAKE SUCH A FORWARD MOVE AS TO ISOLATE THEMSELVES. THE RUSSIANS HAD SPOKEN IN CAIRO ABOUT THE THINGS THEY EXPECTED THE EGYPTIANS TO ACCEPT. THEY HAD MADE IT CLEAR THEY DID NOT EXPECT THE EGYPTIANS TO RECOGNISE THE STATE OF ISRAEL, BUT THEY DID EXPECT THEM TO GIVE UP THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY (OTHER WORDS WOULD HAVE TO BE USED FOR THIS BECAUSE THE EXPRESSION HAD BECOME ANATHEME TO THE ARABS, BUT THIS WAS NO GREAT PROBLEM). INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE OPENED. IN THE END HOWEVER THE RUSSIANS HAD COME UP AGAINST A MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK: THE EGYPTIANS HAD ASKED WHETHER THE RUSSIANS COULD GUARANTEE THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD WITHDRAW. THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO GIVE THAT GUARANTEE WHICH, SAID MOROSOV IN CONFIDENCE, WAS THE REAL WEAKNESS OF THE RUSSIAN CASE WITH THE ARABS. THE RUSSIANS BELIEVED THAT ONLY THE AMERICANS COULD ENSURE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BUT WASHINGTON APPEARED TO BE RELAXED AND CERTAINLY SHOWED NO DESIRE EITHER TO CONSULT WITH THE RUSSIANS OR TO EXERCISE INFLUENCE ON THE ISRAELIS.

5. MOROSOV REPEATED THAT THE NEED FOR AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WAS PARAMOUNT. LASTING PEACE WAS A LONG TERM AFFAIR: OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY COULD ONLY BE SHORT TERM. THE TWO COULD NOT BE EQUATED. ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL COULD NOT THEREFORE BE PART OF A FINAL PEACE TREATY BUT MUST PRECEDE IT. IT WAS UP TO THE AMERICANS TO ENSURE THIS.

6. HOPE SAID THAT WE TOO WERE ANXIOUS TO SEE A SETTLEMENT TO THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT AND THAT LIKE THE RUSSIANS WE WANTED THE CANAL OPEN. SINCE NO ONE WOULD CONTEMPLATE DRIVING THE ISRAELIS OUT BY FORCE THIS HAD TO BE DONE BY NEGOTIATION IN WHICH THERE WOULD CLEARLY NEED TO BE AN INDUCEMENT. WHAT INDUCEMENT DID THE RUSSIANS THINK THEY COULD GET FROM THE EGYPTIANS TO ENABLE THE ISRAELIS TO ACCEPT WITHDRAWAL. ON THIS MOROSOV WAS EVASIVE, SAYING THAT BEFORE THE RUSSIANS CAME TO SETTLE THIS FINALLY WITH THE ARABS THEY WOULD NEED

/A SIGN

CONFIDENTIAL

U.K.MIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 2053 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

A SIGN FROM THE AMERICANS THAT THE LATTER REALLY COULD PRESS THE ISRAELIS INTO A WITHDRAWAL - PERHAPS ON THE BASIS OF CERTAIN PRINCIPLES FOR A LASTING PEACE WHICH WOULD MEET LONG-TERM LEGITIMATE ISRAELI AIMS. (MOROSOV SPOKE TORTUOUSLY AT THIS POINT AND DID NOT MAKE IT CLEAR WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WERE TO HAVE NO MORE THAN A PROMISE TO END BELLIGERENCY AND OPEN WATERWAYS IN RETURN FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL, OR AN ASSURANCE ON THESE TWO ISSUES AND A PROMISE OF THE EXPECTATION OF MORE TO COME IN A PEACE TREATY.) WHILE HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE ISRAELIS SUCCESS WAS EXTREMELY DISTASTEFUL TO THE RUSSIANS HE SAID THAT NEVERTHELESS PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS SO IMPORTANT TO THE RUSSIANS THAT THE SITUATION AS IT EXISTED TODAY HAD TO BE GRAPPLED WITH.

7. BEFORE THE ABOVE CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE I HAD SUGGESTED TO MOROSOV THAT I SHOULD CALL ON HIM SOON TO TAKE OUR CONVERSATION FURTHER. I INTEND TO DO THIS EARLY NEXT WEEK AND TO HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (INCLUDING GOLDBERG WHO WILL NOT BE BACK IN NEW YORK TILL NEXT WEEK - PARA 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM TO WASHINGTON UNDER REFERENCE).

F O PASS PRIORITY MOSCOW 355 AND SAVING TO UKDIS GENEVA 7 AND UKDEL NATO 71.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0100Z 26 AUGUST
RECD 0100Z 26 AUGUST

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.
S.A.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 2772 26 AUGUST 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2772 OF 26 AUGUST
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO MOSCOW
AND UKDIS GENEVA.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 9313: MIDDLE EAST AND U.N.

FOLLOWING FROM TOMKINS.

INSTRUCTIONS HAVE NOW BEEN SENT TO THOMPSON TO SEE GROMYKO AS SOON AS THE LATTER RETURNS TO MOSCOW. IT IS EXPECTED THAT A MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE EARLY NEXT WEEK.

2. MEANWHILE I AM SEEING BATTLE AND SISCO (ROSTOW BEING AWAY FOR A WEEK) ON MONDAY MORNING AND WILL GIVE THEM AN ACCOUNT OF HOPE'S TALK WITH MOROZOV (UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 2053). IF I FIND THAT THEY ARE STILL RELUCTANT TO MOVE TOO QUICKLY IN THE DIRECTION OF ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE BASIS OF THE AGREED DRAFT RESOLUTION, I SHALL ASK TO SEE RUSK IN ORDER TO TELL HIM PERSONALLY ABOUT YOUR FEELINGS ON THE SUBJECT.

F O PASS ROUTINE UKDEL NATO 237 MOSCOW 208 AND UKDIS GENEVA 99.

SIR P DEAN SENT AT 1929Z/26 RH

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FO/CO/WH.DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.
ADVANCE COPIES SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2Ø74 28 AUGUST 1967
CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 2Ø74 OF 28 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW AND SAVING TO PARIS, UKDEL NATO AND UKMIS GENEVA.

MY TELNO. 2Ø53 PARA 7 (NOT TO ALL): MIDDLE EAST.

WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS I AM HOPING TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITH SEVERAL DELEGATIONS INCLUDING PARTICULARLY MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DISCOVER THEIR IDEAS ON TACTICS AND PROSPECTS IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. I HAVE ALREADY HAD PRELIMINARY TALKS WITH IGNATIEFF (CANADA) AND VRATUSA (YUGOSLAVIA) AND I HAVE A TENTATIVE ENGAGEMENT TO TALK SOON WITH MOROZOV (USSR). WHEN I HAVE COMPLETED THIS ROUND I SHALL LET YOU HAVE MY COMMENTS ON HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED HERE.

2. TODAY I SAW RALPH BUNCHE AND WE HAD A GENERAL DISCUSSION REALISING THAT FUTURE ACTION WILL DEPEND TO SOME EXTENT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE ARAB SUMMIT MEETING - THOUGH WE DID NOT EXPECT TO LEARN FROM THE COMMINIQUES ISSUED BY THE ARABS ALL THAT TAKES PLACE AT THAT MEETING, AND WE SHALL PROBABLY HAVE TO DEPEND PARTLY ON LATER LEAKS.

3. WE STARTED FROM THE OBVIOUS POINT THAT REAL PROGRESS MUST DEPEND ON AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BIG POWERS. BUNCHE THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE THAT WE COULD DO UNTIL WE KNEW WHETHER THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R. WERE AGREED TO PRESS ON TOGETHER. BUNCHE'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE READY TO MOVE (ON THEIR OWN TERMS), BUT THAT THE AMERICANS WERE IN NO HURRY.

4. BUNCHE WENT ON TO SAY THAT AS USUAL ISRAEL'S SECRET WEAPON WAS THE STUPIDITY OF THE ARABS WHO BOTH ON TIMING AND ON STRATEGY SEEMED DETERMINED TO MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE MISTAKE.

5. AS A GENERAL PURPOSE HE THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE WELL TO ATTEMPT TO GET THROUGH A RESOLUTION OF THE DOBRYNIN MODEL TO SET A FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE ACTION AND THEN PRESS FOR LIMITED INITIATIVES WITHIN THAT FRAMEWORK, FOR INSTANCE ON THE REFUGEES FIRST OF ALL, AND CONCEIVABLY ON THE CANAL. BUT IT WAS OPTIMISTIC IN VIEW OF THE ARAB ATTITUDE TO IMAGINE THAT A DOBRYNIN RESOLUTION COULD BE SECURED IN THE EARLY FUTURE.

/6.

6. BUNCHE CONFIRMED THAT GENERAL BULL HAD BEEN ABLE TO NEGOTIATE AN INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE CANAL (TEXT IN MY TELNO 2069). HE ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE GOING TO EXTEND THE DEADLINE FOR RETURN OF REFUGEES TO THE WEST BANK, THOUGH PROBABLY FOR A QUITE INADEQUATE PERIOD (POSSIBLY ONLY TWO WEEKS).

7. HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT RECENTLY THERE HAD BEEN SOME SMALL BUT STRIKING INDICATIONS OF A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE FROM THE ISRAELIS. ORIGINALLY THEY HAD TALKED VERY TOUGH TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON EVERYTHING BUT RECENTLY THEY HAD STARTED TO BE MUCH MORE COOPERATIVE. NOT ONLY HAD THEY INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY EXTEND THE REFUGEE DEADLINE, BUT THEY HAD COME TO AN AGREEMENT ABOUT GOVERNMENT HOUSE IN JERUSALEM AND, HAVING FIRST LAID DOWN SOME EXTREMELY UNREASONABLE AND RESTRICTIVE CONDITIONS FOR AMBASSADOR THALMANN'S ENQUIRIES IN JERUSALEM, HAD THEN WHEN THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD THREATENED TO WITHDRAW THALMANN, RUSHED IN A NOTE TO SAY THAT HE COULD GO WHERE HE PLEASED AND SEE WHOMEVER HE WISHED, IN PRIVATE IF HE LIKED.

8. BUNCHE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT EL KONY (U.A.R.) HAD BEEN SPEAKING FOR SEVERAL DAYS ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF RE-CONVENING THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION, AND HE GATHERED THAT THE ARABS WERE ANXIOUS TO CONTINUE THE DEBATE IN THE ASSEMBLY RATHER THAN GO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT THIS STAGE. THERE IS SOME TALK OF THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION CONTINUING CONCURRENTLY WITH THE NORMAL 22ND SESSION OR ALTERNATIVELY CONVENING ON 14 SEPTEMBER AS A CURTAIN RAISER FOR THE REGULAR SESSION (AND TO RECEIVE GUSSING'S OR THALMANN'S REPORTS IF THEY ARE AVAILABLE). THE SECRETARIAT ARE ANXIOUS TO HAVE THE EMERGENCY SESSION CLOSED BEFORE THE REGULAR SESSION BEGINS. I HOPE VERY SOON TO GET FURTHER INDICATIONS OF ARAB INTENTIONS ON THIS AND ALSO THE VIEWS OF OTHER DELEGATIONS INCLUDING THE RUSSIAN AND THE FRENCH.

9. BUNCHE HAS ALSO TOLD ME BY THE WAY THAT THALMANN'S REPORT MIGHT BE READY AND PUBLISHED ABOUT THE 7TH OF SEPTEMBER WHILE GUSSING'S REPORT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE PUBLISHED 'TILL THE MIDDLE OF SEPTEMBER. MY REACTION TO THIS WAS TO SUGGEST

/THAT

THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR PUBLISHING BOTH AT THE SAME TIME. WE CERTAINLY DO NOT WANT TO ENCOURAGE A DEBATE ON JERUSALEM BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE.

10. IT IS WORTH BEARING IN MIND THAT THE INTERVAL BETWEEN REPORTS OF THE ARAB SUMMIT IN KHARTOUM AND THE DATE FOR THE OPENING OF THE 22ND SESSION WILL BE SHORT AND IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO MAKE MUCH PROGRESS EITHER IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR IN A CONTINUED EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION BEFORE THE NEW REGULAR SESSION BEGINS.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 358 AND SAVING TO PARIS 56, UKDEL NATO 72 AND UK MISSION GENEVA 74.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0135 29 AUGUST
RECD 0135 29 AUGUST

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION].
REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS.

F.O./C.O./WH DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT.

GVL

file

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2780
CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
28 AUGUST 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2780 OF 28 AUGUST
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO
MOSCOW AND UKDIS GENEVA.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 2772: MIDDLE EAST AND UNITED NATIONS.

FOLLOWING FROM TOMKINS.

I CONVEYED TO BATTLE THIS MORNING THE INSTRUCTIONS IN YOUR TELEGRAMS 9313 AND 9334 AND GAVE HIM AN ACCOUNT OF HOPE'S TALK WITH MOROZOV.

2. BATTLE WAS CATEGORICAL THAT FOLLOWING THE AMERICAN EXCHANGES WITH DOBRYNIN LAST MONTH THE RUSSIANS COULD NOT BE IN ANY DOUBT THAT THE BALL WAS IN THEIR COURT: THE AMERICANS HAD MADE IT VERY CLEAR TO DOBRYNIN THAT THEY WERE EXPECTING HIM TO SEEK FURTHER ADVICE FROM HIS GOVERNMENT WHEN HE WENT HOME ON LEAVE. BATTLE SAID HE WAS MYSTIFIED BY MOROZOV'S REMARKS AND IT STRUCK ME AS OUR MEETING PROGRESSED THAT THE MORE HE THOUGHT ABOUT IT THE LESS HE LIKED IT, FOR TWO MAIN REASONS. FIRSTLY BECAUSE IN HIS VIEW MOROZOV'S FAILURE TO MAKE ANY REFERENCE TO THE POSITION JOINTLY REACHED BY THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS AT THE END OF THE SPECIAL ASSEMBLY COULD BE INTERPRETED AS AN INDICATION THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD MOVED AWAY FROM THE BASIC POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY ADOPTED. SECONDLY BECAUSE IT AROUSED THE SUSPICION THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE TRYING TO SEPARATE US FROM THE AMERICANS AND BATTLE EXPRESSED FEAR THAT IF THE RUSSIANS THOUGHT THAT THEY HAD ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS IN THIS, THEY WOULD BE LESS INCLINED TO STICK TO THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION AND MIGHT PREFER TO PLAY A WAITING GAME.

3. THIS LED BATTLE TO CONCLUDE THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT NOW THAN EVER TO FIND OUT WHERE THE RUSSIANS REALLY STOOD. INSTRUCTIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN SENT TO THOMPSON TO ASK GROMYKO THIS AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY (MY TELEGRAM 2772). BATTLE SAID HE WOULD NOW TELEGRAPH THOMPSON AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT MOROZOV HAD SAID AS HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT AFFECT HOW HE PLAYED THE HAND WITH GROMYKO.

/4.

4. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN THE LIGHT OF THIS LATEST SOVIET MANOEUVRE BATTLE THOUGHT IT BETTER THAT THE EXCHANGE SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN MOSCOW RATHER THAN IN NEW YORK, WHERE MOROZOV WAS HOLDING THE FORT AND FEDERENKO REPORTEDLY MIGHT NOT RETURN, OR IN WASHINGTON WHERE DOBRYNIN WAS STILL NOT BACK FROM HIS HOLIDAY.

5. I TOLD BATTLE THAT HOPE WAS LIKELY TO SEE MOROZOV AGAIN AND HE SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO HEAR THE RESULT OF ANY FURTHER TALKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH I SENSED THAT HE HOPED THAT GROMYKO WOULD HAVE GIVEN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S VIEW IN MOSCOW BEFORE OUR OWN EXCHANGES WITH MOROZOV HAD GOT MUCH FURTHER.

6. I THEN ASKED BATTLE WHAT HE THOUGHT THE NEXT STEPS SHOULD BE. HE SAID THAT EVERYTHING TURNED ON GROMYKO'S REPLY: PROVIDED THE SOVIET POSITION HAD NOT ALTERED THE AMERICANS WOULD THEN BROACH THE DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. HE THOUGHT THAT AT THIS POINT MR. GOLDBERG WOULD PROBABLY WISH TO STEP IN AS IT WAS ESSENTIALLY A UNITED NATIONS MATTER. IN REPLY TO MY ENQUIRY ABOUT WHAT THE AMERICANS WOULD DO IF THE RUSSIANS WERE FOUND TO HAVE RETREATED FROM THEIR EARLIER POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST, BATTLE SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE BACK TO SQUARE ONE AND WOULD HAVE TO LOOK AT THE WHOLE POSITION AGAIN IN THE LIGHT OF THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARAB WORLD.

7. BATTLE THOUGHT THAT THE PRESENT DISARRAY AMONG THE ARABS COULD CUT EITHER WAY IN ITS EFFECT ON THE RUSSIANS. THEY MIGHT BE ENCOURAGED BY THE RELATIVELY ISOLATED POSITION OF THE ARAB EXTREMISTS AND NASSER HIMSELF PROBABLY FELT THAT HE WAS DOING WHAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED IN ADOPTING HIS PRESENT MODERATE LINE. ON THE OTHER HAND IF THE EXTREMISTS STAYED AWAY FROM THE SUMMIT THE REMAINING PARTICIPANTS MIGHT BE INHIBITED BY FEAR OF THE ATTACKS THEY COULD EXPECT FROM THEM ON ANY DECISIONS THEY TOOK.

8. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT AS A RESULT OF THIS CONVERSATION THE AMERICANS ARE NOW MORE ANXIOUS THAN EVER TO RE-ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE RUSSIANS ON THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY STILL DO NOT WANT TO APPEAR TO BE RUNNING AFTER THEM BUT THEY REALISE THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO ESTABLISH SOON WHAT THE SOVIET POSITION IS AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT MAY HAVE CHANGED AS A RESULT OF

/SOVIET

SOVIET EXCHANGES WITH THE ARABS. THEY CONSIDER THAT THIS MUST BE THE PRE-REQUISITE FOR A MOVE IN THE U.N., WHICH IS STILL THEIR NEXT OBJECTIVE. I DOUBT WHETHER THERE IS MUCH MORE THEY CAN DO THAN THEY ARE DOING ALREADY TO PROBE THE SOVIET POSITION AND I WOULD SUGGEST THAT NO FURTHER PRESSURE IS NEEDED UNTIL WE KNOW GROMYKO'S ANSWER.

F O PASS PRIORITY UKDEL NATO 238 MOSCOW 209 AND UKDIS GENEVA 100.

SIR P DEAN

SENT 2254 28 AUGUST
RECD 2254 28 AUGUST

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS].

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

GVL

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT +A+.
PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2796

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
29 AUGUST 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2796 OF 29 AUGUST
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO,
MOSCOW AND BELGRADE AND SAVING TO UKDIS GENEVA AND CAIRO.
FOLLOWING FROM TOMKINS.
MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 2780: MIDDLE EAST AND U.N.
SISCO INFORMED ME TODAY THAT THE YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR HAD CALLED ON HIM TO GIVE AN ACCOUNT OF TITO'S IMPRESSIONS ABOUT HIS RECENT TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAID THAT TITO HAD RETURNED OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF FINDING A POLITICAL SOLUTION BASED ON THE RESPECT OF RIGHTS OF ALL COUNTRIES IN THE AREA. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE DISCOVERED CERTAIN NEW ELEMENTS IN THE SITUATION WHICH COULD JUSTIFY INITIATIVES BY THE NON-ALIGNED NATIONS. TITO'S IDEAS WERE STILL RATHER VAGUE BUT HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO COME FORWARD FAIRLY SOON WITH SOME PRECISE SUGGESTIONS ABOUT HOW TO GET THINGS MOVING.
2. THE AMBASSADOR THOUGHT, THOUGH HE HAD STRESSED THAT THIS WAS ONLY A PERSONAL IMPRESSION, THAT TITO WAS AIMING AT A SOLUTION LINKING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL LINKED TO THE EVENTUAL RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AND AN END OF BELLIGERENCY. THE AMBASSADOR HAD MADE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE FORMAL RENUNCIATION OF BELLIGERENCY WOULD CREATE INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE ARABS SO LONG AS ISRAELI FORCES REMAINED ON ARAB TERRITORY AND SISCO THEREFORE ASSUMED THAT THE ARABS AND PRESUMABLY TITO, WERE THINKING MORE IN TERMS OF AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FOLLOWED BY QUIET ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD BRING THE SITUATION BACK APPROXIMATELY TO WHERE IT WAS ON JUNE 4. ONCE THIS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO GET A SIMULTANEOUS

/END TO

CONFIDENTIAL

END TO BELLIGERENCY AND ARAB RECOGNITION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL PLUS IMPROVED ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE GULF OF AQABA AND SUEZ. IT STILL SEEMS, HOWEVER, THAT THE ARABS CANNOT ACCEPT ISRAELI-FLAG SHIPS IN THE CANAL.

3. OTHER POINTS DISCUSSED WITH THE AMBASSADOR WERE ACTION IN THE U.N. THE YUGOSLAVS ARE OPPOSED TO CONSIDERATION OF THIS QUESTION IN THE ASSEMBLY. THEY THINK THAT IT WILL DEGENERATE INTO A PROPAGANDA EXERCISE WHICH WILL ONLY HAVE THE RESULT OF EXPOSING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES RATHER THAN BRINGING THEM CLOSER TOGETHER, AS IT DID LAST TIME. THEY THEREFORE PREFER THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND AGREE WITH THE AMERICANS THAT CAREFUL PREPARATION IS NECESSARY. IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY INTEND TO BE VERY ACTIVE.

4. SISCO WAS NOT VERY OPTIMISTIC THAT MUCH WOULD COME OF THIS YUGOSLAV INITIATIVE. HE THOUGHT THAT TITO WAS STILL TRYING TO PULL NASSER'S CHESTNUTS OUT OF THE FIRE. HE DID NOT THINK THERE WAS ANY HOPE OF THE ISRAELIS AGREEING TO WHAT SEEMED TO BE THE FUNDAMENTAL IDEA OF TITO'S PLAN, WHICH WAS UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL. BUT HE IS RESERVING JUDGEMENT UNTIL HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO STUDY TITO'S IDEAS IN DETAIL.

F O PASS UKDEL NATO 240 MOSCOW 210 BELGRADE 1 AND SAVING TO UKDIS GENEVA 38 AND CAIRO 22
SIR P DEAN

SENT AT 2328Z/29 AUGUST 1967.
RECD AT 2329Z/29 AUGUST 1967.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FO/CO/WH. DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

44444

EOS.

Israel (Pt. 1)

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT +A+.
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2085

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
29 AUGUST 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 2085 OF 29 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, AND SAVING TO PARIS, AND UKDEL NATO.

MY TELNO. 2074: MIDDLE EAST.

I HAD TENTATIVELY ARRANGED TO SEE MOROZOV (USSR) TODAY TO TALK ABOUT TACTICS AND PROSPECTS BUT WITH HIS AGREEMENT I PUT THIS OFF (AFTER READING WASHINGTON TELEGRAM TO YOU NO. 2780). WE AGREED TO POSTPONE OUR TALK UNTIL WE KNEW THE RESULTS OF THE ARAB SUMMIT IN KHARTOUM. I ASKED HIM HOWEVER WHAT HE THOUGHT ABOUT THE SUGGESTION THAT THERE SHOULD BE ANOTHER DEBATE IN THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION. HE SAID THAT WE WOULD TALK ABOUT THIS WHEN WE MET BUT THAT HE WAS INCLINED TO THINK THAT ANOTHER DEBATE IN THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION WOULD BE ''OBSTRUCTIVE''.

2. WE HAVE ALSO SPOKEN TO THE FRENCH WHOSE PRESENT INCLINATION IS TO DO NOTHING.

3. I HAVE TODAY HAD A GOOD TALK WITH ARTHUR GOLDBURG WHO IS HERE FOR A DAY OR TWO (HE AND HIS MISSION WILL NOT BE FULLY BACK AT WORK UNTIL AFTER LABOUR DAY ON THE 4TH SEPTEMBER).

4. AS TO THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE WINDING UP OF THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION SHOULD BE AS SHORT AND FORMAL AS POSSIBLE. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT WE SHOULD STAND OUT FIRMLY AGAINST THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION RUNNING CONCURRENTLY WITH THE REGULAR SESSION. ALL THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY WOULD BE FOR THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION IN COMPLETING ITS WORK TO REFER THE QUESTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST TO THE REGULAR SESSION.

5. WHEN I SPOKE OF THE DOBRYNIN DRAFT RESOLUTION HE SAID THAT WE SHOULD SPEAK OF IT AS THE GROMYKO DRAFT. HE EXPLAINED THAT

/IT WAS

CONFIDENTIAL

IT WAS GROMYKO HIMSELF WHO HAD PUT FORWARD THE FINAL SUGGESTIONS AT THE END OF THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION (WHICH GOLDBERG HAD THEN PUT INTO WORDS WHICH GROMYKO ACCEPTED). GOLDBERG SAID THAT HE FELT SURE THAT MOSCOW WOULD KEEP A CLOSE CONTROL ON FUTURE TACTICS IN THE UNITED NATIONS. HE DID NOT EXPECT MOSCOW TO WELCOME ANY FURTHER DEBATE IN THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION AFTER THEIR EXPERIENCE IN JUNE AND JULY.

6. GOLDBERG DID NOT DISAGREE WITH THE GENERAL PROPOSITION THAT WE SHOULD AIM AT GETTING A RESOLUTION CREATING A GENERAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH FUTURE ACTION SHOULD PROCEED. BUT HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE BACK-PEDALLING AND HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT DISAGREEMENT AMONGST THE ARABS WOULD INHIBIT THE RUSSIANS FROM JOINING WITH THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN A CONSTRUCTIVE MOVE AT THIS STAGE.

7. WHILE HE EXPECTED THE ARABS TO DISAGREE AMONGST THEMSELVES AND TO FALL BACK ON A NEGATIVE ATTITUDE, HE THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE HARDENING (AND HE DID NOT UNDERRATE THE MASSIVE PRESSURE WHICH THE JEWS COULD EXERCISE ON THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGAINST ANYTHING WHICH THEY COULD MAINTAIN WAS A SELL OUT). HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT ESHKOL AND EBAN WERE LOSING GROUND TO THE TOUGH GUYS. THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL RABIN AS AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON WAS SIGNIFICANT. BUT HE DID NOT FEEL THAT THIS SHIFT WAS NECESSARILY A BAD THING. IN THE END WHEN AWKWARD DECISIONS HAD TO BE TAKEN IT MIGHT BE EASIER TO DEAL WITH DAYAN AND THE NEW MEN RATHER THAN ESHKOL AND THE OLD BRIGADE.

8. GOLDBERG WENT ON TO SAY THAT THOUGH THE TOUGHNESS OF THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE WAS A MATTER FOR CONCERN, AND WHILE IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD EXERCISE EXTREME PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS BY CUTTING OFF FINANCIAL AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE, IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT LOOK TO THE COMMUNISTS FOR MILITARY RE-EQUIPMENT OR TO FRANCE (EXCEPT FOR SOME BOOTLEGGING OF MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM FRANCE NOW TAKING PLACE).

/ ISRAEL

ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO LOOK TO THE UNITED STATES (POSSIBLY ALSO TO THE UNITED KINGDOM) FOR MILITARY RE-EQUIPMENT AND THEY KNEW VERY WELL THAT THEY COULD NOT GO IT ALONE.

9. I SAID THAT I FELT THAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PRESENT ATTITUDE OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND MINE WAS THAT WE ON OUR PART WISHED TO PRESS ON URGENTLY TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT WHEREAS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SEEMED TO BE IN NO HURRY. HE REALISED THAT WE WERE MUCH MORE ADVERSELY AFFECTED ECONOMICALLY BY THE PRESENT SITUATION THAN THE UNITED STATES. WE SHOULD NOT FEEL THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS GOING BACK ON WHAT OUR GOVERNMENTS HAD AGREED TOGETHER. EVERYTHING WOULD DEPEND ON THE RESPONSE NOW OBTAINABLE FROM GROMYKO. IF THE RUSSIANS COULD BE PERSUADED TO GO AHEAD ON THE LINES OF THE GROMYKO RESOLUTION THAT WAS FINE, BUT IF IN THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO PROCEED WITHOUT ARAB SUPPORT THE RUSSIANS RESORTED TO A PROPAGANDA APPROACH RATHER THAN A CONSTRUCTIVE ONE, THEN IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW ANY EARLY PROGRESS COULD BE MADE. HE WAS VERY READY TO CONSULT AND ACT CLOSELY WITH US AS SOON AS WE KNEW THE RESULT OF THE ARAB SUMMIT AND THE GROMYKO RESPONSE.

10. HE IMAGINED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD MEET ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF SEPTEMBER AT LEAST TO DISCUSS THE GUSSING AND THALMANN REPORTS BUT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SAY NOW WHETHER THERE WAS ANY PROPECT OF A GENERAL RESOLUTION BEING PASSED IN THE COUNCIL AT THAT TIME.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 359 AND SAVING TO PARIS 58 AND UKDEL NATO 75.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT ØØ45Z/3Ø AUGUST 1967.
RECD AT ØØ46Z/3Ø AUGUST 1967.

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION.
REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

FO/CO/WH. DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

EOS

Michael B - on return

A.N. Halls, Esq., M.B.E.,
T.D., i.d.c.,
10 Downing Street.

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

1979.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1

6 September 1967.

No. 10

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR, 30 AUGUST, 1967

Present:

Rt. Hon. Mr. George Brown, M.P. — Mr. A. Remez

Mr. T. F. Brenchley — Mr. Y. Anug

Mr. T. J. Rutter

Mr. Remez gave the Foreign Secretary the text of a message from the Israel Foreign Minister. Mr. Brown commented that this was a tough statement of the Israel position, but was not the statement he had asked Mr. Eban for on 23 July giving him his own personal assessment of the discussions in the Israel Cabinet on the desirability of otherwise of moving towards a settlement. Mr. Remez said that from his recent conversations with Mr. Eban he thought that Mr. Eban would not regard it as realistic to expect Israel-Jordan negotiations soon. As it became clear that King Hussein's survival was assured, his attitude towards the desirability of negotiations with Israel had hardened. Mr. Remez said that a number of Israel Ministers thought that the chances of realistic negotiations with the United Arab Republic were increasing as time passed. The present situation had already influenced some Arab governments in the direction of greater realism. This process would be intensified by the passage of time and could be expected ultimately to prepare Arab governments for direct negotiations with Israel.

/2.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Mr. Brown pointed out that if Israel maintained her present rigid position on the return of refugees and the status of Jerusalem, while she was waiting for an Arab change of mind, she would lose friends. He said that he could not defend Israel's attempted unilateral annexation of Jerusalem as a result of conquest any more than he would be able to defend a similar act were the Arab and Israel position reversed. Had the Arabs attempted to annex territory they had conquered from Israel, he was sure that the Israel Government would have contested the validity of this annexation and they could be sure that he would have supported them in this. Israel was, however, attempting to establish a dangerous precedent which, in changed circumstances, could rebound on her. Israel was in a strong enough position to be able to think again on Jerusalem. In reply to a question from Mr. Remez as to what the Israel Government should do about Jerusalem, Mr. Brown said that they should rescind their legislation, which implicitly had the effect of annexing Jerusalem to the State of Israel, and should be prepared to discuss what Jerusalem's future status should be, in the first instance with their friends, but ultimately with the United Nations where the recognition of Israel's existence and the settlement of related problems should be enshrined.

Mr. Remez said that the future of Jerusalem could be on the agenda for negotiations. Israel was prepared to keep all options open except the redivision of Jerusalem, against

/which

which the Israel Government and public were unanimous.

Mr. Brown reminded Mr. Remez that Her Majesty's Government did not advocate the redivision of the City, but merely maintained that Israel's way of trying to unify Jerusalem was dangerous, and that, if unification were their overriding objective, they should be prepared to negotiate about the mode of unification and about the future status of a unified Jerusalem.

3. Mr. Remez said that Jordan Government pronouncements had indicated that refugees were being encouraged to return to the West Bank in order to disturb the relaxed atmosphere which the Israel authorities had managed to establish there. This attitude made it difficult for the Israel Government to respond to appeals that on humanitarian grounds the deadline of 31 August for the processing of applications and for the return of refugees should be extended. Since the Jordan Government were evidently using the refugees as a political weapon against Israel, the only concessions which the Israel Government had been able to agree in the face of strong public pressure in Israel for strict adherence to the deadline, were (a) that those who had by 31 August received Israel authorisation to return but had not managed to do so by that date would be permitted to return thereafter; and (b) that arrangements could be made over an indefinite period for families to be re-united on an individual basis.

4. Mr. Brown said that these concessions were very disappointing and did not touch the core of the problem which was that 100,000

/refugees

refugees who wanted to return to the West Bank would be refused re-entry. Her Majesty's Government had not so far publicised their representations to the Israel Government, but would now have to make their position clear. Mr. Remez asked that in any statement they made they should refer also to Jordan's incitement of the refugees to return to be "a thorn in the flesh of the aggressors".

5. Mr. Brown said that the Israel Government would not put itself at risk by making a magnanimous gesture on this. What Mr. Remez had said about the Israel public's view on this indicated that Israel was living in an emotional atmosphere which was relevant to the situation which prevailed before 4 June, but was no longer so. It was difficult to reconcile Israel's legitimate expectations of international sympathy in the pre-4 June situation with her refusal to use magnanimously her present considerable power. Mr. Remez said that the governing factor was not Israel public opinion but the Israel Government's anxiety that relations between the Israel authorities on the West Bank and the Arab population there should not be disturbed from their present equilibrium. The Israel Government did not want to find itself forced into a campaign of repression to deal with the attempts of a deliberately introduced Fifth Column to disturb the peace on the West Bank. They had evidence that not all of the 130,000 refugees who had applied to return wished to do so, and concluded that the Jordan Government had tried to

/bring

bring pressure on them to return in order to subvert the present stable régime on the West Bank. Mr. Remez referred to a speech by the Jordan Finance Minister declaring that the refugees should return to be "a thorn in the flesh of the aggressor" and to a broadcast as recently as 27 August by Radio Amman inciting the refugees to return "to be the vanguard for the conquering Jordan Army which is on the way".

Mr. Brenchley said that the Israel Government must know that neither the refugees nor the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank would take this threat seriously since they knew perfectly well that there was no Jordanian Army which was capable of launching a successful attempt against the West Bank. Mr. Keren said that if these refugees had been admitted and had instigated trouble on the West Bank, the Israel authorities would have had to respond with harsh repressive measures. The main sufferers would have been the present Arab inhabitants of the West Bank who were now relaxed about Israel occupation, but who would inevitably have suffered from any repressive measures which the Israel authorities would have been forced to introduce. There would, moreover, certainly have been sharp international reaction against such necessary security measures. In reply to a question from Mr. Remez, Mr. Brown said that he would find it easier to sympathise with such security measures to deal with a genuine problem on the West Bank than with Israel's present refusal to permit the return of the refugees to the West Bank in order to

/avoid

avoid any serious problems in their continued occupation. By refusing to face these problems on the West Bank, they merely left them to be faced on the East Bank.

6. Mr. Remez said that this question was quite separate from that of a solution of the refugee problem. If there were any prospect of such a solution, Israel would be prepared to think again. Meanwhile, he said, the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank themselves did not wish the Israel Government, by responding to humanitarian appeals, to admit a disruptive element which would disturb the present tranquillity of life on the West Bank. The Israel authorities could not now afford to lose face with those Arabs who had remained on the West Bank. Mr. Brown said that he was amazed that in her present position of strength, Israel was prepared to consider questions of face.

7. Mr. Remez raised the question of tactics at the United Nations. Mr. Brown said that it was desirable that the Security Council should be seized of the Middle East crisis in order to preempt major initiatives in the General Assembly. Mr. Remez assented. Mr. Brown suggested that in the interest of this general objective, Israel should be prepared to agree to the discussion of a draft resolution which, though not ideal from their point of view, might become modified in the Council into a resolution which would be acceptable to them.

8. He said that if there were no chance for Mr. Eban to call on him in London on his way to New York, a meeting should be arranged in New York on 21 September, before he embarked on conversations with other Foreign Ministers.

Foreign Office,
4 September 1967

En Clair

PRIORITY KHARTOUM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram No. 493 2 September, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 493 of 2 September,
Repeated for information to Arab Posts, H.C. Aden, Tel Aviv and Saving to Washington, UKMission New York.

At the final open session of the Arab Summit Conference on 1 September the Chairman, Ismail El Azhari of the Sudan read out an official communiqué. Text of main points is in my immediately following telegram.

2. The Sudanese Prime Minister Mohd Ahmed Mahgoub then announced the agreed resolutions of the Conference as follows:

First. The Conference affirmed Arab solidarity and the unification of Arab joint action in a pure atmosphere of coordination and conciliation. Their Majesties and Excellencies Kings and Heads of State and their representatives reaffirmed their commitment to the Charter of Arab Solidarity issued at the Third Arab Summit Conference in Casablanca.

Second. The Conference affirmed the necessity of concerted joint efforts in the elimination of all traces of aggression on the basis that the recovery of all occupied Arab territory is the joint responsibility of all Arab Nations.

Third. The Arab Kings and Heads of State agreed on the unification of their efforts in joint political and diplomatic action at the international level to the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territory after June 5th, within the framework of the basic Arab commitment and conviction which entails non-recognition of Israel, nor concilation, nor negotiation with her, but upholding the rights of the Palestinian people to their land.

Fourth. The Ministers of Finance, Economy and Petrol recommended the possibility of using the petrol as a weapon in the struggle. But the Summit Conference after careful study, sees that the petrol export could be used as a positive weapon, which would be directed towards the consolidation of the economy of the Arab Nations that directly suffered from the aggression to help them in facing the pressures of battle. It has been decided by the Summit Conference that petroleum, being an effective Arab resource, which could help Arab objectives and could contribute towards helping those countries which were directly affected by the aggression and which have lost their economic resources in facing up to the elimination of the traces of aggression. The petroleum producing countries have already contributed help to these countries to enable them to stand up to any economic pressure.

/Fifth.

Fifth. The Conference approved the scheme submitted by Kuwait to establish an Arab development, economic and social bank in accordance with the recommendations of the Arab Finance, Economy and Petrol Ministers Conference which met in Baghdad.

Sixth. The Conference decided that it is necessary to take all steps to consolidate military preparedness to face all the consequences of the situation.

Seventh. The Conference decided to speed up the liquidation of the foreign bases in the Arab Nations.

For comment see second immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office pass Saving Washington No. 16, UKMission New York No. 10.

Mr. Reddaway

Sent 0930Z 2 September
Recd 1217Z 2 September

[Repeated as requested]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

Eastern Department

SSSSS

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2861

DATED 6 SEPTEMBER 1967

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2861 OF 6 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BONN TEL AVIV AMMAN AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

FOLLOWING FROM TOMKINS.

JORDAN- ISRAEL.

GENE ROSTOW TOLD ME TODAY THAT A MESSAGE HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM EBAN LAST WEEK SUGGESTING THAT THE TIME WOULD BE RIPE AFTER THE ARAB SUMMIT IN KHARTOUM FOR A SECRET MEETING BETWEEN ISRAELI AND JORDANIAN REPRESENTATIVES AND ASKING FOR THIS TO BE CONVEYED TO KING HUSSEIN. THE LATTER HAD REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WAIT.

2. ROSTOW COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION WITH MR. RUSK, HE FELT THAT THERE WAS DANGER IN DELAY AND THAT IT MIGHT BE ADVISABLE TO ENCOURAGE KING HUSSEIN TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE RIGHT WHEN THEY SAID (SEE MY TELEGRAM NO. 2741) THAT JORDAN WOULD GET BETTER TERMS NOW THAN LATER. ROSTOW CONSIDERED THAT THE CHANCES FOR A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT WERE DETERIORATING. THE REFUGEES ON THE LEFT BANK WERE BEGINNING TO TURN AWAY FROM THE KING AND A MOVEMENT WAS DEVELOPING IN FAVOUR OF A BI-NATIONAL STATE AND THIS MUST BE AN ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE ISRAELIS TO TAKE A HARDER LINE. THEY WERE MOREOVER, INCENSED BY AN INTERVIEW WHICH THE KING HAD RECENTLY GIVEN TO S IEGEL (WHICH WE HAVE NOT SEEN) WHICH THEY REGARDED AS A PROVOCATION AND THIS COULD MAKE THEM UNWILLING TO RECEIVE MORE REFUGEES. ROSTOW ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD PRESSED THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR VERY HARD ON THE SUBJECT OF JERUSALEM AND THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF A REASONABLE DEAL IF IT WERE TAKEN AS THE LAST ITEM TO BE NEGOTIATED.

2. ROSTOW THINKS THAT WE SHOULD CONSULT URGENTLY ABOUT THIS QUESTION AND I SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL TO HAVE YOUR VIEWS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

/3. ROSTOW

SECRET

3. ROSTOW HAS JUST RETURNED FROM LEAVE AND HAD JUST BEEN SEEING THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR WHO MAY HAVE INFLUENCED HIM UNDULY. OUR OTHER CONTACTS IN THE STATE DEPT. HAVE NOT SPOKEN TO US ON THESE LINES AND THE MOOD AT DESK LEVEL IS RESENTMENT AGAINST THE INCREASINGLY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE OF THE ISRAELIS AT A TIME WHEN THE ARABS ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY.

F.O. PASS BONN 230 TEL AVIV 125 AMMAN 113

SIR P. DEAN

SENT AT..07/0150Z
RECD AT..07/0151Z

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

F.O.
EASTERN DEPT.
U.N.DEPT.

C.O.
M.E.W. & U.N.D.

YCC

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO. 2004 7 SEPTEMBER, 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 2004 OF 7 SEPTEMBER AND TO
TEL AVIV REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.

WASHINGTON TELNO 2361: JORDAN/ISRAEL.

PLEASE LET ME HAVE YOUR COMMENTS ON ROSTOW'S IDEAS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. FROM AMMAN I SHOULD WELCOME AN EARLY ASSESSMENT ON HOW FAR RECENT EVENTS, AND IN PARTICULAR THE KHARTOUM SUMMIT, HAVE MADE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, EITHER DIRECT OR THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF A THIRD PARTY, ANY MORE PRACTICABLE FOR KING HUSSEIN AND ANY MORE ACCEPTABLE TO HIM. IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL TO HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON THE ADVISABILITY OF OUR TRYING TO ENCOURAGE KING HUSSEIN TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING, AS SUGGESTED BY ROSTOW, BEARING IN MIND WHAT WE KNOW OF CURRENT ISRAELI ATTITUDES.

SOSFA SENT 1907Z 7 SEPTEMBER

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPARTMENT
U.N. DEPARTMENT
N.E.A.D

CONFIDENTIAL

MBI

S E C R E T

Cypher/Cat.A.

IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 1094 8 September, 1967.

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1094 of 8 September.
Repeated for information to Tel Aviv, UKMis New York and Washington.

Your telegram No. 2004.

Jordan/Israel.

King Hussein returned from the Khartoum Summit Meeting very well satisfied (a) by the success of the "moderates" in imposing their views on the extremists and (b) by the support which Jordan obtained, both moral and financial, from other Arab States.

2. While the King received general endorsement of the approval which he had earlier got from Nasser to do what he could on his own to recover what Jordan had lost in the recent war, he has apparently decided that it is too soon to take any separate initiative on his own. His instinct in this is probably right. Arab leaders at present seem ahead of their people in appreciating the implications of their recent defeat by Israel. They apparently have set their faces against any renewed war with Israel and know in their hearts that a settlement must be reached through negotiation. However, for reasons of face, the Arabs will want someone else to do the negotiations and preferably to impose a solution.

3. The King and his advisers, together with some responsible Jordanians, seem therefore to be awaiting the next meeting of the Security Council, which they hope will take some step in the direction of an imposed solution. Indeed, a remarkable feature of the present attitude of the King and the Jordan Government is their apparent passivity and view that only a solution arrived at between the United States and U.S.S.R. at the United Nations and imposed by them will restore to the Arabs what they have lost in the recent war.

4. As regards separate and secret negotiations with Israel, there have been stories of emissaries from the King to Jerusalem, allegedly to sound out the Israelis, but we and my United States and other diplomatic colleagues here discount these rumours,

/for

S E C R E T

for which we have found no supporting evidence. The King knows that on present form Israel is most unlikely to meet Jordan's requirement for the return of Jerusalem and, as I have reported (my telegram No. 973) believes it useless to open negotiations unless he is assured that Jerusalem is negotiable.

5. I have been trying to assess the strength of King Hussein's position both internally and in the Middle East generally to see how long he might be able to sit tight and wait for events to evolve more favourably for Jordan e.g. through United Nations pressures on Israel. This is difficult in the present circumstances, but our view is that the régime probably has several months at least before pressures become such that the King is forced to make a move. Meanwhile life in Jordan should proceed at a reduced tempo and the standard of living will decline: but there should be enough to eat (Jordan has nearly £100 million reserves even without the £40 million aid promised at the Summit) and UNRWA has shouldered much of the burden of the refugees.

6. So long as the army and the public security services remain loyal and effective (and there is no evidence of serious disaffection or disloyalty yet) the régime cannot be challenged effectively.

7. Palestinians. The West Bank may not be sure where their destiny lies - there is certainly evidence that many of them hanker after some sort of separate Palestine entity, and some may be toying with the idea of association with Israel. The régime here may underestimate the strength of this feeling but our information is that the majority, probably excluding the political ambitious, would still prefer to return to a re-unified Jordan. They would, however, expect a better deal from the Hashemites than in the past and their re-incorporation might well pose greater problems for the régime here than the King at present bargains for.

8. I do not think it would be in our interests to take too active a part in encouraging the King to negotiate sooner rather than later with the Israelis (and evidently against his own judgment). If these negotiations failed or leaked before his people and the Arabs generally had come to accept the need for negotiations, the King would be far more exposed to hostile elements which could destroy him e.g. an assassin's bullet. On the other hand I see considerable advantages in my being given authority to discuss with the King on his return the pros and cons of negotiating sooner rather than later.

/ 9.

S E C R E T

Amman telegram No. 1094 to Foreign Office.

9. To sum up, recent events and in particular the Khartoum Summit have probably made negotiations with Israel more practicable for King Hussein (by virtue of the general Arab line) but not any more acceptable to him (because his view probably is that the time is not yet ripe).

Foreign Office pass Immediate to Washington No. 204 and UKMis New York 146.

Mr. Adams Sent 1330Z 8 September.
Recd. 1537Z 8 September.

[Repeated as requested]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Eastern Dept.
U.N. Dept.
N.E.A.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

44444

S E C R E T

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 1012 9 September, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1012 of 9 September.
Repeated for information to: Washington UKMis New York
Amman.

Your telegram No. 2004 to Amman: Jordan Israel.

There is no doubt that public, Parliamentary and Government opinion is hardening as time goes on. Indeed a current of feeling is emerging which sees the present territorial situation not as a bargaining counter to force the Arabs to negotiate but as a desirable end in itself.

2. The Khartoum Conference is looked on not as a victory for real "moderation" but as the beginning of a clever Arab play which could be extremely dangerous for Israel if the West is taken in by it.

3. Eban is probably more realistic than most of his colleagues on the dangers to Israel of losing world sympathy by the adoption of public attitudes which appear too rigid. He will therefore continue to give the appearance of more flexibility in his exchanges with the Americans and ourselves than is warranted by his ability to "deliver" his Cabinet colleagues. At the same time he will for internal Israel public opinion have to go as near as he dare to a hard line in his public pronouncements here.

4. With regard to Palestinians (Amman telegram No. 1094), the feeling here is that it is not so much a choice of Jordan or Israel, but that they are beginning to realise that the choice is between continuing to exist under an occupation régime or coming to a separate accommodation with Israel. The appreciation is that the longer the former continues the greater the tendency will be to opt for the latter. To this extent an early move by King Hussein to talk to the Israelis would give a necessary boost to the new found pro-Hashemite feeling on the West Bank and encourage West Bankers to feel that there were still the option open of reunification with the East Bank.

5. I would also guess that King Hussein, if he made a gesture towards a peace settlement at the moment would be more likely to get more generous terms (particularly over Jerusalem) than he would get if a settlement is sought through the U.N. or Great Power pressures unless of course the Americans are prepared to exert considerably greater political, financial and economic pressures on Israel than they would appear to be at the moment.

Foreign Office pass UKMis New York and Washington as my telegrams Nos 215 and 225.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1125Z 9 September
Recd 1310Z 9 September

[Repeated as requested].

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. Eastern Dept.
U.N. Dept.
N.E.A.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT.

uuuuu

CONFIDENTIAL

Cairo to London

TIME TO TALK—AS EQUAL

'In 100 years there has never been genuine dialogue between our two countries' by Mohamed Hassanein Heikal

Editor of Al Ahram

THE REAL TROUBLE with Anglo-Egyptian relations is that there has never been genuine dialogue between our two countries. This is what I told Mr. Harold Wilson when he asked me what was to be done to improve them. For several reasons, some of them rooted in history and some psychological, Britain and Egypt have not talked to each other as equals at any time in the past hundred years.

In 1882 Britain occupied Egypt and restored the rule of the hated royal family which had been overthrown by a popular revolution. From then on Britain was the occupying power and we were always shouting at you to get out. Until 1919 Britain generally didn't reply to our shouting, but between 1919 and 1923 our resistance became more violent and Britain responded with repression.

In 1923 came "independence" with a British-type constitution but the unrest continued and political assassinations were frequent. In 1925 gunboat diplomacy caused the fall of the Zaghloul Government and Britain remained the occupying power.

The Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 was deception for Egypt. It ties us to Britain in a permanent alliance which gave Britain the right to occupy all our ports, airports and communications network in time of war. Nahas Pasha actually defended the agreement to the Egyptian people on the nonsensical grounds that it gave the King of Egypt equivalent rights. The ludicrous suggestion was that the Egyptian Navy (which anyway did not exist at that time) could use British ports in time of war. So it was that in the second world war many Egyptians appeared to be pro-Axis when they were really anti-British and pro-independence.

Throughout the British occupation the two nations never mixed. There were Englishmen who devoted their lives to Egypt but their interest was in things rather than people (such men were Professor Cresswell, the great scholar of Muslim architecture, or H. E. Hurst, who wrote the classic work on the River Nile). Only some of the British teachers in our schools and universities really knew and understood the Egyptians, while some of our boys who went as students to England came back with a true idea of what it was like.

In the second world war about two or three million British troops spent some time in Egypt but this still did not bring our two nations any closer. The ordinary soldiers mixed with the lowest elements: shoe shiners, pimps, pickpockets, belly dancers and bartenders, who formed their idea of the "Gyppo." On the other hand, officers met only the Circassian Turkish upper classes, the circles connected with the royal family and centred on the Gezira Club—a cosmopolitan society isolated from the real Egypt. No British soldier ever entered an Egyptian home and our two nations never met.

It was probably inevitable that Britain and Egypt should clash more strongly after the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. Britain's influence in the Middle East was still great and her interests here still vast. There was a rising wave of Arab nationalism in which Egypt began to take the lead —a fact which Britain failed to appreciate and resented. Britain didn't regard Egypt as part of the Arab world and there were some sound historical reasons for this. Under Muhammed Aly, Egypt alone of the Arab States had acquired virtual independence from the Ottoman Empire. During the occupation, Egypt was a separate British interest while the rest of the Arab States (especially Iraq, the Persian Gulf States and South Arabia) were the concern of the Government of India.

Another factor was that Britain always looked at the Middle East through the eyes of her Arabists—the Khan el Khalily experts, as I would call them. (The Khan el Khalil is the bazaar in Old Cairo where traditional Egyptian handicrafts are sold.) The paradox was that although they were supposed to be promoting Anglo-Arab ties, they were not looking for points of contact between East and West so much as stressing the differences. They did not like to think of the Arabs as people trying to modernise themselves. They preferred the desert Bedouin to the people of the towns who were the rising force.

The supreme example of this was General Glubb—a man who is genuinely admired by many Arabs. A coup was carried out against him by the corps he had created and the officers he had trained and with the knowledge of King Hussein. Glubb was taken completely by surprise because he had lost touch.

Thus when Egypt took the lead in the Arab world Britain misinterpreted what was happening. She charged Egypt with expansionism when in fact she was only rediscovering herself. In fact the poems of Ahmed Shawky, the singing of Umm Kalthoum, the music of Abdul Wahab and the stories of Taha Hussain and Tawfik Hakim were known all over the Arab world before the free officers dreamed of revolution. When the young revolutionaries called for independence and social justice they were understood by all the Arabs. Britain said they were trying to export their ideas but it was the Arab masses who were trying to import them.

Communications between Arabs is easy because of the special nature of our language, which has greater force than any other. We had no music and no painting, so throughout history our language has been loaded with implication. It is the language of religion and a unifying force. So Egypt's independence didn't solve our problem with Britain. The clash continued outside our borders as everything that was said in Cairo was heard in Baghdad and other Arab capitals.

Britain still did not appreciate Egypt's role. When Sir Anthony Eden in 1955, President Nasser told him that he could not oppose the Baghdad Pact. Eden was merely said with a laugh that he could go ahead. He did not say why because he knew Egypt's influence was no dialogue between London and Cairo.

One month before the evacuation of British troops from Egypt could be completed, left a load of explosives that had hoped would destroy the Labour Government coming to power there would be no reason for change because the Canal Zone base on Suez had gone. What happened? In 1956 a shipment sent direct from George Thomson, Secretary of State at the Commonwealth Office, but it was sent via Teheran and the British Embassy there, in view of President Nasser's bloodthirsty speeches, so that it tried to create the impression that there was a rapprochement between Egypt and Britain.

Mr Thomson's message was sent via Teheran to the British Embassy in Beirut, and the Ambassador, who was here, thought that the shipment suspended the operation of Aden and the Federation of its National Assembly. President Nasser was told of the interview which had been arranged with Mr Thomson. So it was that Britain broke relations with Egypt.

TALK—AS EQUALS

'In 100 years there has never been genuine dialogue between our two countries'

by **Mohamed Hassanein Heikal**

Editor of Al Ahram

in our
es really
od the
e of our
dents to
with a
was like.
rld war
million
t some
his still
nations
ordinary
ith the
shoe
pockets,
tenders,
a of the
er hand,
Circas-
classes,
with the
tred on
cosmo-
ed from
British
red an
our two

evitable
t should
fter the
of 1952.
in the
reat and
till vast.
wave of
which
the lead
n failed
esented.
Egypt as
orld and
und his-

torical reasons for this. Under Muhammed Aly, Egypt alone of the Arab States had acquired virtual independence from the Ottoman Empire. During the occupation, Egypt was a separate British interest while the rest of the Arab States (especially Iraq, the Persian Gulf States and South Arabia) were the concern of the Government of India.

Another factor was that Britain always looked at the Middle East through the eyes of her Arabists—the Khan el Khalily experts, as I would call them. (The Khan el Khalil is the bazaar in Old Cairo where traditional Egyptian handicrafts are sold.) The paradox was that although they were supposed to be promoting Anglo-Arab ties, they were not looking for points of contact between East and West so much as stressing the differences. They did not like to think of the Arabs as people trying to modernise themselves. They preferred the desert Bedouin to the people of the towns who were the rising force.

The supreme example of this was General Glubb—a man who is genuinely admired by many Arabs. A coup was carried out against him by the corps he had created and the officers he had trained and with the knowledge of King Hus. Glubb was taken comple

by surprise because he had lost touch.

Thus when Egypt took the lead in the Arab world Britain misinterpreted what was happening. She charged Egypt with expansionism when in fact she was only rediscovering herself. In fact the poems of Ahmed Shawky, the singing of Umm Kalthoum, the music of Abdul Wahab and the stories of Taha Hussain and Tawfik Hakim were known all over the Arab world before the free officers dreamed of revolution. When the young revolutionaries called for independence and social justice they were understood by all the Arabs. Britain said they were trying to export their ideas but it was the Arab masses who were trying to import them.

Communications between Arabs is easy because of the special nature of our language, which has greater force than any other. We had no music and no painting, so throughout history our language has been loaded with implication. It is the language of religion and a unifying force. So Egypt's independence didn't solve our problem with Britain. The clash continued outside our borders as everything that was said in Cairo was heard in Baghdad and other Arab capitals.

Britain still did not appreciate Egypt's role. When Sir Anthony Eden came to Cairo in 1955, President Nasser told him that he was going to oppose the Baghdad Pact. Eden was merely amused and said with a laugh that Egypt could go ahead and oppose it. He did not seem to care, because he underestimated Egypt's influence. Still there was no dialogue between London and Cairo.

One month after the final evacuation of British troops from Egypt came Suez, which left a load of mistrust. We had hoped that when the Labour Government came to power there would be a change because the men of Suez had gone. But what happened? In 1965 the Government sent out to Cairo Mr George Thomson, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, but it was so concerned with the British public's common view of President Nasser as a bloodthirsty pocket Hitler that it tried to avoid the impression it was seeking rapprochement with Egypt.

Mr Thomson came to Cairo via Teheran, Jeddah and Beirut, and then, while he was here, the British Government suspended the constitution of Aden and dismissed its Nationalist Government. President Nasser cancelled the interview that had been arranged with Mr Thomson. So it was that when Egypt broke relations with Britain in December, 1965, over Rhodesia, there were not any real relations to break. We were still not talking to each other in any meaningful way.

I would suggest that it is time for this dialogue to begin. We must admit that Britain has legitimate interests in the Middle East. As has often been said, we Arabs cannot drink our oil so we must sell it. On your side you must recognise the existence of Arab nationalism and Egypt as the biggest power in it, if only because of the size of its population. You will then understand what is in our minds. Britain could make a great contribution to the development of the Middle East; in many ways her interests are greater than those of France. But these interests must no longer be political.

We cannot help suspecting that Britain is trying to do by stealth what she can no longer achieve through power. France has made her come-back in the Arab world since the end of the Algerian war because she completely disassociated herself from the old order. Also the Arabs respect President de Gaulle because of his independence from the arrogance of American power. Unfortunately Britain too often looks to us like an American satellite.

Britain has made a positive contribution here and could do so again. She laid the basis of our civil service. We respect her scholars, teachers and doctors. We trust her machines and appreciate her type of efficiency which achieves results discreetly and without show. We admire her courage and endurance of the Churchillian variety and her sense of fair play although our faith in this was sadly shaken by Suez. It was not so much that you attacked us. If you had said outright that you were invading Egypt we would have hated but respected you. But it was the deceit, the lies, and the collusion, which took years to be revealed.

Nevertheless so many of these things could be put right if we were to meet and discuss our differences as equals for the first time in our history.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 2255 12 SEPTEMBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 2255 OF 12 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW WASHINGTON PARIS UKDEL NATO AMMAN AND TEL AVIV.

YRTEL NO 4547 (NOT TO ALL):

MIDDLE EAST.

NO ONE IS YET MAKING ANY MOVE TO GO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE AMERICANS ARE WAITING ON THE RUSSIANS, AND WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE HERE THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE READY OR ANXIOUS FOR ACTION IN THE COUNCIL. THE FRENCH SEEM NEGATIVE AND PESSIMISTIC.

2...MOST OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS AGREE THAT THINGS WILL GET WORSE IF WE DRIFT AND ALSO AGREE ON THE PURPOSES OF WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY BUT THEY ARE DETERRED FROM MAKING ANY NEW MOVE BOTH BY THE INACTIVITY OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS AND BY THE INTRANSIGENCE OF BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND THE ARABS.

3...PARTHASARATHI (THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL) HAS ASKED TO HAVE ANOTHER DISCUSSION WITH ME BUT HE TOLD ME TODAY THAT HE DID NOT THINK THERE WAS ANY PROSPECT OF THE COUNCIL MEETING USEFULLY ON THE MIDDLE EAST UNTIL TOWARDS THE END OF THIS MONTH AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS.

4...I AM TO SEE PARTHASARATHI AND BERARD AND GOLDBERG BEFORE THE END OF THIS WEEK AND I SHALL ALSO BE IN TOUCH WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

/ 5... IT STILL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 2255 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

5...IT STILL SEEMS TO ME URGENT AND IMPORTANT THAT WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY WE SHOULD TRY TO GET A GENERAL RESOLUTION FROM THE COUNCIL SETTING OUT IN THE PREAMBLE THE PRINCIPLES OF WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY AND THEN IN THE OPERATIVE SECTION RECOMMENDING THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (TOGETHER PERHAPS WITH A COMMISSION TO REVIEW THE WHOLE QUESTION OF THE REFUGEES AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS).

6...I DO NOT THINK THAT WE SHOULD WAIT INDEFINITELY ON AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U S AND THE U S S R AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE SHOULD PLUG AWAY WITH ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL IN ADVOCATING A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS IN ORDER TO GET THE SORT OF GENERAL RESOLUTION WE WANT AND BEING READY TO DISCUSS THE WORDING (WITHOUT PUTTING FORWARD A TEXT OF OUR OWN).

7...IF THE U S AND U S S R REACH AGREEMENT SO MUCH THE BETTER. BUT IF THEY BOTH CONTINUE TO HOLD BACK I THINK THAT THE REST OF US SHOULD PRESS THEM BOTH TO GO FORWARD IN THE WAY WE THINK IS BEST. I REALISE THAT IT IS OPTIMISTIC TO IMAGINE THAT THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS WILL CALL THE COUNCIL AND PRESS A RESOLUTION BUT IF THEY COULD BE PERSUADED TO DO SO I DO NOT THINK THAT EITHER THE U S OR THE U S S R WOULD WISH TO BLOCK AN INITIATIVE BACKED BY A GOOD MAJORITY.

8...I HAVE THOUGHT WHAT DISADVANTAGES MIGHT ARISE FROM OUR PROPOSING OR BACKING AN INITIATIVE. I DO NOT THINK THAT THE ARABS WOULD HOLD IT AGAINST US BUT I REALISE THAT THE ISRAELIS, WHO SEEM DETERMINED TO OPPOSE ANY ACTION BY THE UNITED NATIONS, WOULD BE ANGRY.

9...MUCH MUST OF COURSE DEPEND ON THE WORDING OF A RESOLUTION BUT IN DISCUSSING THIS I DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN GO FAR WRONG BY STARTING FROM THE GROMYKO-GOLDBERG TEXT.

10. IF YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER GUIDANCE TO GIVE ME BEFORE I HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS HERE I SHOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD LET ME KNOW BY FRIDAY MORNING NEXT SINCE I HOPE TO SEE GOLDBERG AND BERARD THAT DAY.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 384, PARIS 369, UKDEL NATO 22, TEL AVIV 400, AMMAN 268.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0027Z/13 SEPT
RECD 0043Z/13 SEPT
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FO/CO/WH.DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Palliser. 6

COPY NO. 12.....

S E C R E T

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

TEL. NO. 1229 12 SEPTEMBER, 1967 (V)

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO CAIRO TELEGRAM NO 1229 OF 12 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, OTTAWA, UKMIS GENEVA (PERSONAL FOR SIR H. BEELEY).

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 878 AND LATER TELEGRAMS: DIALOGUE WITH PRESIDENT NASSER.

PLEASE SEEK AN INTERVIEW WITH HEIKAL AND ASK HIM TO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM ME TO PRESIDENT NASSER.

BEGINS.

I FEEL I SHOULD SEND YOU A FURTHER MESSAGE SINCE IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IN THE RECENT DIFFICULT MONTHS IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A GREAT HELP IF WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO BE IN CLOSE TOUCH.

2. WE HAVE NOW, I THINK, REACHED A POINT AT WHICH, MORE THAN EVER, A RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS WOULD MAKE GOOD SENSE. I NEED NOT SPELL OUT THE REASONS: YOU KNOW HOW STRONGLY I HAVE ALWAYS FAVOURED A RESUMPTION, AND AS WE APPROACH THE END OF THE SECOND YEAR WITHOUT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS I FEEL IT HAS GONE ON QUITE LONG ENOUGH. I AM SURE THAT MORE CONTACT AND DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AT ALL LEVELS COULD ONLY BE HELPFUL TO US BOTH.

3. I WOULD THEREFORE LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT WE MIGHT NOW FIX A DEFINITE DATE FOR THE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN US. THE BEGINNING OF OCTOBER WOULD, I THINK, BE A GOOD TIME TO AIM AT, AND IF I KNEW THAT YOU WERE AGREEABLE TO THIS I WOULD BE VERY GLAD TO ARRANGE FOR THIS SUGGESTION TO BE PUT TO YOU IN AN APPROPRIATE FORMAL COMMUNICATION. COULD YOU LET ME KNOW WHAT YOU THINK ABOUT THIS? IF YOU THINK IT WOULD HELP, I SHOULD BE VERY GLAD TO SEND IN ADVANCE A SENIOR AND EXPERIENCED OFFICIAL, WHO IS KNOWN TO YOU AND IN WHOM I KNOW THAT YOU HAVE THE UTMOST CONFIDENCE, TO VISIT CAIRO IN ORDER TO CONVEY MY THOUGHTS TO YOU ON THE SUBJECT.

4. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM YOU, AND SEND YOU MY PERSONAL GOOD WISHES. REGARDS.

ENDS.

2. IN DELIVERING THE ABOVE MESSAGE YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT THE

/ REPRESENTATIVE

S E C R E T

REPRESENTATIVE I HAVE IN MIND AT PRESENT TO VISIT CAIRO IF NECESSARY (PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE) IS SIR HAROLD BEELEY. IN SPEAKING TO HEIKAL YOU SHOULD ALSO SAY THAT I WAS INTERESTED TO READ HIS THOUGHTFUL ARTICLE IN THE SUNDAY TIMES OF 10 SEPTEMBER. YOU MAY ALLOW HEIKAL TO THINK THAT THE APPEARANCE OF THIS ARTICLE WAS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR INFLUENCING MY DECISION TO SEND THE PRESENT MESSAGE.

SOSFA SENT 2202Z/12 SEPTEMBER

PRISEC (F.O.)

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 1103 13 September 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1103 of 13 September, Repeated for information to Tel Aviv, UKMIS New York and Washington.

Crawford's letter to Moberly of 1 September and your telegram No. 9774 to Washington: Jordan/Israel and the United Nations.

The Jordanian Foreign Minister summoned me today to discuss his intentions at the United Nations. He leaves on 16 September for Cairo on his way to New York in the hope of concerting his plan of action with the Egyptians. This was in accordance with agreements reached at the Khartoum Conference.

2. Atiri said his idea was that Jordan and Egypt as the countries which had lost most in the war with Israel should present a common statement of policy at an early Meeting of the General Assembly. This would, he hoped, have been cleared in advance with the other Arabs and would, of course, begin by pressing for the early return of the occupied territories including Jersualem. He realised that for such a statement to be effective in leading towards a settlement it would have also to indicate recognition of the fact that the Arabs would have to pay some price for Israeli withdrawal. He argued that the Arab leaders, all of whom were to some degree insecure, could not afford to make an explicit statement about ending the state of war. The great difficulty was to find a form of words which reflected the current thinking of the leaders (as indicated at Khartoum) without giving the public at large the excuse for claiming that the leaders had let them down. The Arabs had been intensely emotional about Palestine for half a century and they could not now swallow their emotions and forget them overnight. Nevertheless, Amiri [sic] was anxious to indicate at New York that the Arabs were not wholly intransigent, and thought he had a fair chance of persuading the Egyptians to agree.

3. Emphasising that I was speaking very personally I said I thought that an Arab initiative at this time could be helpful. The Israelis showed every sign of being prepared to sit it out and my guess was that their terms for settlement would not get any easier with the passage of time. But unless it could be clearly indicated to them that there was no further question of an Arab war against them they were unlikely to give way on any point of substance.

4. The Foreign Minister seemed to take this point and we had some discussion of the kind of modus vivendi which might be worked out between the Arabs and the Israelis pending full recognition of one by the other. He said notably that he thought it would be virtually impossible for Nasser to allow Israeli shipping to use the Suez Canal. I reminded him that the Egyptian denial of the Canal to Israel derived from her claim to belligerent rights and that putting an end to the formal state of war was the objective of the

/great

Powers and apparently many others.

5. Asked whether we should support Israeli attempts to secure the demilitarisation of territories returned to the Arabs I said that I did not know but that I assumed the answer would depend on other conditions in any Agreement. I added that it would surely be better for Jordan to regain her sovereignty over the West Bank even if demilitarised than to continue in the present situation.

6. I left the Minister with the impression that he sincerely wants to make a constructive contribution in New York, although he is still apparently a long way from finding the means of expressing the Arab intention to seek a diplomatic solution in terms which would not involve an explicit statement of the ending of belligerency. He is anxious to maintain close relations with our Mission and said he believed the United Kingdom position was closer to the Arabs than that of any of the other great Powers (including the Soviet Union). He will be grateful for any advice which Lord Caradon can give him as the Assembly proceeds.

Foreign Office pass Routine to UKMIS New York 147 and Washington 206.

Mr. Adams

Sent 1215Z 13 September

Recd 1435Z 13 September

[Repeated as requested]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Eastern Dept.
U.N. Dept.
N.E.A.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

NNNNN

7

S E C R E T

Foreign Office
S.W.1

13 September, 1967.

Dear Michael,

Later today, the Foreign Secretary will be circulating a paper on various aspects of the present situation in the Middle East for tomorrow's Cabinet. In introducing this paper the Foreign Secretary proposes to tell his colleagues that he is taking soundings in Cairo about the possibility of resuming relations. He has asked me, however, to tell you this straight away and I am therefore enclosing a copy of F.O. telegram No. 1229 to Cairo which deals with this.

...

Yours ever,

Donald

A.M. Palliser, Esq., CMG,
10 Downing Street.

S E C R E T

SECRET

E.R.

PRIME MINISTER

7B

Implication of the Middle East Situation for the United Kingdom Balance of Payments and Oil Supplies

(OPD(67) 71)

This memorandum was prepared several weeks ago; and the situation may have changed in the interval. But it still forms a convenient means of taking stock of the position in which we find ourselves.

Section I shows that some two-thirds of the total cost to the balance of payments (approximately £20 million a month) arises from expenditure on oil purchases and freights, mainly because of the closure of the Suez Canal, and that the situation is aggravated by the present loss of Nigerian oil production. Effects in other fields arise from increases in dry cargo freight rates, from antagonism in Arab countries to British goods or ships and from increased remittances to Israel.

When the paper was drafted the Khartoum meeting of Arab Heads of State had only recently taken place and there had been no time to judge its effects fully. It may be possible to elicit more on this subject now, and especially -

(a) Whether President Nasser's apparent desire for a rapprochement with the United Kingdom is likely to lead to a reopening of the Canal fairly soon or whether he will continue to keep it closed as long as Israel's troops occupy its East bank. The current discussions in the United Nations are relevant in this latter context.

(b) Whether the changed atmosphere in Arab countries means that British goods and ships are no longer at any significant disadvantage.

In the light of the latest news from Nigeria it looks as though it will still be a long time before oil shipments will be resumed from that country; but you will wish to verify this.

Section II of the report gives interim comments on the possibility of reducing our dependence on the Suez Canal. So far as oil is concerned, the report concludes that the immediate task is to examine the cost and effectiveness of contingency measures to meet interruptions of supply and measures to by-pass the Suez Canal and the existing pipelines to the Eastern Mediterranean. Diversification of sources of supply is a longer term aim. As regards dry cargoes, it does not appear that overland routes can be developed to take the place of shipment through the Canal.

E.R.

The Committee will wish to note that a preliminary assessment of the more immediately feasible insurance measures is to be made before the end of the year; and they may think it best to defer substantive discussion until then. But, if at that point the Canal remains closed and Nigerian oil is still not available, we must be ready to embark on whatever action seems most likely to enable us to deal with that situation in the longer term; and evidence that we were preparing to do so could be a not insignificant factor contributing to the reopening of the Canal.

Duncan Sandys

9th October, 1967

Israel Pt 7.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO UKMIS NEW YORK

TELNO 4833 14 SEPTEMBER, 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEWYORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 4833 OF 14 SEPTEMBER

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS UKDEL NATO AMMAN AND TEL AVIV.

YOUR TELNO 2255 : MIDDLE EAST.

MR. ROSTOW DISCUSSED THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE THIS MORNING WITH SIR DENIS ALLEN AND OTHER OFFICIALS. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WERE DISENGAGING FROM THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE GROMYKO/GOLDBERG DRAFT, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD NOT SAID SPECIFICALLY THAT THE DEAL WAS OFF. HE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE PRESSED FURTHER ON THIS BY HIS GOVERNMENT IN ADVANCE OF GROMYKO'S ARRIVAL IN NEW YORK. MR. ROSTOW AGREED WITH SIR DENIS ALLEN THAT A RESOLUTION ON THE LINES OF THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO DRAFT STILL SEEMED THE ONLY SENSIBLE WAY OF MAKING PROGRESS.

2. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE ISRAEL ATTITUDE TO THE DRAFT AND THE AMERICAN REACTION TO THAT, ROSTOW SAID THAT THEY WERE SEEKING TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIES THAT THE DRAFT IN FACT EMBODIED PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FIVE PRINCIPLES AND THAT THE RUSSIANS UNDERSTOOD IT AS DOING SO. HE MENTIONED THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD INVITED THE ISRAELIES TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT WHICH WOULD MAKE IT ACCEPTABLE FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW: NO REPLY HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED.

3. ROSTOW SAID THAT IF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WERE TO KEEP TO THE DRAFT AND THE ISRAELIS STILL DID NOT ACQUIESCE, HE WOULD BE DISPOSED TO ADVISE GOING AHEAD DESPITE ISRAELI OBJECTIONS. WE WERE NOT YET IN THAT POSITION, HOWEVER, AS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD NOT SAID THEY WOULD GO AHEAD.

/4. ON THE

4. ON THE TITO PROPOSALS ROSTOW SAID THAT THE YUGOSLAVS HAD ORIGINALLY SEEMED DISPOSED TO GO ALONG WITH THE PRESIDENT'S FIVE PRINCIPLES. IT WAS A SURPRISE, THEREFORE, THAT THE TITO PROPOSALS IN THE EVENT DEPARTED SO FAR FROM THESE. HE AGREED THAT THERE WAS A DANGER THAT THESE PROPOSALS MIGHT BE ATTRACTIVE TO SOME WHO HAD SUPPORTED THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT AND THAT THEY MIGHT GAIN SUPPORT AT THE U.N. IN THIS CONTEXT HE WAS NOT ENTIRELY HAPPY ABOUT THE REFERENCE IN OUR DRAFT REPLY TO TITO TO CONTINUING DISCUSSION AT THE U N. ROSTOW WAS INCLINED TO EMPHASISE THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING AT TITO DIRECT, RATHER THAN THROUGH SUBORDINATES AT THE U.N., TO PERSUADE HIM TO MODIFY HIS PROPOSALS IN THE DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S PRINCIPLES. HE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT THIS MIGHT BE DONE BECAUSE THE YUGOSLAVS HAD BEEN SAYING E.G. TO M. HARMEL, THAT THEY REGARDED THE TITO PLAN AS A BASIS FOR BARGAINING. WE HAVE SOME DOUBTS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF THESE TACTICS AND WONDER IF WE MIGHT NOT END UP WITH A SOMEWHAT MODIFIED BUT STILL UNSATISFACTORY RESOLUTION AGAINST WHICH IT WOULD BE HARD TO MAINTAIN THE SOLIDARITY WE MUSTERED FOR THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT AT THE SPECIAL SESSION. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS.

5. IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT MR ROSTOW SAID AND IN PARTICULAR OF HIS INTENTION TO RECOMMEND A FURTHER REPRESENTATION IN MOSCOW, I WOULD PREFER YOU TO DELAY ANY INITIATIVE WITH THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON LINES PROPOSED IN YOUR TEL UNDER REF.

6. WE SHALL BE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ON THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL IN THE LIGHT OF ROSTOW'S COMMENTS ON THIS.

SOSFA

SENT 2021Z 14 SEPTEMBER

F.O./C.O./WH DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

8A

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND MR. D. ROSTOW HELD AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE ON THURSDAY 14 SEPTEMBER 1967 AT 4.30 P.M.

Present:

The Rt. Hon. George Brown, M.P.
Mr. D.J.D. Maitland, C.M.G., O.B.E.
Mr. C.E. Diggines
Mr. D. Rostow
Mr. P. Kaiser
Mr. R.I. Spiers

Middle East

Mr. Brown welcomed Mr. Rostow and invited him to give his views on the current situation in the Middle East.

2. Mr. Rostow expressed his appreciation of the talks he had had earlier in the day with officials on a variety of subjects. As regards the Middle East, he felt that the situation was still difficult and it was far from clear what would be the right course of action now. The main immediate objective was to persuade the Russians to stick to their undertaking regarding early action in the Security Council. If they did not, the situation would become even more awkward.

3. Mr. Brown agreed that it would be best to go into the Security Council with some prior understanding of this kind. We thought that early action in the Security Council offered the best prospects. The Yugoslav proposals did not offer a satisfactory alternative. It would be most undesirable for the Security Council proceedings to drag on: if they did, there was a danger of a ragged and uncontrolled argument developing in the General Assembly. Mr. Brown added that he was concerned at the present rigid Israeli attitude.

4. Mr. Rostow said he thought the Israeli attitude was still very carefully controlled. The Israelis wanted a unified Jerusalem with a unified administration, and various other things which he felt were negotiable. As so much was now at stake, the United States Government were considering going back to King Hussein and telling him that they thought the present a favourable moment for achieving the goals he had in mind.

5. Mr. Brown said he had some doubts about this. But he would be seeing Mr. Eban the following day and going to New York on 20 September where he hoped to see Mr. Dean Rusk soon after his arrival. This would provide an opportunity to align

/British

British and American policies as closely as possible. In reply to a suggestion by Mr. Rostow, Mr. Brown said he doubted w whether a unilateral move on the part of the Arab countries (such as a statement to the Security Council or the Secretary-General) would be helpful. The British Government, for their part, had replied in cautious terms to recent feelers from the President of the United Arab Republic.

6. Mr. Rostow agreed that the mood of the Arabs appeared to be changing: the problem was how to translate this into useful action. After some further discussion it was agreed that the best course would still be early action in the Security Council. But they still had to decide by whom it should be initiated.

7. Mr. Rostow suggested that if it proved impossible to persuade any other Member of the Security Council to take the lead, the United States and the United Kingdom should do so together. There was of course the danger that if they could not carry the Russians along with them, the Russians might actively oppose such a move.

8. Mr. Brown said that the worst situation would be one in which Britain and the United States upset both sides in the dispute, allowing the Russians to stand aside and escape any odium. As regards the Yugoslav proposals, he hoped that the British and American replies would be closely aligned, and was assured that the two views on this were almost identical.

NATO and East-West Developments

9. Mr. Rostow said that the United States could not act alone in matters of common concern to NATO, but if all the Allies were helpful and cooperative everything was possible. For example, he looked forward to extensive talks in the coming autumn in the NATO Council on Russian penetration of the Middle East, as a result of which it was hoped to get an active group working on the problem. Similarly the United States Government hoped to push the Harmel Exercise to a successful conclusion. On the question of Russian penetration of the Middle East he believed the Russians were now better entrenched in the U.A.R., Algeria, Syria and Somaliland than before the recent war.

10. Mr. Brown, while agreeing generally, wondered whether it was right to include the U.A.R. amongst the places where the Russians were more strongly entrenched than before. As regards cooperation in NATO he fully agreed with the views expressed by Mr. Rostow, and the British Government had suggested certain ways by which NATO might take initiatives which would take advantage of any flexibility shown on the other side.

11. Mr. Rostow wondered whether, if the outcome of the Harmel Exercise was to establish permanent machinery in NATO to

/manage

manage the détente, this should be done through a working group consisting of all members or through a smaller group of perhaps four permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany) with 3 or 4 rotating members. Mr. Rusk was inclined to think that it would be best to have a nominally large committee operating through a smaller working group.

12. Mr. Rostow also expressed concern about the best way of handling the French problem: in a recent discussion with Mr. Spaak, the latter had said that he thought President de Gaulle would use any excuse for leaving the Alliance. If so it was all the more important for NATO to avoid providing the excuse. On the other hand, the Alliance as a whole should not be deterred from the best course of action merely by fear of French reactions. Mr. Brown agreed that all the signs pointed to an eventual French withdrawal from the Alliance whatever the other members did.

United States and Arms Procurement in Britain

13. Mr. Brown said he wished to take this opportunity of telling Mr. Rostow that the British Government now faced serious domestic difficulties over her relations with the United States. This did not arise solely on the issue of the minesweepers raised by the Byrnes' amendment. The British Government had to satisfy public opinion in this country that Britain and the United States were genuinely partners. There was strong feeling at present in Britain that this was not so. In this context, the British Government were extremely concerned at the Gross and Byrnes' amendments. We had been told not to make too much fuss over the Byrnes amendment on the grounds that it would be rejected by the Senate, but things had not worked out in this way. Apart from this there had been a swing-back of opinion in Britain over Viet-Nam. After quietening down for some time it was now blowing up. He hoped that Mr. Dean Rusk would not under-estimate the strength of this feeling. A further irritant was the forthcoming announcement by the United States' Government about Anti-Ballistic Missile deployment. This would be seen as introducing a fresh escalation into the nuclear confrontation. The British Government had taken a firm line with the Russians over this, and he himself had had a difficult passage with Mr. Kosygin on this matter. But now he had heard that the announcement was to be made on 18 September. Although he did not deny the United States' Government right to do this, Britain was inevitably affected and he felt that there might have been fuller consultation. Unless there could be a greater feeling that the two Governments did take the trouble to consult on such matters, things would become even more difficult domestically for the British Government. If the United States' Government could do nothing to improve the situation as regards the Gross and Byrnes amendments, there would be strong in Britain.

/14.

14. Mr. Rostow thanked Mr. Brown for his candour. He did not think that anything could now be done to reverse the Byrnes amendment, but he was confident that the Gross amendment could and would be killed. In reply to a question from Mr. Brown, he explained that the President could not veto the Byrnes amendment without vetoing the whole Appropriations Bill. He acknowledged that it was up to the United States' Government to make clear that there would still be a great deal of military procurement from the United Kingdom.

15. Mr. Kaiser added that the Byrnes amendment would only be in force one year, and that Britain could therefore still bid for nine out of the sixteen mine-sweepers. Moreover, the United States record of procurement as a whole was good: $140 million had already been committed out of the total allocation of $325 million.

16. Mr. Brown reaffirmed that the United States Government could and should do everything possible to provide evidence of a positive policy in these matters, and so make it easier for the British Government to support them.

Anti-Ballastic Missiles

17. Mr. Rostow said that he had been startled at the strength of the British reactions on this matter, and particularly at the suggestion that the United States was initiating an A.B.M. race. He was under the impression that the United States Government in a statement some months ago, had made it clear that, since the Russians had A.B.Ms, it would be impossible for the United States to get into the position where the Soviet Union could defend its territory against missiles and the United States could not. On the question of consultation, which Mr. Brown had raised, he felt that there had in fact been a great deal of consultation on A.B.Ms.

18. Mr. Brown felt that the United States Government needed a better defence for their actions than the fact of a troublesome Congress. He still considered they were rushing the announcement unnecessarily, and he regretted that the British Government had not been given more opportunity to give its views. He could not recall seeing any substantive report on this subject since his return from Moscow in May, until the report today that the United States Government were about to make their announcement. This had come as a shock to him and, combined with the resurgence of feeling in Britain about Viet Nam, he thought it would give the impression in Britain that the United States Government were "escalating" in all directions. Despite all this, the British Government intended to stand by the American Government, but their task had been made harder.

19. Mr. Rostow undertook to report these views on his return.

20. Mr. Brown said that the proposed issue of the announcement on 18 September, ten days before the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in Ankara hardly looked like happy timing. He would like to go over the whole matter again with Mr. Rusk.

/ 21.

21. Mr. Rostow remarked that there had also been a great resurgence of feeling on Viet Nam in the United States. Although the racial riots had not been occasioned by the Viet Nam situation people in America had been so horrified by these riots that they turned to Viet Nam as an external matter on which they could work off their feelings.

Distribution

Mr. Mulley
Mr. Roberts
H.M.A. Washington
H.M.A. Tel Aviv
H.M.A. Moscow
H.M.A. Paris
U.K.Del. NATO
British Interests Section CAIRO
U.K. Mission New York

(P.U.S.
(Sir D. Allen

(Lord Hood
(Western Dept.
(W.O.C.D.

(Sir J. Henniker
(Mr. Brenchley
(Eastern Dept.

Mr. Hohler

(Sir J. Rennie
(Defence Dept.
(Planning Staff

No. 10
Room 51 (2 copies)

(Sir D. Greenhill
(Mr. Hayman
(U.N. (Pol.) Dept.

American Dept. to enter

SECRET - GUARD

9

C[redacted]r/Cat A and By Bag

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

Telno 9941 18 September, 1967 (PS)

SECRET

Addressed to Washington telegram No.9941 of 18 September, Repeated for information to Amman, Tel Aviv, UKMIS New York and Saving to Paris.

GUARD.

Your telegram No.2861 and Foreign Office telegram to Amman No.[2059] Jordan/Israel.

It was clear from our discussions with Mr. Rostow on 14 September that he is keen to get early negotiations going between Jordan and Israel, and is worried that a continuance of the present situation will increase Arab hostility to the United States. He seemed to think that once negotiations were started a satisfactory solution over Jerusalem would be worked out somehow. He argued that the Israeli attitude over Jerusalem had not hardened, that the Israel Government (as opposed to individual ministers) had never claimed sovereignty over the Old City, and had not said that the Jerusalem question was not negotiable.

2. This seems to us an unduly rosy view of the Israeli attitude, and too unsupported to justify us in encouraging King Hussein to start negotiations. Though Sir Denis Allen explained our attitude to Mr. Rostow (paragraph 2 of our telegram to Amman (No.2059) and the same line was repeated by Permanent Under-Secretary of State the discussion ended inconclusively. It would therefore be as well for you to go over the ground with him again, and explain the basis on which we are instructing Her Majesty's Ambassador in Amman to speak to the King.

3. Anything you can do to pin Mr. Rostow down about United States ideas for a "reasonable settlement" over Jerusalem, and the amount of pressure they are prepared to put on Israel will be useful. Mr. Sisco in discussion with Peter Hayman here was pretty frank that not much could be expected in election year.

SOSFA Sent 11.30Z/18 September

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. Eastern Dept.
U.N.D.
C.O. M.E.W. & U.N.D.

88888

SECRET - GUARD

AU 2/29. SECRET.

Middle East

Prime Minister's Office
10, Downing Street

With the compliments of

FOREIGN OFFICE

American Department.

28/9.

LONDON, S.W.1.

26/9/67.

SECRET

Israel Pt 7

10

SECRET - GUARD

CYPHER/CAT.A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

TELNO. 2059 18 SEPTEMBER 1967 (F.E.D.)

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NO. 2059 DATE 18/9 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO PARIS.

GUARD

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1094 AND WASHINGTON TELEGRAM TO FOREIGN OFFICE NO. 2861: JORDAN/ISRAEL.

I ACCEPT THE ADVICE IN PARAGRAPH 8 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD DISCUSS THE PROS AND CONS OF THE MATTER WITH THE KING ON HIS RETURN, DRAWING ON THE LAST THREE PARAGRAPHS OF THIS TELEGRAM. YOU SHOULD HOWEVER SUSPEND ACTION UNTIL YOU RECEIVE A FURTHER TELEGRAM FROM ME IN THE LIGHT OF WASHINGTON'S REPLY TO MY TELEGRAM TO WASHINGTON NO 9941.

2. IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE ON SEPTEMBER 14, MR. ROSTOW REPEATED THE VIEWS REPORTED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF WASHINGTON TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. WE SAID THAT WE WOULD NOT FEEL JUSTIFIED IN GIVING POSITIVE ADVICE TO THE KING TO START NEGOTIATIONS SOONER RATHER THAN LATER, AND THAT WE THOUGHT HE MUST BE LEFT TO ASSESS THE POLITICAL RISKS INVOLVED FOR HIMSELF. THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM WAS JERUSALEM.

KING HUSSEIN COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO EMBARK ON NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT HE WOULD SECURE A SOLUTION ON THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM WHICH HE COULD ACCEPT. THIS WOULD HAVE TO INVOLVE RESIGNATION OF ISRAELI CLAIMS TO SOVEREIGNTY. WE COULD AT PRESENT SEE NO GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM THAT THE ISRAELIS, WHOSE ATTITUDE SEEMED TO US TO HAVE BEEN HARDENING, WOULD AGREE TO SUCH A SOLUTION, PARTICULARLY IN THE LIMITED CONTEXT OF ISRAELI/JORDANIAN

/NEGOTIATIONS

SECRET - GUARD

NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS ALSO SUGGESTED TO ROSTOW THAT KING HUSSEIN COULD HARDLY BE URGED TO APPROACH THE ISRAELIS UNLESS HE HAD AN ASSURANCE, HOWEVER UNRELIABLE, OF AT LEAST SOME ARAB SUPPORT (E.G. NASSER). WE WOULD THEREFORE NOT FEEL JUSTIFIED IN GOING FURTHER THAN AUTHORISING YOU TO DISCUSS WITH THE KING THE PROS AND CONS OF EARLY NEGOTIATIONS. MR. ROSTOW ACCEPTED THAT WE COULD NOT TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR URGING KING HUSSEIN TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS, AND SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE U.S. ADVICE WOULD BE RESTRICTED TO SAYING THAT IN THEIR VIEW JORDAN WOULD GET BETTER TERMS NOW THAN IN SIX MONTHS TIME.

3. IT MAY BE TRUE THAT AS REGARDS SECURING THE RETURN OF THE WEST BANK TIME IS AGAINST THE JORDANIANS AND THAT IF NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN, SAY, SIX MONTHS THE PALESTINIANS WILL SEEK SOME ACCOMMODATION WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THEIR OWN ACCOUNT. BUT WE CANNOT BE SURE OF THIS AND IT IS EVEN LESS CLEAR WHICH WAY TIME WILL OPERATE OVER THE JERUSALEM ISSUE. WE SEE NO EVIDENCE YET FOR MR. ROSTOW'S OPTIMISM ABOUT A QUOTE REASONABLE DEAL UNQUOTE BEING POSSIBLE AT THE MOMENT (PARAGRAPH 2 OF WASHINGTON TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE) AND MR. ROSTOW WAS UNABLE TO PRODUCE ANY. IT IS PERHAPS POSSIBLE THAT UNDER THE PRESSURE OF INTERNATIONAL OPINION AT THE U.N., AND IF THE U.S. ARE PREPARED TO PRESS THE ISRAELIS REALLY HARD ON THIS ISSUE, AS TO WHICH THERE MUST BE SOME DOUBTS IN ELECTION YEAR (THOUGH THIS IS A POINT WHICH KING HUSSEIN MUST BE LEFT TO DISCERN FOR HIMSELF), AND IF THE PROSPECTS OF A SETTLE-MENT WITH EGYPT BECOME MORE ENCOURAGING, THE ISRAELIS COULD BE BROUGHT TO SOME MODIFICATION OF THEIR CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT. BUT UNTIL THERE ARE MORE SOLID GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM OVER THE JERUSALEM ISSUE OR, ALTERNATIVELY, UNTIL THE ARAB COUNTRIES ARE SUFFICIENTLY IMPRESSED BY THE WEAKNESS OF THEIR POSITION VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL TO BE READY TO ACQUIESCE IN A DEGREE OF ISRAELI AUTHORITY IN THE OLD CITY, ANY ISRAELI/JORDANIAN NEGOTIATIONS WOULD IT SEEMS TO US BE BOUND TO BREAK DOWN ON THIS ISSUE. IN THAT CASE, THE KING'S POSITION WOULD PRESUMABLY BE WORSE THAN IF HE HAD NOT EMBARKED ON THEM.

/4.

4. KING HUSSEIN'S DILEMMA IS ADMITTEDLY SHARP. IF HE DOES NOT MAKE A MOVE HIS CHANCES OF REGAINING THE WEST BANK WILL PROBABLY DIMINISH: IF HE DOES, AND FAILS, HIS PRESTIGE AND ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE WILL BE REDUCED. HIS DECISION WILL PRESUMABLY DEPEND PARTLY ON HIS JUDGEMENT OF HOW LONG HE CAN AFFORD TO WAIT. ON THIS THE ESTIMATE IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE IS ENCOURAGING.

5. THE DANGERS FROM UNSUCCESSFUL EXCHANGES WITH THE ISRAELIS WOULD PRESUMABLY BE LESS IF THESE WERE CONDUCTED IN THE FIRST PLACE THROUGH A CONCILIATOR APPOINTED BY THE U.N. SUCH AN APPOINTMENT MIGHT POSSIBLY BE AN OUTCOME OF THE NEXT ROUND THERE.

SOSFA SENT 1152Z/18 SEPTEMBER 1967

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
U.N. DEPT.
N.E.A.D.

SSSSS

S E C R E T

CYPHER/CAT 'A'
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO 3006
SECRET.

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
19TH SEPTEMBER 1967.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 3006 OF 19TH SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV AND UKMIS NEW YORK. SAVING TO PARIS.
YOUR TEL.2059: JORDAN/ISRAEL.
I DISCUSSED THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY FIRST WITH WALT AND LATER WITH GENE ROSTOW.
2. GENE ROSTOW TOLD ME THAT, WHEN HE SUGGESTED IN LONDON THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR KING HUSSEIN TO DO A DEAL WITH THE ISRAELIS, HE HAD HAD IN MIND:

(A) A DISCUSSION HE HAD HAD WITH THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON BEFORE HIS VISIT TO EUROPE, WHEN EVRON HAD SAID THAT JERUSALEM WAS DEFINITELY NEGOTIABLE AS THE LAST ITEM ON THE AGENDA AND THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD HAVE GOT A BETTER DEAL IF HE HAD NEGOTIATED TWO MONTHS AGO THAN HE WOULD NOW AND EQUALLY WOULD DO BETTER NOW THAN IN SIX MONTHS' TIME:

(B) THE FACT THAT EVRON'S VIEWS HAD BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL WHOM ROSTOW HAD SEEN BRIEFLY AT LONDON AIRPORT. BARBOUR, WHO IS RETURNING HERE SHORTLY, HAD RECOMMENDED THAT KING HUSSEIN BE TOLD TIME WAS DEFINITELY WORKING AGAINST HIM OVER THE RETURN OF THE WEST BANK.

3. ROSTOW STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT HIMSELF VERY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS AND HAD RAISED THE QUESTION IN LONDON ON A PERSONAL BASIS BECAUSE HE WISHED TO ESTABLISH WHETHER WE TOO FELT THAT KING HUSSEIN'S CHANCES OF A FAVOURABLE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WERE DIMINISHING AS TIME WENT BY.

/4. ROSTOW

S E C R E T

4. ROSTOW THEN SAID HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A TELEGRAM REPORTING A CONVERSATION THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN HAD HAD WITH KING HUSSEIN. THE KING HAD BEEN VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF PROGRESS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE UNITED NATIONS. HE INTENDED COMING TO THE UNITED STATES IN OCTOBER AND, IF IT WAS CLEAR THAT NO PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT, THE JORDANIANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO SECRET TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS IN EITHER NEW YORK OR WASHINGTON. THE KING TOLD BURNS THAT HE WOULD EITHER HAVE TO MAKE A MOVE BY NOVEMBER OR FORGET ABOUT THE WEST BANK.

5. ROSTOW THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT OUR TWO AMBASSADORS IN AMMAN SHOULD IF POSSIBLE SPEAK TO THE KING ON THE SAME LINES AND HE HOPED THAT YOU WOULD THEREFORE AGREE TO DELAYING ADAMS' TALK TO THE KING FOR ANOTHER DAY OR SO IN ORDER TO GIVE THE STATE DEPARTMENT TIME TO CONSIDER THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS LATEST REPORT ON THE KING'S INTENTIONS. I SAID THAT YOU WOULD AGREE.

6. ROSTOW SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER THE KHARTOUM CONFERENCE HAD BEEN DREADFUL, THE STATE DEPARTMENT EXPERTS ON THE BASIS OF SECRET REPORTS ON THE CONFERENCE THOUGHT THE KING HAD BEEN GIVEN A GREEN LIGHT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE ISRAELIS. I POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS A HEAVILY QUALIFIED AGREEMENT AND CERTAINLY DID NOT COVER DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS. WALT ROSTOW TOLD ME THAT, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS, THERE COULD BE NO RETURN TO THE PREVIOUS POSITION ON JERUSALEM. WE KNOW THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE STILL THINKING IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONALISATION OF THE JORDANIAN PART OF THE CITY.

7. BOTH GENE AND WALT ROSTOW SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE VERY READY TO QUOTE LEAN ON UNQUOTE THE ISRAELIS AND INDEED HAD ALREADY BEEN PUTTING HEAVY PRESSURE ON THEM ABOUT JERUSALEM AND REFUGEES. BUT WALT ROSTOW QUALIFIED THIS BY SAYING THAT NEITHER ON THE QUESTION OF BELLIGERENCY NOR ON DIRECT ARAB-ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS WAS THERE ANYTHING WHICH THE AMERICANS COULD USE AS A LEVER ON THE ISRAELIS TO BRING ABOUT THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED ARAB / TERRITORIES

TERRITORIES.

8. GENE ROSTOW SAID THAT PROGRESS AT THE ASSEMBLY WOULD TURN ON THE U.S. TALKS WITH GROMYKO. I UNDERSTAND MR. RUSK WILL BE SEEING MR. GROMYKO IN NEW YORK FOR A WORKING DINNER ON 27 SEPTEMBER AND THAT THE LATTER WILL BE RETURNING TO MOSCOW ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. THE DIRECTOR OF SOVIET AFFAIRS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS CONFIRMED TO US THAT THE AMERICANS THINK THE RUSSIANS ARE NOW WALKING OUT ON THE DRAFT U.S./SOVIET RESOLUTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THE RUSSIANS WILL MAKE ANY SUBSTANTIVE MOVE DURING THE PRESENT SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

9. I STRESSED TO BOTH WALT AND GENE ROSTOW THE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF THE CONTINUED CLOSURE OF THE CANAL AND HOW LITTLE WE WERE LIKELY TO BENEFIT FROM THE DECISIONS OF THE KHARTOUM CONFERENCE (YOUR TEL. 9735). THEY BOTH SAID THAT THEY HAD THIS VERY MUCH IN MIND AND GENE ADDED THAT MR. RUSK AND MR. KATZENBACH WERE ALSO WELL AWARE OF AND SHARED OUR PREOCCUPATION: INDEED THIS WAS ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS WHY THE AMERICANS WERE PRESSING SO HARD FOR ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN 120 MOSCOW 231 TEL AVIV 132 AND SAVING PARIS 150

SIR. P. DEAN. SENT:0327Z/20 SEPT.
RECD:0327Z/20 SEPT.

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.
U.N.D.
N.E.A.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

AA

Fve

EN CLAIR
PRIORITY U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 2383 22 SEPTEMBER 1967
UNCLASSIFIED
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2383 OF 22 SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, BEIRUT, AND SAVING TO CAIRO AND JEDDA.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM (NOT TO ALL): MIDDLE EAST.

THE MAIN POINTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST IN MR. GROMYKO'S SPEECH ARE AS FOLLOWS.

2. ISRAEL WAS STILL OCCUPYING SIZEABLE PARTS OF THE U.A.R., SYRIA AND JORDAN, AND WAS IMPLANTING AN OCCUPATION ADMINISTRTION THERE. HER TROOPS LINED THE EASTERN BANK OF THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE CANAL ITSELF WAS OUT OF ACTION. MANY THOUSANDS OF ARAB REFUGEES HAD BEEN EVICTED. THE DANGER OF A RESUMPTION OF WAR REMAINED.

3. THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION HAD FAILED TO FIND A SOLUTION, THANKS LARGELY TO THE UNITED STATES. BUT QUOTE THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF STATES UNQUOTE HAD CONDEMNED THE AGGRESSORS ACTIONS AND SPOKEN UP FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE ARABS. INITIATIVES TAKEN RECENTLY IN ARAB CAPITALS MET WITH THE SOVIET UNION'S UNDERSTANDING. THE MAIN QUESTION WAS STILL THE NEED TO ENSURE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES BEHIND THE LINES THEY OCCUPIED BEFORE 5 JUNE. ALSO, THE U.A.R., SYRIA AND JORDAN SHOULD BE COMPENSATED FOR THE MATERIAL DAMAGE INFLICTED UPON THEM BY ISRAEL, AND BY THE CONTINUING OCCUPATION OF PARTS OF THEIR TERRITORY.

4. FURTHERMORE ISRAEL MUST COMPLY WITH THE U.N. DECISION ON JERUSALEM: OTHERWISE THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A DECISION ON SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT DECISION.

5. ISRAEL'S ATTACK ON THE ARAB STATES FACED THE U.N. STILL MORE EMPHATICALLY WITH THE QUESTION OF THE ATTITUDE TO BE TAKEN TOWARDS THE POLICY OF AGGRESSION. THE CHOICE BEFORE THE U.N. WAS CURBING THE AGGRESSOR OR CONNIVING WITH HIM.

6. EXERCISING HIS RIGHT OF REPLY, GOLDBERG, (U.S.A.) COMMENTED THAT UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS AS CALLED FOR BY THE SOVIET UNION, WOULD

/NOT PROVIDE

NOT PROVIDE A SOLUTION. TO OBTAIN A JUST SETTLEMENT, BOTH PARTIES MUST BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE.

7. FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 398, TEL AVIV 408, AMMAN 279, BEIRUT 168, AND SAVING CAIRO 159 AND JEDDA 97.

LORD CARADON

SENT 2258Z/22 SEPT
RECD 2259Z/22 SEPT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FQ/CQ/WH DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

FFFFF

ERW

Israel - Main file

Subject

file

Israel

(Pt 7)

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T250/67

COPY NO:

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 2422 24 SEPTEMBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY.

I AM ABOUT HALF WAY THROUGH MY PROGRAMME HERE AND ALREADY, ON SOME SUBJECTS AT LEAST, A FAIRLY CLEAR PATTERN IS BEGINNING TO EMERGE. I HAVE HAD GOOD TALKS WITH GROMYKO, COUVE, EBAN (TWICE) AND MAHMOUD RIAD. TOMORROW I AM TO HAVE A LONG SESSION WITH RUSK AT WHICH GOLDBERG WILL BE PRESENT. ON TUESDAY MORNING I WILL BE MAKING MY SPEECH TO THE ASSEMBLY.

2...GROMYKO WAS IN A VERY RELAXED IF NOT REFLECTIVE MOOD. THIS CONTRASTED WITH HIS SOMEWHAT THEATRICAL PERFORMANCE IN THE ASSEMBLY THE PREVIOUS DAY. WHEN HE WAS NOT WIPING THE SWEAT FROM HIS BROW HE WAS CASTIGATING THE AMERICANS, PRESUMABLY AS PART OF THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS. COUVE WAS SURPRISINGLY FRIENDLY - ONE OF MY STAFF SAID THAT HIS TEMPERATURE MUST ALMOST HAVE REACHED 34 DEGREES - AND, AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN IN A SEPARATE TELEGRAM, HE HAD INTERESTING THINGS TO SAY ABOUT OUR APPROACH TO THE E E C. EBAN WAS AS LUCID AS EVER BUT SHOWED LITTLE SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE. MAHMOUD RIAD WAS FRIENDLY, UNEMOTIONAL AND REALISTIC.

3...THE MIDDLE EAST HAS OF COURSE DOMINATED MY TALKS SO FAR. EBAN IS CLEARLY MORE CONCERNED WITH ISRAEL'S SECURITY THAN WITH TERRITORIAL GAINS. RIAD IS CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL HAVE TO BE SATISFIED IN SOME WAY AS TO THEIR FUTURE SECURITY. HE WARNED ME, HOWEVER, THAT THE PRESENT REASONABLE MOOD IN THE U A R WOULD NOT LAST. THIS POINT WAS ALSO MADE BY THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WHO APPEALED FOR SOME RESPONSE FROM THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY FROM US, WHICH WOULD STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF THE ADVOCATES OF MODERATION IN THE ARAB CAMP.

4...NO CONSENSUS HAS YET EMERGED ON WHAT THE NEXT STEPS SHOULD BE. EBAN DID NOT SEEM TO BE VERY INTERESTED IN THE PROPOSAL THAT A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD GO TO THE AREA BUT HE WOULD NOT OBJECT TO THIS. RIAD AND OTHER ARABS HAVE STRESSED THAT IF THIS PROPOSAL WERE MADE IN ISOLATION IT WOULD

/ BE REGARDED

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy sent to
Sir B. Trend
26/9

BE REGARDED BY THE ARABS AS A DELAYING DEVICE AND NOT AS A SERIOUS CONTRIBUTION TO SOLVING THE PROBLEM. THE ARABS WOULD, HOWEVER, LOOK AT IT DIFFERENTLY IF THE PROPOSAL WERE INCLUDED IN A RESOLUTION ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND RELATED MATTERS. YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT THIS WAS ONE OF MY MAIN PROPOSALS WHEN I ADDRESSED THE SPECIAL SESSION ON 21 JUNE AND IT HAS VERY RECENTLY BEEN PUBLICLY ENDORSED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. I HAVE THE FEELING THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE WELCOME TO MANY DELEGATIONS HERE AS A FIRST PRACTICAL STEP FORWARD.

5...THERE SEEMS WIDE AGREEMENT THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS THE PROPER BODY FOR DEALING WITH THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. GROMYKO, WHILE ACCEPTING THIS, WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS SINCE HE BELIEVES THAT U S SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL HAS HARDENED SINCE JUNE. IT SEEMED CLEAR TO ME THAT GROMYKO WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO HAVE A SETTLEMENT PROVIDED HE DID NOT HAVE TO MOVE AHEAD OF THE MODERATE ARABS. THIS IS DIFFERENT FROM THE IMPRESSIONS WE HAVE BEEN GETTING RECENTLY FROM THE AMERICANS, E G WHEN GENE ROSTOW WAS IN LONDON TEN DAYS AGO. EBAN BELIEVES THAT NO RESOLUTION WHICH WAS NOT UNDULY BIASED AGAINST THE ARABS WOULD ESCAPE THE SOVIET VETO. HIS POLICY THEREFORE IS TO PLAY FOR TIME AND TO PREVENT ANY INTERVENTION BY THE UNITED NATIONS AT THIS STAGE. THERE ARE OF COURSE OTHER REASONS WHY THIS SHOULD BE PRESENT ISRAEL POLICY.

6...TWO OTHER POINTS IN MY CONVERSATION WITH RIAD ARE OF INTEREST. I MENTIONED TO HIM A PROPOSAL (PUT TO ME BY U THANT) THAT THE EGYPTIANS SHOULD OPEN THE SOUTHERN END OF THE CANAL TO LET OUT THE SHIPS STUCK IN THE BITTER LAKES. HE LOOKED DUBIOUS, MENTIONED SOME OF THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES BUT DID NOT RULE IT OUT.

7...AS REGARDS OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS RIAD SAID THAT NASSER HAD VERY MUCH APPRECIATED THE TONE OF MY MESSAGE. THE U A R WOULD NOW HAVE TO CONSULT OTHER ARAB AND AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS WHO HAD NO RELATIONS WITH US BUT HE THOUGHT THERE WERE REASONABLE PROSPECTS

/ FOR A

CONFIDENTIAL

UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO.2422 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

FOR A FAVOURABLE REPLY IN A FEW WEEKS' TIME.
8...ON VIETNAM NO ONE SEES ANY POSSIBILITY OF MAKING PROGRESS. GROMYKO TOOK AS HARD A LINE AS EVER. IN FACT HE SAID IT WOULD NOT BE WORTH OUR WHILE DISCUSSING THE SUBJECT. I WILL LEARN MORE ABOUT THE AMERICAN POSITION TOMORROW FROM RUSK.
9...THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER, WHOM I SAW THREE DAYS AGO, SHOWED SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS AND HIS OFFICIALS AND OURS ARE WORKING ON A POSSIBLE NEW FORMULA. THE GOODWILL IS CERTAINLY THERE. I AGREED WITH THE GUATEMALAN, WHO IS AMONGST THE WORLD'S SLICKEST OPERATORS, THAT A COOLING OFF PERIOD OVER BRITISH HONDURAS WOULD BE IN BOTH OUR INTERESTS. I AM MEETING CASTIELLA TOMORROW BUT DO NOT EXPECT TO GET INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF GIBRALTAR WITH HIM. I WILL TELL HIM THAT A SENSIBLE DIALOGUE BETWEEN US IS OUT OF THE QUESTION SO LONG AS THE SPANIARDS KEEP ON ESCALATING THEIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST GIBRALTAR.
10..I TOLD THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT IN MY SPEECH NEXT TUESDAY I WILL BE CRITICISING CONSTRUCTIVELY CERTAIN ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. HE SURPRISED ME BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD WELCOME THIS. HE IS GIVING A DINNER ON TUESDAY EVENING FOR RUSK, GROMYKO, COUVE AND MYSELF. THIS HAS AROUSED SPECULATION HERE THAT U THANT IS PLANNING SOME INITIATIVE ON VIETNAM, BUT I THINK IT MORE LIKELY THAT HE WILL TRY TO GET OUR SUPPORT FOR HIS PROPOSAL THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD MEET IN CAMERA AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL FROM TIME TO TIME. THIS IDEA HAS SOME ATTRACTIONS FOR ME, BUT I AM DOUBTFUL HOW FAR IT WILL GET OF THE GROUND. GROMYKO WAS RATHER SCORNFUL WHEN I RAISED IT WITH HIM.
LORD CARADON.

SENT 0201Z/25 SEPTEMBER
RECD 0202Z/25 SEPTEMBER

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET]

PRISEC (F.O.)

CONFIDENTIAL

JB

2 file.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2436

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
25 SEPTEMBER 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2436 OF 25 SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON PARIS UKDEL NATO CAIRO
AND TEL AVIV.

FOLLOWING FROM SECRETARY OF STATE.

DISCUSSION WITH MR. RUSK: THE MIDDLE EAST.

WE HAD A LONG TALK. RUSK WAS OBVIOUSLY UNCERTAIN HOW TO PROCEED. GOLDBERG, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT WITH AMERICAN OFFICIALS, WAS FRANKLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING PROGRESS IN THE UNITED NATIONS. HIS VIEW WAS THAT IT WOULD BE VERY HARD TO GET THE RUSSIANS AWAY FROM THE POSITION THAT THE CRUCIAL QUESTION WAS STILL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO FIND A FORM OF WORDS IN A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION COVERING ISRAELI INDEPENDENCE AND NON- BELLIGERENCE WHICH WOULD NOT LEAD TO A RUSSIAN VETO. IT EMERGED FROM SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION THAT GOLDBERG TOOK THIS VIEW BECAUSE HE BELIEVED THAT THE RESOLUTION MUST BIND THE ARABS FIRMLY TO RECOGNITION. HE WAS NOT RECEPTIVE TO THE ARGUMENT THAT, SINCE RECOGNITION AND WITHDRAWAL OUGHT TO BE MORE OR LESS SIMULTANEOUS, THE RESOLUTION SHOULD NOT DO MORE THAN POINT THE WAY TO BOTH, LEAVING THEIR APPLICATION TO FOLLOW FROM THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR WHOM THE RESOLUTION WOULD ALSO PROVIDE.

2. I TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT MY STRONG IMPRESSION AFTER TALKING TO GROMYKO WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED TO GET A SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST IF POSSIBLE BY MEANS OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. IN GENERAL THIS WOULD HELP THEM OVER THEIR FUTURE COMMITMENTS TOWARDS ARAB COUNTRIES: ON THE OTHER HAND AFTER THEIR EXPERIENCES AT THE EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY THEY WERE NOT GOING TO MOVE AHEAD OF QUOTE MODERATE UNQUOTE

/ARAB

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy on Foreign Policy, September, 1967.

ARAB GOVERNMENTS. I CONSIDERED THAT WE COULD BEST MAKE PROGRESS THROUGH THE APPOINTMENT OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, BUT I RECOGNISED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD ONLY BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

3. I TOLD MR. RUSK THAT I THOUGHT THAT THE YUGOSLAVS MIGHT HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY HERE ALTHOUGH THE TITO PROPOSALS AS THEY STOOD WERE CERTAINLY NON-STARTERS. NIKESIC, THE YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO GREATLY IMPRESSED ME WHEN I SAW HIM YESTERDAY, MADE IT PLAIN THAT THE YUGOSLAV PROPOSALS WERE SIMPLY A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AND, IN ANY CASE, HAD BEEN PREPARED BEFORE THE KHARTOUM CONFERENCE.

4. I EMPHASISED THAT WE HAD NOT GOT MUCH TIME: ARAB GOVERNMENTS WOULD NOT REMAIN IN THEIR PRESENT MODERATE MOOD FOR LONG AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET THE CANAL OPEN QUICKLY. ON THE LATTER POINT I SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT TAKE THE IMMEDIATE PRACTICAL STEP OF PERSUADING THE U.A.R. TO RELEASE THE SHIPS NOW BLOCKED IN THE GREAT BITTER LAKE.

5. RUSK DID NOT DISSENT FROM THESE ARGUEMENTS (SISCO TOLD US AFTERWORDS THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT DID NOT FULLY SHARE THE PESSIMISM OF GOLDBERG). THEY ACCEPTED THE VIEW THAT PROGRESS COULD ONLY BE MADE THROUGH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THAT HIS APPOINTMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE ON THE BASIS OF A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. AT SOME TIME, HE ADDED, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO QUOTE PULL THE ISRAELIS UP UNQUOTE, BUT THEY WOULD WAIT FOR A MAJOR ISSUE ON WHICH TO DO IT. RUSK HAD NOT YET TALKED TO GROMYKO AND WAS MUCH INTERESTED IN MY ASSESSMENT OF THE RUSSIAN POINT OF VIEW. HE AGREED ALSO THAT AN IMPORTANT STEP WOULD BE TO GET THINGS

/MOVING

U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 2436 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

MOVING OVER THE SUEZ CANAL. HE THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE A PRACTICAL INTEREST ALSO IN GETTING THE SUEZ CANAL OPENED.

6. I SHALL BE MEETING RUSK AGAIN AT U THANT'S DINNER TOMORROW NIGHT. HE WILL THEN TELL ME THE RESULTS OF HIS OWN MEETING WITH GROMYKO.

F.O. PASS PARIS 394, UKDEL NATO 24, CAIRO 97 AND TEL AVIV 411.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0230Z/26

RECD AT 0230Z/26

[REPETITION TO CAIRO REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION
REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
U.N.D.
N.E.A.D.
ARABIAN DEPT.
NORTHERN DEPT.
J.R.D. (SOVIET)
D.D. AND P.U.S.D.
NEWS DEPT.
WESTERN DEPT.
AMERICAN DEPT.
J.R.D. (WESTERN)

C.O. M.E.W. AND U.N.D.
DIS M.O.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

77777

EN CLAIR
PRIORITY U.K.MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TEL NO 2441 UNCLASSIFIED 25 SEPTEMBER 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 2441 OF 25 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV, AMMAN AND MOSCOW.

ISRAELI SPEECH IN THE GENERAL DEBATE.

IN HIS SPEECH IN THE GENERAL DEBATE THIS AFTERNOON, MR. EBAN RECALLED HOW THE THREAT TO ISRAEL HAD GROWN IN THE WEEKS PRECEDING 5 JUNE, LEADING TO THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. HIS SPEECH ALSO CONTAINED A STRONG ATTACK ON SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. SPEAKING OF ISRAEL'S POLICY,HE SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN DESCRIBED IN HIS STATEMENTS OF 19 JUNE AND SUBSEQUENT DATES AND HAD NOT CHANGED.

SOME EXTRACTS FROM HIS SPEECH DESCRIBING THIS POLICY AND THE ISRAELI VIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:-

3. ISRAEL'S POLICY RE-STATED

ON JUNE 19 AND ON SUBSEQUENT DATES, I DESCRIBED MY GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS AND POLICIES ON THE MIDDLE EASTERN CONFLICT. THESE HAVE NOT CHANGED. UNTIL PEACE IS ACHIEVED WE SHALL FULLY PRESERVE AND RESPECT THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS. WE STAND READY TO NEGOTIATE THEIR REPLACE-MENT BY TREATIES OF PEACE WHICH WILL ENSURE THE SECURITY OF ALL MIDDLE EASTERN STATES AND ESTABLISH CONDITIONS OF STABLE CO-EXISTENCE.

IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARAB GOVERNMENTS WE SHALL MAKE VIABLE AND EQUITABLE PROPOSALS COMPATIBLE WITH THE NATIONAL HONOUR AND LEGITIM-ATE INTERESTS OF ALL STATES. WE SHALL ALSO MAKE SUGGESTIONS FOR EFFECTIVE REGIONAL COOPERATION, AND FOR THE REGIONAL AND INTERNATION-AL SOLUTION OF POPULATION PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE WARS AND BELLIGERENT POLICIES OF THE PAST TWO DECADES. WE SHALL, OF COURSE, GIVE CONSIDERATION AND MAKE REPLY TO WHATEVER SUGGESTIONS THE OTHER NEGOTIATING PARTIES DECIDE TO SUBMIT. /IN SHORT

IN SHORT, WE PROPOSE THAT A NINETEEN YEAR OLD WAR BE BROUGHT AT LONG LAST TO A PERMANENT END BY PACIFIC SETTLEMENT AND DIRECT AGREEMENT.

THE PRINCIPLES HELD VALID IN ALL OTHER INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS MUST BE APPLIED IN THIS CASE. NEVER IN THE HISTORY OF NATIONS HAS PROGRESS TOWARDS A DURABLE SETTLEMENT BEEN MADE IN THE ABSENCE OF A WILL TO NEGOTIATE.....

WE CANNOT RECONCILE OURSELVES AGAIN TO UNILATERAL BELLIGERENCY, OR BE SATISFIED WITH INTERMEDIATE SITUATIONS WHICH ARE NEITHER WAR NOR PEACE. IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL THE TRADITIONS AND PRECEDENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE CEASE-FIRE SITUATION MUST BE REPLACED BY PEACE TREATIES WITH THE AUTOMATIC COROLLARY THAT BELLIGERENCY IS AT A PERMANENT END. WE AGREE WITH THOSE WHO HAVE SAID THAT THE FRAGILE AND VIOLATED ARMISTICE LINES MUST BE SUPERSEDED BY ACCEPTED FRONTIERS AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS ENSURING SECURITY AGAINST TERROR DESTRUCTION AND WAR. AND, IT IS VITAL THAT THE NEW SITUATION SHOULD REST ON CONTRACT AT ARRANGEMENTS WHICH COMMIT AND ENGAGE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ISRAEL AND EACH ARAB STATE. NO EXTERNAL DECLARATIONS OR GUARANTEES NO GENERAL AFFIRMATIONS OF CHARTER PRINCIPLES, NO RECOMMENDATIONS OR STATEMENTS BY INTERNATIONAL BODIES, HOWEVER UNEXCEPTIONABLE, CAN REPLACE THE SOVEREIGN RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED. I STRESS THIS POINT IN THE LIGHT OF PROPOSALS SUCH AS THOSE PRESENTED BY YUGOSLOVIA TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS - (BUT NOT TO ISRAEL), ACCORDING TO WHICH THERE WOULD BE A MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THE CEASE-FIRE LINES WITHOUT ANY DIRECT PEACE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE ARAB STATES. NO SERVICE IS DONE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CAUSE BY SEEKING CLEVER INEFFECTUAL SUBSTITUTES FOR DIRECT AND RECIPROCAL NATIONAL MOVEMENTS.

4. ON THE UNITED NATIONS' ROLE

THESE CONSIDERATION HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EASTERN CONFLICT. THE FACT THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WAS HELPLESS TO PREVENT THE WAR HAS A DIRECT BEARING ON THE QUESTION OF ITS CAPACITY AND TITLE TO IMPOSE A PEACE. THE INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES AND OF THE ORGANIZATION ITSELF REQUIRE THAT UNITED NATIONS ACTION BE REALISTICALLY ADAPTED TO UNITED NATIONS CAPACITIES. A CALL TO MIDDLE EASTERN STATES TO NEGOTIATE THE CONDITIONS OF THEIR FUTURE CO-EXISTENCE IS THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE COURSE WHICH THIS ASSEMBLY CAN TAKE. WHAT THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD STRENUOUSLY AVOID IS THE TENDENCY TO MAKE ITS EXISTENCE A SUBSTITUTE FOR NEGOTIATION AND A BARRIER TO DIRECT SETTLEMENT.....

THERE IS ALREADY EVIDENCE THAT ARAB STATES REGARD THE UNITED NATIONS AS A SHELTER AGAINST THE NECESSITY OF PEACE. THIS IS THE PRECISE ANTITHESIS OF WHAT THIS ORGANIZATION IS MEANT TO BE.

5. ON REFUGEES

IN THE FORTHCOMING DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, WE SHALL MAKE FURTHER PROPOSALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL AND HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS. IT IS DEPLORABLE THAT THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT WHOSE WARLIKE DECISION ON JUNE 5 PROVOKED THE JOURNEY OF REFUGEES FROM THE WEST TO THE EAST BANK, SHOULD NOT BE USING THEIR PLIGHT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL WARFARE.

(HE ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT THE SILENCES ABOUT THE FATE OF JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN ARAB LANDS.)

/ON

ON JERUSALEM

AFTER TWENTY SORDID YEARS OF DIVISION, WAR AND SACRILEGE, THERE IS NOW UNITY, PEACE AND THE ASSURANCES OF ACCESS TO THE HOLY PLACES. THERE ARE STILL MATTERS TO BE RESOLVED IN JERUSALEM. THE PRESENT SITUATION, WHICH HAS ARISEN DIRECTLY FROM JORDANIAN AGGRESSION, DOES NOT FORECLOSE OR PRE-EMPT THE AGREED SETTLEMENT OF THOSE IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE JERUSALEM PROBLEM WHICH HAVE ALWAYS BEEN AT THE ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSAL INTEREST IN THE CITY.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS TEL AVIV 413, AMMAN 281 AND MOSCOW 414

LORD CARADON

SENT 0340Z/26
RECD 0340Z/26

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

Israel (Pt 7) 10 B

No 10.

COPY NO. 15

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3071
SECRET.

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
27 SEPTEMBER 1967.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPENT AN HOUR AND A QUARTER WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON THIS MORNING.

2. THE SUBJECT UPPERSMOST IN THE PRESIDENT'S MIND WAS OF COURSE VIETNAM. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TRIED TO PERSUADE HIM THAT THE ADVANTAGES ACCRUING FROM THE CONTINUED BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM WERE OUTWEIGHED BY THE POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES WITH WORLD OPINION GENERALLY AND PARTICULARLY THE ALLIES OF THE UNITED STATES. THE PRESIDENT AGREED THAT THE MILITARY ADVANTAGES WERE AT BEST MARGINAL, BUT SAID THAT FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS HE WAS UNABLE TO PUT A STOP TO THE BOMBING.

3. THE PRESIDENT DESCRIBED IN DETAIL THE VARIOUS APPROACHES THE AMERICANS AND THEIR FRIENDS HAD MADE TO TRY TO GET TALKS STARTED. BUT ON NO OCCASION HAD HANOI RESPONDED. HE FELT THAT THE NEXT YEAR'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES WERE PLAYING A PART IN HANOI'S CALCULATIONS, WHERE THE VARIOUS AMERICAN INITIATIVES WERE INTERPRETED AS SIGNS OF PRE-ELECTORAL NERVOUSNESS. HE WAS CONSEQUENTLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF GETTING ANY NEGOTIATION BEFORE NOVEMBER 1968.

4. ON THE MIDDLE EAST THE PRESIDENT WAS LESS INCLINED THAN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND GOLDBERG TO LET MATTERS RUN THEIR COURSE, AS THE ISRAELIS WOULD PREFER. HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED IN THE GENUINENESS OF THE NEW MOOD OF MODERATION DISPLAYED BY THE ARABS AT KHARTOUM. HE FELT ON THE OTHER HAND THAT THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE WAS HARDENING. HE THOUGHT THAT IF THE ISRAELIS PERSISTED IN THIS THEY MIGHT GET THEMSELVES INTO A CORNER.

5. IN THE CONTEXT OF A DISCUSSION OF THE BYRNES AND GROSS AMENDMENTS AND THE RECENT A.B.M. ANNOUNCEMENT THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO COMPLAIN PUBLICLY FROM TIME TO TIME OVER ACTIONS BY THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WHICH THEY

/CONSIDERED

SECRET

CONSIDERED HIGHHANDED. AS REGARDS THE A.B.M. DECISION HE THOUGHT. THAT WE HAD HAD ENOUGH WARNING THAT IT WAS IN THE WIND.

6. IN TALKING TO THE PRESS AT THE END OF THE MEETING THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WAS ALWAYS A WELCOME VISITOR BECAUSE HE ALWAYS SPOKE HIS MIND FRANKLY.

SIR P DEAN

SENT 2242Z/27
RECD 2243Z/27

PRISEC (F.O.)

JPC

fr6

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A.
PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO 3093

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
29 SEPTEMBER 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDSD TO F.O. TELNO 3093 OF 29 SEPTEMBER REPTD FOR INFMN UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV BEIRUT AMMAN CAIRO.
MIDDLE EAST.
RUSK AND GROMYKO MET IN NEW YORK ON THE 27TH SEPTEMBER PRIVATELY. KOHLER GAVE THE MINISTER TODAY THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF THEIR CONVERSATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST.
2. GROMYKO CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIET VIEWS WERE STILL BASED ON THE TENTATIVE DRAFT AGREED BETWEEN GROMYKO AND GOLDBERG AT THE END OF THE SPECIAL SESSION. HE DENIED SUGGESTIONS BY RUSK THAT THE SOVIETS WERE MOVING AWAY FROM THIS DRAFT IN THE DIRECTION OF A TITO TYPE FORMULA THOUGH HE SAID THAT THIS FORMULA WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN POINTS OF INTERPRETATION IN THE GROMYKO GOLDBERG FORMULA ON WHICH THE SOVIETS DID NOT SEE EYE TO EYE WITH THE AMERICANS. HE SAID IN PARTICULAR THAT ANY DRAFT RESOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS, IMPLYING THEREBY THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT EXERT THEMSELVES MUCH TO SECURE ARAB AGREEMENT. HIS SECOND POINT REFERRED TO THE SUEZ CANAL ., ON THIS HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NO OBJECTION TO ISRAELI FLAG SHIPS USING THE CANAL BUT THAT HE DOUBTED WHETHER THIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS. RUSK INTERPRETS THIS AS MEANING THAT THE USSR WILL NOT SUPPORT PUBLICLY THE ISRAELI RIGHT TO USE THE CANAL. GROMYKO APPEARED LESS CONCERNED ABOUT THE ALGERIANS AND THE SYRIANS THAN PREVIOUSLY AND SEEMED TO WANT A SOLUTION WHICH IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GET NASSER AND THE MODERATE ARABS TO LIVE WITH. IN PARTICULAR HE SEEMED TO THINK THAT IT WAS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT TO FIND A FORMULA ON THE ENDING OF BELLIGERENCY WHICH WOULD NOT HUMILIATE THE ARABS. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO TALK FURTHER, PRESUMABLY IN NEW YORK.

/N.P.3.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. KOHLER'S COMMENT WAS THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR EARLY PROGRESS IN NEW YORK DID NOT SEEM TO HIM TO BE GOOD AND THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE STILL CLEARLY SOMEWHAT HESITANT. HE THOUGHT HOWEVER THAT THE PROSPECTS WOULD IMPROVE IN A FEW WEEKS TIME WHEN FAIRLY GENERAL AGREEMENT ON BASIC ISSUES MIGHT HAVE BEEN REACHED IN THE CORRIDORS. IT MIGHT THEN BE POSSIBLE TO GET A RESOLUTION THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL APPOINTING A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO VISIT THE AREA AND GET INTO TOUCH WITH THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED. THE MINISTER ARGUED THAT YOU HAD DETECTED ENCOURAGING SIGNS OF MOVEMENT ON THE PART OF THE RUSSIANS THAT A GENERAL CONSENSUS SEEMED TO BE DEVELOPING IN THE U.N. IN FAVOUR OF EARLY ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND THAT THERE WAS AN URGENT NEED TO PRESS FORWARD.
F.O. PASS MOSCOW 236, PARIS 261, TEL AVIV 135, BEIRUT 61, AMMAN 124, CAIRO 55.

SIR P DEAN

SENT AT 29/2325Z SEPTEMBER
RECD AT 29/2325Z SEPTEMBER

RC

[REPETITION TO CAIRO REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
N.E.A.D.
NORTHERN DEPT.
J.R.D. (SOVIET SECT.)
D.D. & P.U.S.D.
U.N. DEPT.
NEWS DEPT.
J.I.R.D.
J.I.P.G.D.
C.O. M.E.W. & U.N. DEPT.
DIS. MOD.

file

Israel

En Clair

IMMEDIATE CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Tel. No. 961 30 September, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 961 of 30 September.
Repeated for information to UKMIS New York and U.K.Mission Geneva.

The following appears prominently on the front page of today's Al Ahram under the heading "British Foreign Minister sends important message to President Nasser": sub-heading states that you wrote personally and suggested the sending of a special envoy to Cairo to clarify a number of questions and that the special envoy, Sir Harold Beeley, will arrive in Cairo in two weeks.

2. The diplomatic editor of Al Ahram has learned that President Nasser has received a message from Mr. George Brown, British Minister of Foreign Affairs, and that a reply reached London some days ago. Mr. Brown's message, though it touched on important political questions, was of a private nature arising from the old friendship between the President and Mr. Brown when the latter was in Opposition. Although relations with Britain were broken off over Rhodesia over two years ago Mr. Brown has sent the President several messages dealing with a large number of political questions but the correspondence was broken off after the Middle East crisis until Mr. Brown again took the initiative and wrote to the President. The diplomatic editor has learned that the British Foreign Minister, when he met the Egyptian Foreign Minister some days ago in New York at the United Nations General Assembly, told him that he felt there were a number of questions he would like to elucidate with Cairo. Hence he suggests the delegation of a special envoy well acquainted with and well known to Cairo to come here for talks and explanations. The editor learns that Mr. Brown has chosen Sir Harold Beeley, previously British Ambassador in Cairo, and also one of Britain's leading experts in Arab affairs and it has been decided that Sir Harold will undertake his visit within the space of two weeks.

3. Akhbar, under the heading "Egypt/British relations" reports briefly a B.B.C. statement that talks between yourself and Mr. Riad in New York dealt with relations between the two countries and that British circles expected an improvement in these relations in the course of October.

Foreign Office pass Immediate UKMIS New York 88 and U.K.Mission Geneva 11.

Mr. Tesh

Sent 0700Z/30 September
Recd. 0837Z/30 September

[Repeated as requested]

FO/CO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES SENT.

N.E.A.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2633 9 OCTOBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 2633 OF 9 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV AND AMMAN.
MY TELEGRAM NO. 2613: MIDDLE EAST.
REPRESENTATIVES OF THIS MISSION MET TODAY WITH REPERESENTATIVES OF THE U.S. MISSION IN ORDER TO CONSIDER FUTHER THE PAPER ABOUT FUTURE ACTION WHICH AMBASSADOR PEDERSON HAD PUT FORWARD YESTERDAY. GOLDBERG HAD BEEN CONSULTED.
2. I ASKED OUR REPRESENTATIVES TO REPEAT THAT WE WISHED TO SEE EARLY REFERENCE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE BASIS OF THE GROMYKO-GOLDBERG TEXT (AS MODIFIED IN THE WASHINGTON TALKS) WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO SETTLE IN ADVANCE DETAILED QUESTIONS OF IMPLEMENTATION WHICH SHOULD BE FOR NEGOTIATION BY THE U.N. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.
3. FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WITH THE U.S. MISSION THE PAPER IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM WAS PREPARED BY THE AMERICANS SEEKING OUR AGREEMENT. THE U.S. MISSION IS PUTTING THIS PAPER TO WASHINGTON AND I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT TO YOU FOR INSTRUCTIONS.
4. I SHOULD HAVE PREFERRED THE UNITED STATES TO GO BACK INTO URGENT NEGOTIATION WITH THE USSR WITH THE TRUE GROMYKO-GOLDBERG TEXT AS THE STARTING POINT AND WITHOUT ANY PRIOR IMPEDIMENTS. BUT THEY ARGUE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD AGREED ON MEANINGS LAST SUMMER AND HAVE PERSISTANTLY BACKED OFF SINCE THEN AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO ARGUE WITH MOST OF THE POINTS IN THE PAPER NOW PREPARED.
5. MY MOST SERIOUS DOUBT ABOUT THE PROPOSALS IN THAT PAPER IS WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPH 6 AND THE PHRASE ''WITHDRAWAL MUST SIMILARLY BE UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF THE U.A.R., JORDAN AND SYRIA''. I SUGGEST THAT IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO DEPART FROM THE WORDS IN THE GROMYKO-GLODBERG TEXT ''WITHDRAWAL BY THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT OF THEIR FORCES FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY THEM''. THOUGH THE AMERICANS MAINTAIN THAT THE NEW WORDING WAS A RUSSIAN VERSION PUT FORWARD IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WHEN BOTH AGREED THAT JERUSALEM WOULD NEED SPECIAL TREATMENT, THE NEW WORDING IS AN OBVIOUS ATTEMPT / TO

CONFIDENTIAL

TO EXCLUDE JERUSALEM FROM THE WITHDRAWAL. BUT THE U.S. ARGUE THAT SINCE DE JURE RECOGNITION HAS NEVER BEEN AFFORDED THE ARABS OVER THE OLD CITY OR OVER GAZA, THE ''OTHER POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS'' IS A LEGITIMATE WAY OF HANDLING THESE TWO PROBLEMS. NEVERTHELESS IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF WE NOW ABANDON THE REQUIREMENT FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORY OCCUPIED IN THE RECENT CONFLICT NEW NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BREAK DOWN AT THE START.

6. SUBJECT TO THAT PRINCIPAL POINT (AND TO WHAT I SAY IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH), I THINK THAT WE SHOULD TELL THE AMERICANS THAT WE ARE CONTENT WITH THE PAPER AND HOPE THAT THE U.S. WILL NOW UNDERTAKE URGENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR ACCORDINGLY. I THINK WE CAN TAKE IT THAT, SUBJECT TO ANY INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED BY THE U.S. MISSION FROM WASHINGTON, WE SHALL NOT GET THE AMERICANS TO MOVE INTO NEGOTIATION WITH THE USSR ON ANY OTHER BASIS. NOR DO I THINK THEY WILL PROCEED WITHOUR OUR ENDORSEMENT OF THE PROPOSALS IN THE PAPER.

7. BUT IN SAYING THAT WE HOPE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR ON THE BASIS OF THE PAPER CAN BE RESUMED AT ONCE I THINK THAT WE SHOULD AGAIN EMPHASISE OUR ANXIETY TO SEE ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL SOON ON A RESOLUTION SUCH AS THAT AGREED IN THE WASHINGTON TALKS, LEAVING DETAILED NEGOTIATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.

8. I HOPE THAT YOU CAN GIVE ME INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS VERY SOON. I AM STILL VERY MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGER OF DAMAGE WHICH WILL BE DONE IF A DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST STARTS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY NEXT WEEK: SO WE MUST DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO ENCOURAGE NEW US/USSR NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT ANY DELAY.

F.O. PASS PARIS 434 MOSCOW 453, TEL AVIV 449 AND AMMAN 318.

LORD CARADON

SENT Ø131 1Ø OCTOBER

RECD Ø131 1Ø OCTOBER

[REPETITION TO TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS].

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
U.N. DEPT.
NORTHERN DEPT.
J.R.D. (SOVIET SECTION)
GVL N.E.A.D.
ADEN DEPT.
ARABIAN DEPT.
C.O. M.E.W. AND U.N.D.
I. AND G. DEPT.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 2634 9 OCTOBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 2634 OF 9 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW TEL AVIV AND AMMAN.

MY I P/T:

MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LATEST VERSION OF PAPER DISCUSSED BY OFFICIALS OF THIS AND THE U S MISSION. IT IS AD REFERENDUM ON BOTH SIDES:-

BEGINS.

DRAFT SUMMARY OF AGREED US/UK PROPOSALS RESULTING FROM THE GOLDBERG-CARADON TALKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, OCTOBER 6, 1967.

1. IT IS PREFERABLE TO DEAL WITH THE MIDDLE EAST ITEM IN THE SC RATHER THAN IN THE GA, AND AS SOON AS AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON A COMMON COURSE OF ACTION.

2. BEFORE WE GO TO THE SC THE US, UK, USSR AND FRANCE SHOULD HAVE A UNIFORM UNDERSTANDING OF THE MEANING OF THE PRINCIPLES TO BE LAID DOWN BY THE SC AND OF THE SPECIFIC ACTIONS THEY ENVISAGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THESE PRINCIPLES.

3. THE U S IS PREPARED TO PURSUE FURTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH THE U S S R TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER IT STANDS ON THE CORRECT TEXT OF VERSION ONE OF THE US-SOV DRAFT OF JULY AND WHETHER IT CONCURS IN AN AGREED INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT, OR IF NOT WHAT CONDITIONS OR RESERVATIONS IT HAS. THIS DISCUSSION WOULD BE OPEN-ENDED ON BOTH PARTS SO THAT IF CHANGES IN THE TEXT WERE ASKED FOR BY THEM, CHANGES COULD ALSO BE ASKED FOR BY THE US WITHOUT BEING SUBJECT BY THEM TO ACCUSATIONS OF HARDENING ITS POSITION.

4. AN AGREED TEXT OF VERSION ONE OF THE US-SOV DRAFT OF LATE JULY, WITH THE ADDITION OF A UN REP AND ADJUSTED TO FIT THE SC,

/SUCH

CONFIDENTIAL

(SUCH AS THE UK-US WASHINGTON WORKING PAPER,) IS AN APPROPRIATE BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS AS TO SC ACTION. IN ADDITION TO CONSULTATIONS WITH THE USSR, ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSULTED TO DETERMINE THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION, AND THEIR SUGGESTIONS TO BE GIVEN CONSIDERATION.

5. IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD, BOTH AMONG THE PERMANENT MEMBERS AND AMONG THE PARTIES, THAT PARA 2B OF THE US-SOV DRAFT ENVISAGES IN IMPLEMENTATION AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS TO ACKNOWLEDGE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY AND TO TERMINATE BELLIGERENCE, DETAILS OF WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT ALONG THE LINES OF PARA 9 BELOW, BUT THAT SUCH TERMINATION WOULD MEAN, INTER ALIA, THAT BOTH TIRAN STRAIT AND SUEZ CANAL WOULD BE OPEN TO SHIPS OF ALL STATES, INCLUDING ISRAEL.

6. PARA 2A OF THAT TEXT REFERRING TO WITHDRAWAL MUST SIMILARLY BE UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF THE UAR, JORDAN, AND SYRIA, DETAILS OF WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT ALONG THE LINES OF PARA 9 BELOW, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PEACE AND SECURITY PROBLEMS MENTIONED IN PARA 2B. (IN DISCUSSING THIS WITH THE USSR, THE US WOULD ELUCIDATE THAT DEMILITARIZED ZONES, POSSIBLY WITH UN SUPERVISION, AND OTHER POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS AND AGREEMENTS ARE ENVISAGED, AND THAT IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE ARMISTICE LINES WOULD BE REPLACED BY INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES.)

7. DESIRABLE AS IT WOULD BE, IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT THE PARTIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST WILL COMMIT THEMSELVES TO SPECIFICS IN ADVANCE OF SC ACTION: HOWEVER, THEY MUST HAVE THE SAME UNDERSTANDING OF THE SC RESOLUTION AS DO THE BIG FOUR.

8. IN ADDITION TO THE PRIVATE UNDERSTANDING BY THE PARTIES OF THE MEANING OF THE RESOLUTION, THEY WOULD BE EXPECTED TO SIGNIFY THEIR COMMITMENT TO IT BY PUBLICLY ''ACCEPTING'' IT AFTER ITS ADOPTION AND AGREEING TO COOPERATE WITH THE UN REPRESENTATIVE IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

/ 9.

9. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLES IN THE RESOLUTION, AND THE DETAILS THEREOF, WOULD BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF A UN REPRESENTATIVE.

10. IT IS NOT AT ALL CERTAIN THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WILL BE SUCCESSFUL: IF NOT, THERE SHOULD BE A DILIGENTLY PURSUED ATTEMPT TO PRODUCE A RESOLUTION LAYING DOWN MORE GENERALISED CHARTER PRINCIPLES AND AN EVEN-HANDED MANDATE FOR THE DESPATCH OF A UN REPRESENTATIVE TO CONSULT WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED, WITH A VIEW TO ASSISTING THEM IN ESTABLISHING A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: OR SIMPLY A RESOLUTION LAYING DOWN SUCH A MANDATE.
ENDS.
F O PASS PARIS 435, MOSCOW 454, TEL AVIV 450 AND AMMAN 319.
LORD CARADON.

SENT AT 0133Z 10 OCTOBER.
RECD AT 0133Z 10 OCTOBER.

[REPETITION TO TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS].

R.W.S.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.
U.N. DEPT.
NORTHERN DEPT.
J.R.D.
N.E.A.D.
ADEN DEPT.
ARABIAN DEPT.
MEW & U.N.D
I. & G.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

TEL NO. 2191 9 OCTOBER 1967 (E)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELNO 2191 OF 9 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW SAVING TO PARIS.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1159 AND UKMIS NEW YORK TEL 2616: MIDDLE EAST.

I SHOULD LIKE YOU TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO KING HUSSEIN:

(I) I HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED TO LEARN FROM YOU THAT DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW THE KING GAVE FURTHER IMPETUS TO THE IDEA THAT THE NEXT STEP SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY THE PASSAGE OF A BALANCED RESOLUTION ON THE LINES OF THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO DRAFT. AS HE KNOWS THIS HAS ALL ALONG BEEN OUR VIEW:

(II) HOWEVER, THE QUESTION OF THE EXACT WORDING IN WHICH THE PRINCIPLES INCORPORATED IN THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO DRAFT SHOULD BE ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS A DELICATE ONE WHICH WILL IN THE END HAVE TO BE SETTLED BY NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW YORK WHERE ALL THE PARTIES ARE REPRESENTED:

(III) I THEREFORE SEE SOME DANGER IN THE PROLIFERATION OF ALTERNATIVE VARIATIONS OF THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO DRAFT. THERE MUST BE A SERIOUS RISK THAT ALTERNATIVE TEXTS WOULD LEAK TO THE PRESS OR WIDELY AMONG DELEGATIONS AT THE U.N. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, KING HUSSEIN'S TEXT IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1160 LEAKED IN THIS WAY IT WOULD BECOME MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE JORDANIAN (WHO IS NOW NAMED AS ONE OF THE FOUR ARAB NEGOTIATORS) AND THE U A R REPRESENTATIVES TO BE FLEXIBLE IN NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW YORK, THE POSITION OF THE EXTREMIST ARABS WOULD HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED, AND THE RISK OF DEADLOCK WOULD HAVE BEEN INCREASED:

(IV) WE WOULD THEREFORE ADVISE KING HUSSEIN THAT IN THE INTERESTS OF MAKING EARLY PROGRESS (AND HE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT THE PRESENT ISRAELI TACTICS ARE EVIDENTLY TO DELAY) HE SHOULD IN ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SYRIANS AND ALGERIANS AVOID COMMITTING HIMSELF TO INSISTENCE ON HIS DRAFT WHICH CAN ONLY BE ONE OF A NUMBER OF FORMULATIONS, AND WOULD BE BEST KEPT FOR USE IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION:

(V) TO ENSURE NO MISUNDERSTANDING, THE AUTHENTIC TEXT OF THE DRAFT IS AS FOLLOWS (READING HIM IN THE TEXT AS IN UK MISSION TELEGRAM NO 1833 (NOT 1832) OF 21 JULY): KING HUSSEIN WILL PERCEIVE HOW CAREFULLY BALANCED IS THE WORDING IN PARAGRAPHS 2(A) AND 2(b). WE FEAR THAT SUCH CHANGES AS FOR INSTANCE THE INSERTION OF THE WORDS ''AFTER THE 4TH OF JUNE'' IN 2 (A) MIGHT LEAD TO SEVERE NEGOTIATING DIFFICULTIES, AND PREJUDICE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE OF MAKING EARLY PROGRESS.

2. I DO NOT WANT AT THIS STAGE TO GET INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN ABOUT DETAILED WORDING, BUT IF YOU CAN DO SO WITHOUT GETTING DRAWN INTO DETAILS, YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN TO HIM THAT WE THINK IT BEST FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO STICK TO ESTABLISHING PRINCIPLES WHICH CAN SERVE AS GUIDELINES FOR THE WORK OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THE MORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL GETS INTO DISCUSSION OF DETAILS THE HARDER IT WILL TO MAKE PROGRESS.

SOSFA SENT 1720Z 9 OCTOBER

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:
FO: EASTERN DEPT
UNITED NATIONS DEPT
N.E.A.D.
ADEN DEPT
ARABIAN DEPT
J.I.P.G.D.

file Like ext 14/10

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 10727 11 OCTOBER 1967 (PS)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 10727 OF 11 OCTOBER AND TO UKMIS NEW YORK REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW TEL AVIV AMMAN AND PARIS.
M I P T.
FOLLOWING IS DRAFT TEXT OF MESSAGE TO RUSK.
BEGINS.
YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE DRAFT PAPER PREPARED FOLLOWING THE VALUABLE TALKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST BETWEEN ARTHUR GOLDBERG AND HUGH CARADON ON 6 OCTOBER.
2. YOU WILL ALSO KNOW THAT OUR POSITION HAS ALL ALONG BEEN THAT THE U N SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN A SETTLEMENT: THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS A BETTER FORUM THAN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: AND THAT WHAT IS NEEDED IS A BALANCED RESOLUTION SETTING OUT THE TWO PRINCIPLES OF WITHDRAWAL AND A RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES IN THE AREA TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY, WITH PROVISION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. WE HAVE FAVOURED AN EARLY RETURN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, PREFERABLY BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY LAUNCHES ITSELF INTO AN ILL-TEMPERED MIDDLE EAST DEBATE WHICH COULD ONLY SERVE TO HARDEN POSITIONS AND EMBITTER THE ATMOSPHERE. IN ALL THIS, THERE HAS, I THINK, BEEN NO BASIC DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US IN OBJECTIVE. HITHERTO, WE HAVE CONSIDERED THAT THE BEST CHANCE OF MAKING PROGRESS LAY IN PURSUING THE LINE OF THE SO-CALLED GOLDBERG/GROMYKO FORMULA WHICH WE NOT ONLY REGARD AS BALANCED ON THE TWIN ELEMENTS OF WITHDRAWAL AND RECOGNITION, BUT WHICH WE BELIEVE TO BE GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE RUSSIANS AND TO ALL BUT THE EXTREME ARABS. WE HAVE THOUGHT THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THIS FORMULA SHOULD ENABLE US TO GET A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON TO THE GROUND TO START WORK TO NARROW THE GAP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

/3....

3. HOWEVER, IT DOES NOW APPEAR THAT THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US AS TO HOW FAR IT IS WISE OR NECESSARY TO SEEK SPECIFIC AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE OF A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING FROM ALL THOSE DIRECTLY CONCERNED ON THEIR PRECISE UNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPLICATIONS BEHIND PARAGRAPHS 2(A) AND 2(B) OF THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO FORMULA. I QUITE ACCEPT THE ADVANTAGES IN SECURING SUCH AGREEMENT IF IT COULD BE DONE, AND THE POSSIBLE RISKS OF NOT DOING SO. HOWEVER, I AM NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES OF AN EARLY MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IF WE MAKE THIS CONDITIONAL ON PRIOR AGREEMENT ON THE LINES PUT BY ARTHUR GOLDBERG TO HUGH CARADON. IN PARTICULAR, I FEAR THAT AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH IN ADVANCE OF A MEETING THAT THE SUEZ CANAL WOULD BE OPENED TO ISRAELI SHIPPING, AND AN EXACT DEFINITION OF THE TERRITORIES TO BE COVERED BY THE CONCEPT OF WITHDRAWAL (ESPECIALLY THE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM) WOULD TOGETHER CONSTITUTE A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO EARLY PROGRESS.

4. I FEAR THAT UNLESS WE CAN GET AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING IN THE COURSE OF THIS WEEK WE SHALL NOT BE ABLE TO HOLD OFF AN ASSEMBLY DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE IS ALSO A STRONG LIKELIHOOD THAT THE ARABS WILL MOVE FOR EARLY MEETINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON JERUSALEM AND REFUGEES. IN ALL THESE DISCUSSIONS THE ARABS WOULD BE BOUND TO TAKE UP INCREASINGLY UNCROMPROMISING ATTITUDES IN DEFAULT OF ANY OUTSIDE INITIATIVE WHICH MIGHT EASE MATTERS FOR THEM. THE ISRAELIS WOULD NO DOUBT FOLLOW SUIT.

5. IF MATTERS DEVELOP IN THIS WAY THERE SEEMS TO ME A GRAVE RISK THAT THE ARABS, WHO HAVE RECENTLY SHOWN WELCOME SIGNS OF COMPARATIVE REALISM AND MODERATION, WILL GO INTO REVERSE AND REVERT, AT WHATEVER COST TO THEMSELVES, TO THEIR CUSTOMARY NEGATIVE AND EXTREME POSITIONS. OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE KHARTOUM MEETING IS THAT NASSER AND HUSSEIN WERE ABLE TO SECURE ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR MORE MODERATE LINE ON THE BASIS THAT THIS WOULD PRODUCE EARLY RESULTS.

6. I MUST SAY THAT MY OWN STRONG PREFERENCE REMAINS FOR A SECURITY

/COUNCIL

COUNCIL RESOLUTION BASED ON THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO DRAFT WITH AN ADDITIONAL PROVISION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AS DISCUSSED BY OUR OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON IN AUGUST. IF DESPITE WHAT I HAVE SAID, WHICH IS WHAT I STRONGLY HOPE YOU WILL AGREE IS THE RIGHT COURSE, YOU STILL FEEL THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO HAVE DETAILED PRIOR UNDERSTANDINGS AMONG ALL CONCERNED, THEN MY FEELING IS THAT IT WOULD BE BEST TO GO INSTEAD AND WITHOUT DELAY FOR AN EVEN SIMPLER RESOLUTION, ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED BY GOLDBERG TO CARADON AS AN ALTERNATIVE COURSE. THIS WOULD COVER THE TWO PRINCIPLES OF RECOGNITION OF ISRAELI INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY, AND WITHDRAWAL COUPLED WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF A RESPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

7. I AM SURE THAT THERE WOULD BE MUCH SUPPORT FOR EITHER OF THESE ALTERNATIVES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. ONCE SUCH A RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED IT WOULD BE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON WAYS TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION BY UNDERTAKINGS WHICH WOULD BE BINDING UPON ALL CONCERNED.

8. I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE BEST AND QUICKEST WAY TO MAKE PROGRESS.

ENDS.

SOSFA SENT 1545Z 11 OCTOBER

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. U.N. (POL) D.
EASTERN DEPT.
ARABIAN DEPT,
N.E.A.D.
ADEN DEPT.

BD

2 file

[redacted]/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 10726 11 OCTOBER, 1967 (PS)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 10726 OF 11 OCTOBER AND TO UKMIS NEW YORK REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PARIS MOSCOW TEL AVIV AND AMMAN.
UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 2633: MIDDLE EAST.
I SHARE THE CONCERN EXPRESSED BY LORD CARADON IN PARAGRAPH 8 OF HIS TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE ABOUT THE DANGERS OF A MIDDLE EAST DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THERE ARE ALSO THE HAZARDS OF POSSIBLE MEETINGS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE REFUGEES AND JERUSALEM. I ALSO SHARE THE DOUBTS IN PARA 5 OF LORD CARADON'S TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE ABOUT THE PROPOSALS PUT TO HIM BY MR GOLDBERG (UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 2634).
2. I FEAR THAT THE PROCESS OF SECURING AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE OF A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BETWEEN ALL CONCERNED TO THE EXTENT PROPOSED BY MR GOLDBERG, EVEN IF THIS WERE POSSIBLE, WOULD BE SO LENGTHY THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO HOLD OFF A GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE FOR WHICH ARAB PRESSURE IS ALREADY BEGINNING TO BUILD UP (C.F. LORD CARADON'S CONVERSATION WITH ABDUL MONEM RIFAI REPORTED IN UKMIS TELEGRAM NO 2628).
3. I THEREFORE INCLINE TO THINK THAT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO ENCOURAGE THE AMERICANS TO EMBARK ON ANOTHER ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS IN PURSUIT OF CLARIFICATION, AND THAT WE SHOULD MAKE A LAST ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE THEM TO ALLOW THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO DRAFT TO BE PUT FORWARD IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHOUT MORE ADO. IF THEY ARE UNWILLING TO AGREE THEN I THINK IT MIGHT BE BEST TO GO FOR THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH FORESEEN BY MR GOLDBERG (PARA 11 OF UKMIS TELEGRAM NO 2614). IT IS PERHAPS SIGNIFICANT THAT THIS IS NOT ENTIRELY INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE REFERENCE WITH MR EBAN MADE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH LORD CARADON REPORTED IN UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 2626. IF WE ARE TO CARRY THE ARABS IN AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH OF THIS KIND IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT IT SHOULD BE BASED ON A DECLARATION OF THE TWO PRINCIPLES, RATHER THAN ON A PURELY PROCEDURAL MANDATE.
4. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I THINK THE TIME HAS NOW COME FOR ME TO SEND A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO MR RUSK. AS RECOMMENDED IN WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 3146. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR THE EARLY COMMENTS OF BOTH LORD CARADON AND SIR P DEAN ON THE DRAFT IN MY I F T.

SOSFA SENT 1505Z 11 OCTOBER, 1967

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

U.N. DEPT.
EASTERN DEPT.
ARABIAN DEPT.
N.E.A.D.
ADEN DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

file

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT/A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 2665 11 OCTOBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 2665 OF 11 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION PARIS, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, TELAVIV AND AMMAN.
MY TELNO. 2633: MIDDLE EAST.
GOLDBERG CALLED A MEETING THIS MORNING OF ''FRIENDLY'' COUNTRIES TO BRIEF THEM ON LATEST U.S. DISCUSSIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST. REPRESENTATIVES ATTENDED FROM ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM BRAZIL, CANADA, DENMARK, ICELAND, IRELAND, ITALY, JAPAN, LUXEMBOURG, MEXICO NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, NEW ZEALAND, SWEDEN AND TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, AS WELL AS OURSELVES.
2. GOLDBERG EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS NOW RESUMING CONSULTATIONS WITH THOSE DELEGATIONS WITH WHOM THE U.S. HAD BEEN IN CLOSE CONTACT DURING THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION. HE BROUGHT THE MEETING UP TO DATE IN GENERAL TERMS ON U.S. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS SINCE THE TEXTS OF THE GROMYKO/GOLDBERG DRAFT RESOLUTIONS WERE DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN JULY (CF PARAGRAPHS 4AND 5 OF MY TELNO. 2614 OF 8 OCTOBER). HE SAID THAT ON 9 OCTOBER, DOBRYNIN HAD GONE TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND SAID HE WISHED TO HAVE A FURTHER TALK. AS GOLDBERG HAD TO TO BE IN WASHINGTON ANYHOW FOR THE RATIFICATION OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY EARLY YESTERDAY, HE WAS ASKED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO SEE DOBRYNIN. HE APOLOGISED FOR NOT BEING ABLE TO WARN ANY OF HIS COLLEAGUES OF THIS MEETING IN ADVANCE.
3. AT THE MEETING ON 10 OCTOBER, DOBRYNIN HAD ASKED THE AMERICANS FOR THEIR VIEWS ON AN EARLY RETURN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. GOLDBERGHAD REPLIED THAT IN THE U.S. VIEW THE COUNCIL WAS STILL SEIZED OF THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION, THE U.S. WERE NOT DRAGGING THEIR HEELS: THEY HAD BEEN AGAINST THE CONVENING OF THE SPECIAL SESSION FROM THE FIRST. BUT THEY WOULD NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN CONVENING THE COUNCIL, BECAUSE THEY HAD BEEN ATTACKED FOR

/DOING

CONFIDENTIAL

DOING SO BEFORE THE 5 JUNE WAR BROKE OUT, AND BECAUSE THEY DID NOT THINK A ''T.V. DEBATE'' WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANCE WOULD BE FRUITFUL. THERE HAD BEEN NO DIRECT COMMENT FROM DOBRYNIN ON THIS.

4. GOLDBERG HAD THEN ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS TO SEEK CLARIFICATION OF WHERE THE RUSSIANS NOW STOOD. HE HAD FIRST ASKED WHETHER THE TALKS THEY WERE NOW CONDUCTING WERE TO BE AD REFERENDUM TO THE ARABS. DOBRYNIN CONFIRMED THAT THEY WERE AD REFERENDUM TO ''ARAB STATES''. (NOT TO ''THE ARAB STATES'', AS IN JULY). GOLDBERG SAID THAT, FOR ITS PART, THE U.S. WOULD CONSULT BOTH ARABS AND ISRAELIS BUT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY EXPECT TO OBTAIN THEIR APPROVAL. (HE PRESUMABLY THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD IMPLIED THAT ARAB STATES' APPROVAL ON ANY AGREEMENT WOULD BE NECESSARY).

5. SECONDLY, GOLDBERG ASKED DOBRYNIN WHETHER THE RUSSIANS THOUGHT WHAT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN JULY CONSTITUTED A FIRM COMMITMENT. DOBRYNIN CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS NOT SO. GOLDBERG THEN ASKED EXACTLY WHAT TEXTS OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS THE RUSSIANS HAD CIRCULATED TO THE ARABS, BUT GOT NO SATISFACTORY REPLY.

6. DOBRYNIN HAD NEXT SUGGESTED THAT THEY SHOULD FORGET THE PAST AND TRY AND AGREE ON WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IN FUTURE. GOLDBERG PROPOSED THAT THEY SHOULD START FROM THE BASIS OF SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION BEING REQUIRED: THAT THERE SHOULD BE A ''EVEN-HANDED'' DECLARATION OF THE PRINCIPLES WHICH COULD BRING PEACE TO THE AREA: AND THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE ENTIRELY CLEAR ON INTERPRETATIONS OF THESE PRINCIPLES. GOLDBERG THEN ASKED WHETHER PARAGRAPH 2(B) OF THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO TEXT MEANT RENUNCIATION OF BELLIGERENCY BY THE ARABS. DOBRYNIN AGREED THAT THIS WAS SO, BUT GAVE NO CLEAR ANSWER WHEN ASKED WHETHER THE SPONSOR OF THE RESOLUTION COULD STATE AS MUCH WHEN TABLING IT. THE POINT WAS LEFT UNSETTLED.

/7.

7. GOLDBERG ASKED WHAT THE RUSSIANS UNDERSTOOD RENUNCIATION OF BELLIGERENCY TO MEAN. DID IT MEAN THAT INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO ALL ? DOBRYNIN REPLIED THAT IN PRINCIPLE THE ANSWER WAS ''YES'', BUT IN FACT NO ARAB GOVERMENT COULD SURVIVE AFTER AGREEING TO OPEN THE SUEZ CANAL TO ISRAELI SHIPPING. GOLDBERG HAD SAID THAT THE PROBLEM WAS MUTUAL, SINCE NO ISRAELI GOVERNMENT COULD SURVIVE IF THE CANAL REMAINED BLOCKED TO ISRAELI SHIPS AFTER WITHDRAWAL. GOLDBERG THEN ASKED WHAT OTHER CONSEQUENCES THE RUSSIANS SAW FLOWING FROM A RENUNCIATION OF BELLIGERENCY, BUT GOT NO CLEAR ANSWER ON THIS EITHER. HE NEXT ASKED WHAT THE RUSSIANS UNDERSTOOD BY ''ACCEPTANCE'' BY THE PARTIES OF A COUNCIL RESOLUTION. DID THEY FORESEE SIGNED JOINT DECLARATIONS ON THE SOVIET/JAPANESE PATTERN OF 1950? OR WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TO THE COUNCIL, AS IN THE CASE OF CEASEFIRE ACCEPTANCES IN EARLY JUNE? NO ANSWER WAS FORTHCOMING.

8. GOLDBERG SAID THAT HE HAD GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD NOT DEFINE OBLIGATIONS ON THE ARABS TOO CLOSELY. HE HAD POINTED OUT THAT PEACE WOULD NOT BE RESTORED IF THE TERMS OF A RESOLUTION WERE NOT CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD. THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENT ON THE U.S. PART WAS THAT

(I) THE RUSSIANS AND THE AMERICANS SHOULD UNDERSTAND WHAT THEY MEANT BY THE TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION: AND THAT

(II) THEY SHOULD COMMUNICATE THIS AGREED UNDERSTANDING TO THE PARTIES.

9. HE HAD TOLD DOBRYNIN AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION THAT THE U.S. WAS STILL FLEXIBLE ON LANGUAGE OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION, BUT NOT ON BASIC CONCEPTS. HE HAD ASKED DOBRYNIN TO LET HIM KNOW FRANKLY WHETHER THE U.S.S.R. WAS INTERESTED IN PERMANENT PEACE IN THE AREA, WITH A FINAL DEFINITION OF BOUNDARIES GUARANTEED BY THE SECURITY

/COUNCIL

COUNCIL (OR THE FOUR POWERS) AND NEGOTIATED BY THE PARTIES, SUPPOSING THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED. DOBRYNIN'S REPLY CONTAINED MANY RESERVATIONS AND MERELY REPEATED THAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED PEACE. GOLDBERG HAD GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT THE RUSSIAN VIEW WAS THAT THERE WAS LITTLE OR NO PRACTICAL CHANCE OF ACHIEVING SUCH A STTLEMENT AT PRESENT.

1Ø. IN CONCLUSION, DOBRYNIN HAD SAID HE WOULD REPORT THIS CONVERSATION TO HIS GOVERNMENT. GOLDBERG COMMENTED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD PROBABLY REPLY ''FAIRLY SOON'', AS THEY APPEARED TO ATTACH URGENCY TO CONTINUING THE DISCUSSIONS. HIS OVERALL IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, WAS THAT THE SITUATION WAS NOT VERY ENCOURAGING. THE RUSSIAN INTENTION SEEMED TO BE TO TRY AND GET A YUGOSLAV-TYPE RESOLUTION AGAIN, BUT PHRASED IN DIFFERENT WORDS. THEY WANTED TO BE PRECISE ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BUT ON NOTHING ELSE, AND TO LEAVE THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO WRESTLE WITH ALL REMAINING PROBLEMS. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS NOT AGAINST THE WORKING OUT OF THE MODALITIES OF IMPLEMENTATION OF A RESOLUTION BY THE PARTIES. BUT THEY STOOD FIRM ON THE NECESSITY FOR A RENUNCIATION OF BELLIGERENCY MEANING A REOPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL TO ALL SHIPPING, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERM OF THE 1951 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

11. GOLDBERG ENDED BY SAYING THAT THE NEXT STEP WAS TO AWAIT THE SOVIET REPLY, AFTER WHICH HE WOULD BRIEF THE SAME GROUP AGAIN. HE STRESSED THE NEED TO AVOID PRESS LEAKS ON THE SUBSTANCE.

F.O. PASS PARIS 437, MOSCOW 456, TEL AVIV 452 AND AMMAN 321.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT Ø255Z 12 OCT.

RECD AT Ø255Z 12 OCT.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
U.N.D.
NORTHERN DEPT.
J.R.D.
N.E.A.D.
ADEN DEPT.
ARABIAN DEPT.
C.O. I. & G.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

file

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 2666 11 OCTOBER, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2666 OF 11 OCTOBER, RFI TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV AND AMMAN.

M.I.P.T.: MIDDLE EAST.

DURING THIS MORNING'S MEETING, THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (TSURUOKA, JAPAN) REPORTED ON THE PRESENT STATE OF HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH COUNCIL MEMBERS. HE SAID HE HAD ASKED ALL MEMBERS WHETHER THE COUNCIL SHOULD MEET ON THE MIDDLE EAST, AND IF SO, AFTER WHAT PREPARATION. HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT ALL THOUGHT AN EARLY MEETING ADVISABLE, PREFERABLY BEFORE THE MIDDLE EAST ITEM WAS DISCUSSED IN PLENARY. THERE WAS ALSO UNANIMITY ON THE DESIRABILITY OF PRIOR AGREEMENT ON THE TEXT OF A RESOLUTION BEFORE THE COUNCIL MET, SO THAT POSITIVE RESULTS COULD BE ACHIEVED. BUT SUCH PRIOR AGREEMENT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED FIRST AND FOREMOST BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER-POWERS. AS TO THE IMMEDIATE NEXT STEP, MANY WERE SAYING THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD CONSULT WITH THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, AND ISSUE AN APPEAL TO THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES TO WORK OUT SOME ACCEPTABLE FORMULA . BUT THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE, FEDERENKO, HAD CATEGORICALLY OPPOSED ANY SUCH INITIATIVE BY THE PRESIDENT, EVEN IF MADE PRIVATELY, ARGUING THAT THERE WAS NO PRECEDENT FOR IT.

2. NEVERTHELESS, IN SPITE OF THESE SOVIET RESERVATIONS, TSURUOKA SAID THAT SOME MEMBERS HAD CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR A PRIVATE MEETING OF THE NON-PERMANENTS, OR EVEN OF ALL THE MEMBERS. HE WAS NOW UNDECIDED WHAT TO DO NEXT. IF PRIVATE MEETINGS OF ALL COUNCIL MEMBERS WERE HELD, THERE WOULD BE LEAKS, AND A FAILURE TO AGREE IN PRIVATE WOULD BE JUST AS DAMAGING AS A

/ PUBLIC.

CONFIDENTIAL

PUBLIC FAILURE. TSURUOKA SAID HE WOULD WELCOME ADVICE FROM THE MEETING, AND WOULD RECONSIDER WHAT HE SHOULD DO THEREAFTER.

3. AFTER GOLDBERG HAD MADE HIS MAIN STATEMENT (TEXT IN M.I.P.T.) HE INVITED COMMENTS. I SPOKE ON THE GENERAL LINES OF PARAGRAPHS 6, 8 AND 12 OF MY TELEGRAM NO. 2614 (OF 8 OCTOBER), EMPHASISING THAT THE COUNCIL, NOT THE ASSEMBLY, WAS THE PROPER FORUM. I HAD ALREADY PUT THIS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, AND TO LEADING ARAB DELEGATIONS. THE LATTER SAID THEY COULD POSTPONE DEBATE IN THE ASSEMBLY, BUT ONLY IF THERE WERE A FIRM PROSPECT OF THE COUNCIL MEETING SOON. THE NEED NOW WAS FOR SPEED: WE SHOULD AIM AT A BALANCED RESOLUTION WITH EQUAL OBLIGATIONS ON BOTH SIDES, IN PARTICULAR WITH NO WEAKENING IN WORDING ON WHAT THE ARABS MUST ACCEPT: THERE SHOULD BE GENERAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR ON WHAT THE WORDING OF THE RESOLUTION MEANT: BUT IF TOO MUCH EMPHASIS WAS LAID ON AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE ON SPECIFIC ACTS, OBSTACLES WOULD BE CREATED: AS TO ACTION, A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD BE SENT TO THE AREA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO WORK ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES IN THE RESOLUTION. I ENDED BY SAYING THAT I SAW NO CAUSE FOR DESPONDENCY SINCE THERE WAS IN FACT A GREAT DEAL OF AGREEMENT ON THE NEXT STEP TO BE TAKEN, AND I WAS GLAD THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS LAY IN GOLDBERG'S ABLE HANDS.

4. MY VIEWS WERE SUPPORTED IN GENERAL BY: ITALY, LUXEMBURG, ARGENTINA, MEXICO, ICELAND, IRELAND, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, CANADA, BRAZIL, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, NORWAY AND THE NETHERLANDS. AUSTRALIA AND DENMARK EXPRESSED CERTAIN RESERVATIONS, THE FORMER SAYING THAT THE RETURN TO THE COUNCIL WAS ACCEPTABLE, BUT ONLY IF FOUNDED ON A REAL WILL TO MAKE PROGRESS BY THE PARTIES CONCERNED. IF THE COUNCIL ATTEMPTED TO TAKE ACTION WHICH WAS NOT CLEARLY SPELLED OUT AND UNDERSTOOD, IT MIGHT IMPEDE RATHER

/ THAN.

THAN HELP. BORCH (DENMARK) MADE THE SEPARATE POINT THAT HE WAS NOT SURE THAT ALL THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS WOULD BE WILLING TO ENTER INTO PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS OF THE TYPE ENVISAGED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, IN VIEW OF THE KNOWN SOVIET ATTITUDE TO SUCH MEETINGS.

5. IGNATIEFF (CANADA) SAID THAT HIS DELEGATION HAD FROM THE FIRST FAVOURED ACTION IN THE COUNCIL. HE REMINDED THE MEETING OF THE DRAFT CANADIAN RESOLUTION OF 14 JUNE (NOT TABLED) WHICH SUGGESTED SIMPLY THAT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD BE SENT TO THE AREA. HE THOUGHT THAT MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET BLOC WERE STILL DISAGREED ON WHAT THEY SHOULD DO NEXT. THE BULGARIAN REPRESENTATIVE HAD TOLD HIM ONLY YESTERDAY THAT HE SAW NO REASON WHY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT MEET WITH NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS IN PRIVATE. AMBASSADOR MOROZOV OF THE SOVIET MISSION WAS TAKING THE LINE THAT THE MAIN DIFFICULTY FOR THE RUSSIANS WAS TO SECURE INCLUSION OF THE DATE (5 JUNE) IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. IGNATIEFF CONCLUDED THAT CONCENTRATION ON DETAILS WOULD PROVE EXCESSIVELY TIME-CONSUMING AND UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS. IT MIGHT THEREFORE BE BEST TO SETTLE FOR A SIMPLE RESOLUTION APPOINTING A SPECIAL RESPRESENTATIVE WITH BROAD TERMS OF REFERENCE. IF THERE WAS NO PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR, HE THOUGHT THAT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL MIGHT BE GLAD TO MEET IN PRIVATE.

6. DE BEUS (NETHERLANDS) SAID THAT THE MOMENT SEEMED PROPITIOUS FOR A RETURN TO THE COUNCIL. HE NOTICED A READINESS TO ACCEPT A COMPROMISE FORMULA NOW. ALL THE PARTIES, EVEN THE ISRAELIS, SEEMED AGREED ON THE USEFULNESS OF DESPATCHING A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA. HE SAID IT WAS UNPRECEDENTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD TRY TO PREVENT AN INFORMAL MEETING OF NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS WAS QUITE / UNACCEPTABLE.

UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 2666 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

UNACCEPTABLE. HE ENCOURAGED THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL TO GO AHEAD AND HOLD SUCH A MEETING, WHICH WOULD BE A MOST USEFUL NUCLEUS FOR DRAFTING PURPOSES.

7. SEE M.I.F.T.

FO PASS PARIS NO. 438, MOSCOW NO. 457, TEL AVIV NO. 453 AND AMMAN 322.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT 0225Z 12 OCT.
RECD AT 0225Z 12 OCT.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
U.N. DEPT.
N.E.A.D.
ARABIAN DEPT.
ADEN DEPT.
D.D. & P.U.S.D.
C.O. M.E.W. & U.N. DEPT.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 2667 11 OCTOBER, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2667 OF 11 OCTOBER, RFI TO MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, AMMAN AND PARIS.

M.I.P.T.: MIDDLE EAST.

RUDA (ARGENTINA) SPOKE TO ME TODAY SAYING THAT HE FELT A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION. HE HAD BEEN THE ORIGINATOR OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT: THIS HAD BEEN VILIFIED AT THE TIME BUT HAD SINCE BEEN VINDICATED. THE LATINS HAD NO OTHER INTEREST THAN TO SEE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY THEREFORE FELT A DUTY TO CARRY THEIR SUMMER INITIATIVE THROUGH TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION NOW IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE FELT THAT THE ARGENTINE POSITION WAS IDENTICAL WITH THE BRITISH. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO GO FORWARD IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE BASIS OF THE TWO CLEAR PRINCIPLES AND DESPATCH OF A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA. HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE WRONG TO SEEK TOO DETAILED ASSURANCES ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE PRINCIPLES IN ADVANCE. THERE WOULD BE ENDLESS DELAY AND PROBABLY FAILURE IF THE COURSE OF SEEKING PRECISE UNDERSTANDINGS OF IMPLICATIONS WAS CARRIED TOO FAR. ON THE OTHER HAND WE MUST KNOW WHERE WE ARE GOING AND HE THEREFORE HOPED THAT THE PRESENT EXCHANGES BETWEEN RUSSIANS AND AMERICANS WOULD PRODUCE THE NECESSARY DEGREE OF UNDERSTANDING. IF NOT A NEW SITUATION WOULD SOON ARISE.

2. FOR HIS PART, HE HAD UP TILL NOW HELD BACK AS HE FELT THAT WE WERE IN THE BEST POSITION TO WORK ON THE AMERICANS

/AND

AND THE ARABS. NEVERTHELESS HE WISHED TO ASSURE ME THAT HE WAS AT OUR DISPOSAL ONCE THE MOMENT WAS RIPE TO CALL FOR A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL. WITH THIS IN MIND HE NOW PROPOSED TO LISTEN TO CERTAIN NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, WHO HAD ASKED TO SEE HIM NOTABLY NIGERIA, ETHIOPIA, INDIA AND BRAZIL, BUT WOULD CERTAINLY NOT TAKE UP ANY POSITION UNTIL HE HEARD FURTHER FROM ME.

3. I THANKED RUDA AND TOLD HIM I THOUGHT HE WAS RIGHT BUT THAT WE MUST NOW ALLOW A LITTLE TIME TO SEE HOW THE AMERICANS GOT ON WITH THE RUSSIANS. WE WOULD THEN MEET AGAIN (PROBABLY AT THE END OF THE WEEK) AND SEE WHAT SHOULD BE DONE.

4. MEANWHILE RUDA WILL LOOK AGAIN AT THE OLD LATIN AMERICAN TEXT AND THE KIND OF FORMULATION USED IN THE TRUE GROMYKO/ GOLDBERG FORMULA SO AS TO BE READY TO MAKE A MOVE AT THE RIGHT TIME.

FO PASS MOSCOW 458, TEL AVIV 454, AMMAN 323 AND PARIS 439.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0232Z 12 OCT.
RECD AT 0232Z 12 OCT.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
U.N. DEPT.
D.D. & P.U.S.D.
N.E.A.D.
ADEN DEPT.
ARABIAN DEPT.

C.O. M.E.W. & U.N.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

RWS

fle

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 2668 11 OCTOBER, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2668 OF 11 OCTOBER, RFI TO PARIS, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV AND AMMAN.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 10726 TO WASHINGTON: MIDDLE EAST.

YOU WILL SEE IN MY TELEGRAMS A REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION IN THE US MISSION THIS MORNING AT WHICH GOLDBERG REPORTED ON HIS MEETING YESTERDAY WITH DOBRYNIN. YOU WILL ALSO SEE FROM THAT REPORT THAT A GOOD NUMBER OF THOSE PRESENT AT THE MEETING EXPRESSED VIEWS VERY SIMILAR TO OURS. THE GENERAL FEELING WAS THAT URGENT ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE TAKEN AND THAT THE PREPARATION FOR THAT MEETING SHOULD PROCEED WITHOUT ANY DELAY.

2. GOLDBERG SAID THAT HE WAS EXPECTING AN EARLY REPLY FROM DOBRYNIN. WE MUST ALLOW SOME LITTLE TIME FOR HIS TALKS WITH DOBRYNIN TO CONTINUE. NEVERTHELESS, I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR A MESSAGE TO GO NOW TO MR. RUSK ON THE LINES SUGGESTED IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 10727. I SUGGEST THAT AT THE SAME TIME YOU MIGHT AUTHORISE ME TO SHOW THE MESSAGE TO GOLDBERG AND TO GIVE HIM A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM YOU (ON THIS I HAVE NOW SEEN YOUR TELEGRAM TO WASHINGTON NO. 10751), TO THE EFFECT THAT YOU ARE VERY GLAD TO LEARN THAT HE IS EMBARKED ON FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH DOBRYNIN, WHICH YOU TRUST WILL LEAD TO AN EARLY RESULT.

/3.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. FIRST OF ALL, AS TO GENERAL PRESENTATION OF THE MESSAGE, PERHAPS IT MIGHT START WITH SOMETHING LIKE THIS. BEGINS. I WAS VERY GLAD TO HAVE A REPORT FROM HUGH CARADON THAT GOLDBERG IS EMBARKED ON RENEWED DISCUSSIONS WITH DOBRYNIN. THIS IS GOOD NEWS. I GREATLY HOPE THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS CAN BE PRESSED FORWARD TO AN EARLY CONCLUSION. HOWEVER IT MAY BE WELL IF I CONFIRM OUR APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM. YOU WILL REMEMBER THAT I PUT FORWARD THESE VIEWS TO YOU WHEN WE HAD OUR USEFUL TALKS IN NEW YORK. ENDS.

4. MY MAIN COMMENT ON THE PROPOSED MESSAGE TO RUSK IS IN REGARD TO THE ALTERNATIVE OF FALLING BACK ON A SIMPLE RESOLUTION (SEE PARAGRAPH 6 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 10727). WE MAY HAVE TO FALL BACK ON SUCH AN ALTERNATIVE, BUT I SUGGEST THAT IT MAY BE BEST TO KEEP THIS IN RESERVE AND PUT IT FORWARD ONLY IF WE GET STUCK ON THE SORT OF BALANCED RESOLUTION THAT WE HAVE BEEN ADVOCATING.

5. OTHER COMMENTS:

PARAGRAPH 3. I SUGGEST THE ADDITION OF THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE AFTER THE WORDS ''POSSIBLE RISKS OF NOT DOING SO''. BEGINS. IT IS OBVIOUSLY WELL TO SECURE AS MUCH UNDERSTANDING AS POSSIBLE IN ADVANCE BY DISCUSSION WITH THE RUSSIANS. ENDS.

I SUGGEST THAT THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 3 MIGHT BE AS FOLLOWS. BEGINS. IN PARTICULAR, I FEAR THAT AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH IN ADVANCE OF A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL THAT THE SUEZ CANAL WOULD BE OPEN TO ISRAELI SHIPPING AND NEW INTERPRETATION (AS PROPOSED IN THE AMERICAN PAPER - SEE MY TELEGRAM NO.2634 OF 9 OCTOBER) REGARDING THE TERRITORIES FROM WHICH WITHDRAWAL IS REQUIRED, WOULD TOGETHER CONSTITUTE A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO EARLY PROGRESS. ENDS.

/6. I SUGGEST

6. I SUGGEST THAT THE SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH 4 ''THERE IS ALSO A STRONG LIKELIHOOD THAT THE ARABS WILL MOVE FOR EARLY MEETINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON JERUSALEM AND REFUGEES'' SHOULD BE OMITTED. SOME LITTLE TIME AGO THE JORDANIANS SUGGESTED THAT THEY MIGHT TAKE THESE ISSUES TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE CONSIDERATION OF A BALANCED RESOLUTION BUT THEY HAVE NOT COME BACK TO THIS SUGGESTION AND I HAVE NOT HEARD IT RAISED AGAIN IN THE PAST WEEK OR SO.

7. IT SEEMS FROM WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 3189 THAT GOLDBERG HAS PROBABLY BEEN SPEAKING ON THE BASIS OF THE AMERICAN PAPER (MY TELEGRAM NO. 2634). I SUGGEST THAT WHEN I HAND HIM YOUR MESSAGE I SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO HIM THAT FOR THE REASONS EXPLAINED IN THAT MESSAGE WE DO NOT AGREE WITH ALL THAT THE AMERICAN PAPER SAYS.

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS PARIS 440, MOSCOW 459, TEL AVIV 455 AND AMMAN 324.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0312Z 12 OCT.
RECD AT 0312Z 12 OCT.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.
U.N. DEPT.
N.E.A.D.
R.W.S. ADEN DEPT.
ARABIAN DEPT.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

This is pretty nasty stuff coming from their man in London. I wonder if they think it does their cause any good.

En Clair

TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 1114 12 October 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1114 of 12 October
Repeated for information to Washington and UKMis New York

My telegram No 1112: Britain/Israel and the United Nations.

There is a further spate of criticism in today s Press of Britain's activities at the United Nations Main theme is that Mr. Eban has had to cancel his return to Israel in order to counter effects of intensive British lobbying.

2 Several papers make the point that the British Government has disqualified itself from pursuing a mediatory role by its courting of President Nasser and general pro Arab leanings

3 Davar s London Corrspondent writes that

"Authoritative Israel circles have reached the conclusion that the Anglo-Israel dialogue for the solution of Middle East problems should stop They see no point in continuing the dialogue with Foreign Secretary Brown and with the 'Bevinist Group which he has gathered around him and which includes the Foot brothers and Harold Beeley In a leader, The Times has attacked every single one of Brown s assumptions on Israel and it is reported that the paper believes that Brown has already failed in his handling of this issue

Authoritative Israel circles believe that Brown is now trying to succeed Tito in his role of the rescuer of the Arabs in the guise of mediator and just as Israel has categorically disqualified Tito as mediator she should also disqualify Brown. If Brown wishes to court Nasser he cannot pretend to be a mediator at the same time and Israel should make it clear to him and to the Arabs alike that he cannot influence Israel or maintain a dialogue with her. It is also learned that a stronger view prevails in high level British circles that Brown has already 'burnt the dish' before having started to cook it. One of the Labour Leaders states at a private conversation that 'Bevin s shoes are too big for Brown.'"

4. The Leader in Lamerhav refers to Britain s abasement before Nasser and argues that the Missions of Sir Dingle Foot and Sir Harold Beeley are likely to lead to increased Arab intransigence. The feverish activities of Britain are attributed to a revival of Bevinism at the Foreign Office.

/The Leader

The Leader adds that the British Government is gravely mistaken if it believes that it can win Nasser over at the expense of Israel.

5. Haaretz reports that the view held in political circles in Jerusalem is that the recent meeting between the United States and U.S.S.R. Delegations was the result of British lobbying but believes that neither the Americans nor the Russians are in a hurry to push for a solution. The paper takes comfort from the thought that Britain will eventually have to follow the French example and reconcile herself to the role of an observer.

6. A cartoon in yesterday's Maariv by Israel's leading Cartoonist portrays Britain as a hyena (the Hebrew word also means hypocrit) chewing on a bone labelled "British policy today" with a pile of bones in the background labelled "British policy in 1947".

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1238Z/12 October 1967

Recd 1424Z/12 October 1967

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

Eastern Dept.

FFFFF

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

TELEGRAM NO. 2135 13 OCTOBER, 1967 (UN (POL))

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO 2135 OF 13 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, AMMAN AND SAVING TO PARIS.
THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ME YESTERDAY AT HIS REQUEST.

2. MR. REMEZ BEGAN BY SAYING THAT ANGLO-ISRAELI RELATIONS WERE NOT SATISFACTORY (QUOTE THERE WAS A BLACK CAT WALKING BETWEEN US UNQUOTE) ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION WAS CONVINCED THAT BRITAIN FOR REASONS OF HER OWN, PARTICULARLY IN SECURING THE OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL, WAS CONCENTRATING ON IMPROVING ANGLO EGYPTIAN RELATIONS, AND WAS PRESSING FOR ACTION IN THE U.N. DETRIMENTAL TO ISRAEL'S VITAL INTEREST. THERE WAS A GENERAL FEELING THAT PRIVATE BRITISH ASSURANCES OF CONCERN FOR ISRAEL'S SECURITY HAD NOT BEEN REFLECTED IN MY PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THE ISRAEL EMBASSY IN LONDON HAD DONE THEIR BEST TO SECURE A CORRECT UNDERSTANDING IN ISRAEL OF BRITISH ATTITUDES, BUT HAD NOT HAD MUCH SUCCESS : WITNESS THE ISRAELI PRESS.

3. I SAID THAT I WAS WELL AWARE OF THE ISRAEL CAMPAIGN AGAINST BRITISH POLICY. I WAS UNABLE TO SEE ANY REASON FOR IT, OR TO UNDERSTAND WHAT THE COMPLAINT WAS ABOUT. IF THERE WAS A BLACK CAT WALKING IT WAS AN ISRAELI ONE. THE ISRAELI PRESS WOULD NOT BE WRITING AS THEY WERE IF THEY HAD NOT BEEN ENCOURAGED TO DO SO. IT WOULD BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES IF THEY WERE STOPPED.

4. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT I HAD BEEN ENTIRELY CONSISTENT IN WHAT I HAD SAID TO THE ISRAELI AND ARAB LEADERS IN PRIVATE, AND IN WHAT I HAD SAID IN PUBLIC. I HAD THROUGHOUT FULLY ACCEPTED THE JUSTICE OF ISRAEL'S INSISTENCE ON HER SECURITY, AND THAT SHE COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO RETURN TO THE SITUATION OF 4 JUNE. I HAD BEEN CAREFUL TO MAKE THIS PLAIN IN ALL MY PUBLIC STATEMENTS. MR REMEZ COULD BE ASSURED THAT I WOULD NEVER BE AN AGENT IN FURTHERING PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD PREJUDICE ISRAEL'S SECURITY.

/5.

5. AS REGARDS OUR RELATIONS WITH EGYPT IT WAS TO ISRAEL'S INTEREST AS WELL AS OURS THAT WE SHOULD HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.A.R. : WE WOULD THEN BE BETTER ABLE TO INFLUENCE THEM. IT WAS CERTAINLY TRUE THAT THERE WAS A MAJOR U.K. INTEREST IN AN EARLY OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL AND IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT THIS INTEREST SHOULD BE REFLECTED FROM TIME TO TIME IN MY PUBLIC STATEMENTS. THE FACT THAT ISRAEL HAD NO CORRESPONDING NATIONAL INTEREST WAS ONE OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND ISRAELI POSITIONS. THE OTHER DIFFERENCE WAS, IN MY OPINION, A DIFFERENCE OF JUDGEMENT. THE ISRAELIS BELIEVED THAT TIME WAS ON THEIR SIDE, AND THAT THEY WOULD HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF A SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT WITH THE ARABS IF MATTERS WERE LEFT AS THEY WERE FOR A TIME. WE ON THE OTHER HAND THOUGHT THAT IF THE PRESENT CHANCE OF MAKING PROGRESS WAS MISSED THE SITUATION WOULD DETERIORATE, AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF GETTING THE ARABS TO AGREE TO ANYTHING REASONABLE WOULD BECOME MORE REMOTE. I EMPHASIZED TO MR. REMEZ THAT WE REGARDED THESE TWO QUESTIONS AS QUITE DISTINCT. OUR REASONS FOR WANTING THE SUEZ CANAL RE-OPENED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE LAY IN THE EXTRA BURDEN OF THE LONG ROUTE ON OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. OUR REASONS FOR WANTING TO SEE EARLY PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT WERE AS I HAD STATED AND HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SUEZ CANAL.

6. THE AMBASSADOR THEN ASKED ABOUT OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS IN THE U.N. DID I AGREE WITH THE PROPOSALS FOR DECLARATIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN CONNEXION WITH THE GOLDBERG-GROMYKO DRAFT, WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN LORD CARADON AND MR. GOLDBERG ? I ASKED MR.REMEZ WHAT UNDERSTANDING HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD REGARD AS SATISFACTORY, AND HE HANDED ME THE TEXT OF MY I.F.T. I UNDERTOOK TO STUDY THIS AND GIVE HIM OUR ANSWER.

SOSFA SENT 1258Z 13 OCTOBER

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT
U.N. (POL) DEPT
N.E.A.D.
ARABIAN DEPT

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV
TELNO 2136 13 OCTOBER, 1967 (UN POL)
CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO 2136 OF 13 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, AMMAN AND SAVING TO PARIS.

MY I.P.T.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT:

AGREED PRINCIPLES.

(A) PREFERENCE IS GIVEN TO DEBATE IN SECURITY COUNCIL AS AGAINST GENERAL ASSEMBLY WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL TAKE PLACE ONLY IF THERE WILL BE A REASONABLE CHANCE OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT.

(B) PRIOR TO SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING, UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FOUR BIG POWERS MUST BE REACHED. WITH THIS IN MIND THE U.S. WILL TRY TO CLARIFY THE MEANING OF THE FIRST VERSION OF THE GOLDBERG-GROMYKO DRAFT, WITH AN ATTEMPT TO REACH AN AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF ALL ITS PROVISIONS. THE U.S. WILL INSIST THAT THE PARAGRAPH DEALING WITH THE +RECOGNITION+ OF ISRAEL BY THE ARAB STATES WILL IMPLY, BY AGREEMENT OF ALL CONCERNED, POSITIVE ACTION ON THE PART OF THE ARABS, SUCH AS PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE ARABS OF THEIR ABANDONMENT OF THE STATE OF WAR WITH ISRAEL, AND ALSO THEIR AGREEMENT TO FREE NAVIGATION FOR ISRAEL IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND THE SUEZ CANAL.

/ LIKEWISE, THE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2136 TO U.K.MIS NEW YORK

LIKEWISE, THE PARAGRAPH DEALING WITH THE EVACUATION OF THE ISRAELI FORCES WILL BE INTERPRETED AS IMPLYING THE DESIRE TO BRING ABOUT A LASTING PEACE AND TO SUPERCEDE THE CEASE-FIRE LINES BY AGREED NATIONAL BORDERS.

(C) ALL CONCERNED WILL HAVE TO ANNOUNCE PUBLICLY THEIR AGREEMENT ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE DRAFT PROPOSAL AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE WITH A VIEW TO THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.

(D) IF THE CHANCES FOR PRIOR AGREEMENT, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, WILL NOT MATERIALISE, THE U.S. WILL NOT JOIN ANY INITIATIVE FOR THE CONVENING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

(E) IN THE CASE OF NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FOUR POWERS, ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF THE DRAFT, IT WAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND GT. BRITAIN TO ENDEAVOUR TO STRIVE FOR A RESOLUTION TO APPOINT A U.N. REPRESENTATIVE WITH EVEN HANDED TERMS OF REFERENCE TO ASSIST THE PARTIES CONCERNED IN ESTABLISHING PEACE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER.

SOSFA SENT 1224Z 13 OCTOBER, 1967

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
U.N.(POL) DEPT
EASTERN DEPT
N.E.A.D.
ARABIAN DEPT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT.A & BY BAG

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

TELNO. 2144 13 OCTOBER, 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 2144 OF 13 OCTOBER REPTD FOR INFMN TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN AND MOSCOW. SAVING PARIS.

MY TELEGRAMS 2135 AND 2136 TO TEL AVIV: MIDDLE EAST.

I SAW MR. REMEZ THIS MORNING AND REPLIED ORALLY IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS:

(A) THE PAPER WHICH MR. GOLDBERG HAD DISCUSSED WITH MR. EBAN IN NEW YORK DEALING WITH TACTICS IN THE UNITED NATIONS HAD BEEN A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE U.K. AND U.S. MISSIONS IN NEW YORK AD REFERENDUM TO WASHINGTON AND LONDON, AND DID NOT REPRESENT FIRM DECISIONS OF EITHER GOVERNMENT. I WAS STILL CONSIDERING IT.

(B) I AGREED THAT IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO SECURE ADEQUATE AGREEMENT BY ALL THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION BEFORE ITS PASSAGE THIS WOULD CLEARLY BE DESIRABLE.

(C) I ALSO AGREED THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT QUOTE BY ALL MEMBER STATES IN THE AREA THAT EACH HAS THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL STATE OF ITS OWN AND TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE RENUNCIATION OF ALL CLAIMS AND ACTS INCONSISTENT WITH THE ABOVE UNQUOTE AS LAID DOWN IN THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO DRAFT, DID ENTAIL THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE FOR ISRAELI VESSELS THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL.

(D) HOWEVER I THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT THE ARABS OR THE RUSSIANS COULD BE BROUGHT TO MAKE AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THIS AT THIS STAGE, ESPECIALLY IF THE TERMS OF THE UNDERSTANDING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL WERE COUCHED IN THE GENERAL TERMS IN THE MEMORANDUM WHICH MR. REMEZ HAD HANDED OVER LAST NIGHT. I.E. QUOTE AS IMPLYING THE DESIRE TO BRING ABOUT A LASTING PEACE AND TO SUPERSEDE THE CEASE-FIRE LINES BY AGREED NATIONAL BORDERS UNQUOTE. THIS FORM OF WORDS WOULD MAKE ANY

/ ISRAELI

ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL DEPENDENT ON ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO THE WHOLE OF A NEW FRONTIER. I FULLY UNDERSTOOD WHY ISRAEL DISLIKED A MORE PRECISE DEFINITION OF WITHDRAWAL, AND I HAVE NEVER PRESSED THAT SHE SHOULD MAKE ONE. HOWEVER, I SAW VERY GREAT DIFFICULTY IN GETTING A PRECISE CLARIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RECOGNITION IF THIS WERE NOT MATCHED BY AN EQUALLY PRECISE ONE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL.

(E) IT SEEMED TO ME THEREFORE THAT THE PROCESS OF SECURING AGREEMENT TO UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE LINES PROPOSED IN THE ISRAELI PAPER WOULD LEAD INEVITABLY INTO A LOT OF CONTENTIOUS DETAILED ARGUMENT ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF A SETTLEMENT, AND I THEREFORE FELT THAT WE WOULD NOT MAKE ANY PROGRESS.

(F) IT WAS NOT THAT I WAS OPPOSED TO FULL CLARIFICATIONS OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DRAFT, BUT THAT WE JUDGED THAT AT THIS STAGE THEY COULD NOT BE SECURED. THAT WAS WHY WE WERE ADVOCATING THE RAPID PASSAGE OF A BALANCED DRAFT LAYING DOWN BROAD PRINCIPLES ON THE LINES OF THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO FORMULA WHICH WOULD AS A RESULT MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR COMMUNICATION TO BEGIN BETWEEN THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS, AT FIRST I IMAGINED THROUGH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. IN THE PROCESS OF THESE COMMUNICATIONS THE CONTENTIOUS DETAILS ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION WOULD BE HAMMERED OUT. WE DID NOT THINK THAT THIS PROCEDURE WOULD BE IN ANY WAY DAMAGING TO ISRAELI INTERESTS, AS ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE BOUND TO TAKE STEPS TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION WITHOUT RECIPROCAL STEPS BEING TAKEN BY THE ARABS. WE COULDN'T SEE THAT THIS IN ANY WAY HARMED ISRAEL'S POSITION.

2. MR. REMEZ EXPLAINED ISRAELI OBJECTIONS TO THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO DRAFT ON FAMILIAR LINES. HE THEN ASKED WHETHER, IF NO PROGRESS COULD BE MADE WITH THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO DRAFT BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTIES OF INTERPRETATION, WE WOULD BE READY TO SUPPORT A SIMPLE

/ RESOLUTION

RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE LINES SUGGESTED IN THE PAPER HE HAD GIVEN ME YESTERDAY (PARAGRAPH E OF MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 2136). I REPLIED THAT I SO MUCH PREFERRED A RESOLUTION CONTAINING BLANCED PRINCIPLES WHICH WOULD GIVE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE WORKING GUIDELINES, THAT I WOULD NO WISH AT THIS STAGE TO CONSIDER AN ALTERNATIVE.

3. SEE M.I.F.T.

SOSFA SENT 2233Z 13 OCTOBER

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. EASTERN DEPT,
N.E.A.D.
U.N. DEPT.
C.O. M.E.W. & U.N. DEPT.

R.J.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT.A & BY BAG

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

TELNO. 2145 13 OCTOBER, 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NO 2145 OF 13 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK MOSCOW AMMAN AND SAVING TO PARIS

MY I/P T

WHEN THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING HE OPENED BY SAYING THAT HIS EMBASSY HAD ALL BEEN VERY SHOCKED BY THE THINGS THAT HAD BEEN WRITTEN IN THE ISRAELI PRESS YESTERDAY. HE HAD SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE LAST NIGHT TO MR EBAN, WHO HAD SHARED THIS VIEW. MR EBAN WOULD TAKE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY OF STATING THE OFFICIAL ISRAELI VIEW OF ANGLO/ISRAEL RELATIONS. HE WAS HIMSELF CALLING A CONFERENCE WITH THE ISRAELI CORRESPONDENTS IN LONDON THIS AFTERNOON TO PUT THEM RIGHT. HE ASKED THAT I SHOULD SAY SOMETHING ON MY SIDE TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT.

2. I SAID THAT I WAS GRATEFUL TO HIM AND TO MR EBAN FOR THEIR REACTION TO WHAT WAS BEING SAID IN ISRAEL. LORD CARADON HAD REPORTED TO ME THE CONCERN WHICH HE HAD EXPRESSED TO MR RAFAEL, AND WHICH I FULLY SHARED, ABOUT THE DISTORTED ACCOUNT, WHICH HAD APPEARED IN THE ISRAEL PRESS OF HIS CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH MR EBAN. I WOULD CONSIDER WAYS OF GETTING OUR TRUE POSITION BETTER UNDERSTOOD.

3. REMEZ ALSO ASKED IF EITHER I OR LORD CARADON WOULD GO ON THE RECORD WITH THE VIEW THAT ARAB QUOTE RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL, UNQUOTE AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO DRAFT, INVOLVED PASSAGE OF ISRAELI VESSELS THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL. I SAID THAT I HAD TOLD THE ARABS THAT THIS WAS MY VIEW. HOWEVER I THOUGHT IT BEST AT THIS STAGE NOT TO SPELL OUT PUBLICLY OUR INTERPRETATION OF ONE SIDE OF THE RESOLUTION, AS TO DO SO WOULD OBLIGE US TO MAKE A CORRESPONDING STATEMENT ABOUT THE OTHER.

SOSFA SENT 2205Z 13 OCTOBER

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
N.E.A.D.
UNITED NATIONS DEPT.

C.O. M.E.W. & U.N. DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 1734 16 October 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.1734 of 16 October.
Repeated for information to Washington, U.K. Mission New York.

Your telegram 2857: Interview with Mr. Gromyko.

I opened my interview with Mr. Gromyko this morning by referring in general terms to that part of your conversation with him in New York dealing with the Middle East. I said that you welcomed the current Soviet-American exchanges. There seemed to be a consensus on one issue, namely that this difficult problem should be pursued, if possible, in the Security Council rather than in the General Assembly. You were hoping to see emerge a balanced resolution with equal obligations on both parties. Clearly there were difficulties and there seemed a real danger that, if rapid progress were not made, opinions would harden and those moderate Arabs disposed to a settlement might be discouraged. Time was short. Could Mr. Gromyko give me any indication of how he viewed developments?

2. Mr. Gromyko replied that the main difficulties now, as before, were being created by the Americans. The Arabs were inclined to "weigh the possibility" of agreeing to the draft resolution presented by the United States. Their position had become more realistic and they had shown a great deal of understanding. The behaviour of the Americans, however, was negative and they were now hesitating to agree with their own draft. He knew Mr. Rusk would like to reach an understanding on some kind of interpretation, that it was not enough just to have a resolution. But the American interpretation was one-sided and it would not be possible to reach agreement on it. Everyone was agreed that the resolution should form the basis for discussion in the Security Council and the Soviet Government would be ready, as he had told Mr. Rusk, to seek the agreement of the Arab countries to the resolution. Since then the Americans had been dragging their feet. If the United Kingdom wished to make a contribution, we should try to influence the Americans to be more reasonable. Since we were allied to them, we should know better than the Russians how to approach them. It was his understanding that the Arabs would accept the American draft and the Russians would do their best to persuade them to do so. The difficulty was the Americans who "no longer liked their own draft". When I asked Mr. Gromyko whether in referring throughout to the American draft he meant the so-called Dobrinin/Goldberg draft, he said that this was a misunderstanding. There was no joint draft: the draft was entirely American and he was not sure that Mr. Dobrinin

/was even

was even present when it was drawn up. I said that, with Soviet-American negotiations in progress, I did not want to risk crossing wires by pursuing the matter in detail. But I did want to say that you felt that the coming week was a crucial one and that the opportunity of securing agreement should not be allowed to slip by. Mr. Gromyko concluded this part of our conversation by repeating that he hoped you would try to influence the Americans to be more reasonable.

F.O. pass Washington 276 and U.K. Mission New York 118.

Sir G. Harrison

Sent 1812Z 16 October
Recd. 1852Z 16 October

[Repeated as requested]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. Northern Dept.
J.R.D.
Consular Dept.
Eastern Dept.
U.N.D.
News Dept.

D.S.A.O. Security Dept.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

vvvvv

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 2731 16 OCTOBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2731 OF 16 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, PARIS AND WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 10815 TO WASHINGTON: MIDDLE EAST.

I WENT WITH HOPE TO CALL ON GOLDBERG THIS MORNING TO PUT TO HIM YOUR COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED AGREED MINUTE WHICH THE AMERICANS PUT TO US LAST WEEK (MY TELEGRAM NO. 2634). SISCO AND AMBASSADOR PEDERSEN WERE PRESENT.

2. GOLDBERG SAID HE HAD ALREADY SEEN A FULL RECORD OF SIR PATRICK DEAN'S REPRESENTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ON THIS SUBJECT. TWO POINTS PUZZLED HIM IN THAT RECORD. WHEN THE U.S./U.K. TALKS HAD BEEN HELD IN AUGUST IN WASHINGTON, THE EMPHASIS ON THE BRITISH SIDE HAD ALL BEEN ON THE NEED FOR AN EARLY REOPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL. THE PRESENT U.S. INSISTENCE ON HAVING FREEDOM OF TRANSIT FOR ALL VESSELS ACCEPTED AS A PRINCIPLE UNDER OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2(B) OF THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO DRAFT WAS BASED ON THE REALISTIC CONCEPT THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT MOVE (AND THE CANAL WOULD NOT OPEN UNLESS THEY DID) UNLESS THEIR REAL INTERESTS WERE PROTECTED. HOW DID WE EXPECT TO GET THE CANAL REOPENED UNLESS THERE WAS QUOTE A DEAL UNQUOTE? OR HAD OUR SENSE OF PRIORITIES CHANGED SINCE AUGUST? SECONDLY, SIR PATRICK DEAN WAS REPORTED TO HAVE ALLEGED THAT THE AMERICAN PREFERENCE WAS NOW TO USE WORDING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL EXPRESSLY DESIGNED TO EXCLUDE JERUSALEM AND GAZA. THIS HAD NOT BEEN THE ORIGINAL U.S. INTENTION: THE WORDING OF VERSION I OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (UKMIS TELEGRAM NO. 1833) WAS QUITE EXPLICIT. IT WAS ONLY AFTER THE RUSSIANS HAD QUOTE GONE BACK UNQUOTE ON THE AGREED INTERPRETATION OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2(B) THAT THE AMERICANS HAD INDICATED TO US THAT THEY MUST FEEL FREE TO INCLUDE RESERVATIONS ON THE BALANCING WORDING OF PARAGRAPH 2(A).

/3. I INTERVENED

3. I INTERVENED TO SAY THAT OF COURSE WE WANTED TO SEE THE CANAL REOPENED TO ALL SHIPPING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THAT WAS ONE ISSUE. BUT WE WERE ALSO MOST ANXIOUS TO MAKE PROGRESS WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY TOWARDS A GENERAL SETTLEMENT. IF WE INSISTED ON AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE ON REOPENING THE CANAL TO ALL SHIPPING INCLUDING ISRAELI SHIPS, WE MIGHT NOT GET STARTED AT ALL.

4. GOLDBERG THEN TURNED TO HIS MAIN PROPOSAL. AS MR. RUSK HAD EXPLAINED TO SIR PATRICK DEAN, THE AMERICANS FOUND THAT THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT A BELATED SOVIET DISAVOWAL OF WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED IN JULY. THE GROMYKO/GOLDBERG DRAFT SHOULD ACCORDINGLY BE LOOKED ON AS DEAD. THE QUESTION WAS, WHERE SHOULD WE GO FROM NOW? THE U.S. WERE PERFECTLY WILLING TO MEET WHAT THEY BELIEVED OUR REQUIREMENT TO BE I.E. ACTION LEADING TO A SPEEDY RETURN TO THE COUNCIL BY JOINING IN A NEW EFFORT TO DEVISE ANOTHER RESOLUTION. THIS WOULD CONTAIN WORDING SETTING OUT PRINCIPLES IN CHARTER LANGUAGE, WHICH WOULD BE QUOTE EQUALLY PRECISE OR EQUALLY AMBIGUOUS UNQUOTE TO BOTH PARTIES. IT MIGHT START OFF WITH A GENERAL, BUT EVEN-HANDED REFERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY: NON-USE OF FORCE: SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF ALL STATES: NEED FOR SECURITY AND A DURABLE PEACE: AND THE IMPERMISSIBILITY OF THE STATIONING OR KEEPING OF FORCES ON ANOTHER'S TERRITORY WITHOUT ITS CONSENT. IT WOULD THEN GO ON TO APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO PROCEED TO THE AREA AND TO WORK WITHIN THESE GENERAL GUIDELINES. IT WOULD CALL ON THE PARTIES TO CO-OPERATE WITH HIM. (IT WOULD CONTAIN NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO REOPENING OF THE CANAL OR TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM.)

5. HOW WOULD THIS NEW RESOLUTION BE LAUNCHED? THE U.S. THEMSELVES WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH INITIATION. GOLDBERG DOUBTED WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WOULD EITHER. THE AMERICANS WOULD MUCH PREFER THE FINNS OR THE SWEDES, OR HELPFUL NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO MAKE THE RUNNING FROM NOW ON. HE HOPED THIS WOULD MEET QUOTE OUR REQUIREMENTS UNQUOTE.

/6. I REPLIED

6. I REPLIED THAT IT SEEMED TO ME TO MATTER A GREAT DEAL HOW THE PRINCIPLES WHICH WOULD GUIDE THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WERE FORMULATED. THE TEXT WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS IN JULY HAD IN OUR OPINION TACKLED THAT FORMULATION VERY WELL, AND IT SEEMED TO ME A PITY TO GIVE UP SUCH WORDING BECAUSE DIFFICULTIES OF INTERPRETATION HAD DEVELOPED. THE ISRAELIS WERE IN POSSESSION, AND I COULD NOT SEE THAT ANY STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES WOULD WEAKEN THEIR POSITION. IN PARTICULAR, I DOUBTED WHETHER WE COULD IMPROVE ON THE PHRASING IN VERSION I OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2(A) (UKMIS TELEGRAM NO. 1833), WHICH OF COURSE DID NOT MENTION THE DATE 5 JUNE. GOLDBERG WAS NOW ARGUING THAT 2(A) DID NOT SET OUT A PRINCIPLE, IT MERELY REFERRED TO ACTION. WE MAINTAINED THAT QUOTE WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES UNQUOTE WAS A PRINCIPLE. (FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS BY SHIPPING WAS EQUALLY A PRINCIPLE.) IT SEEMED TO ME THEREFORE THAT THE REWORDING WHICH GOLDBERG HAD JUST PROPOSED WHILE IN EFFECT MAINTAINING OR STRENGTHENING 2(B), WOULD WEAKEN PARAGRAPH 2(A) AS DRAFTED AND AGREED IN JULY. IF THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE HERE BETWEEN US, IT WAS WELL TO ADMIT IT.

7. I THEN ASKED HOW HE SAW US PROCEEDING IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. IF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS CAME UP WITH A RESOLUTION (POSSIBLY BASED ROUGHLY ON THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT WE HAD BOTH VOTED FOR ON 4 JULY) WOULD THIS BE AN ACCEPTABLE SORT OF NEW INITIATIVE?

8. GOLDBERG REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD DEPEND ON THE WORDING. TIME WAS NEEDED TO LET THE QUOTE PRESS BARRAGE UNQUOTE DIE DOWN. HE DISLIKED STORIES ABOUT U.S./U.K. DIVERGENCIES, AND THE CHARGES THAT THE AMERICANS WERE DRAGGING THEIR FEET. THE BEST WAY MIGHT BE TO HAVE CONVERSATIONS SOON WITH THE LATIN AMERICANS AND OTHER NEUTRALS ANXIOUS TO MAKE PROGRESS. HE THOUGHT THAT BASICALLY THE U.S./U.K. APPROACH WAS THE SAME APART FROM LARGELY SEMANTIC DIFFERENCES.

/9. IN FURTHER

9. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION ON WORDING, AMBASSADOR PEDERSEN REMINDED US THAT THE AMERICANS HAD GOT A COMPLETELY FIRM UNDERSTANDING FROM THE RUSSIANS IN JULY THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF TRANSIT WAS IMPLICIT UNDER OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2(B). THE RUSSIANS HAD GONE BACK ON THIS BECAUSE IT WAS FOUND NOT TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS, AND THEN ACCUSED THE U.S. OF CHANGING THEIR POSITION. THEY WERE NOW SAYING THAT THE CANAL WAS EXCLUDED FROM THE PRINCIPLES AND WAS TO BE DEALT WITH LATER AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE REFUGEES AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 3. THE U.S. THEREFORE WANTED TO TRY A NEW APPROACH, AND HAD DEVISED IT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF OUR VIEWS. GOLDBERG SAID THAT U.S. PROBLEMS LAY MORE IN TRYING TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO MOVE THAN WITH THE ARABS. HE THOUGHT THAT THE ARABS WOULD HAVE TO QUOTE COME OUT WITH SOMETHING UNQUOTE TO BREAK THE IMPASSE. (HE IS SEEING MAHMUD RIAD THIS AFTERNOON.) I SAID THAT IT SEEMED VERY SERIOUS THAT WE SHOULD HAVE SPENT SO MUCH TIME ON TEXTS OF A RESOLUTION WHICH THE AMERICANS NOW CLAIMED WERE UNUSABLE. BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE AMERICANS SAW NO OBJECTION TO INITIATIVES NOW BY THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. OUR BEST HOPE OF PROGRESS MIGHT BE THROUGH THEM.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 465, EL AVIV 462, AMMAN 329 AND PARIS 446.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT Ø1ØØZ/17
RECD AT Ø115Z/17

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT
ARABIAN DEPT
ADEN DEPT
N.E.A.D.
U.N.DEPT
DIS M.O.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

JB

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 2732 16 OCTOBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 2732 OF 16 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS AMMAN TEL AVIV AND ALGIERS.

MY I / P T (NOT TO ALL):

MIDDLE EAST.

I CALLED THIS AFTERNOON ON IGNATIEFF (CANADA). HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY THE ALGERIAN REPRESENTATIVE HERE, BOUATTURA, WHO HAD SPOKEN IN REMARKABLY MODERATE TERMS. THE ALGERIAN HAD SAID THAT, ON THE MIDDLE EAST, THE UNITED NATIONS NOW FACED A CRUCIAL CHOICE. IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE PEACE A' LA VERSAILLES. THE ALTERNATIVE WAS TO PROCEED STEP BY STEP THROUGH AN INTERMEDIARY WHEREBY ISRAEL'S SECURITY MIGHT BE SECURED. HE THOUGHT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT A SERIES OF DEMILITARISED ZONES COULD BE WORKED OUT, WITH THIRD PARTY ASSISTANCE, TO TAKE CARE OF THE ''MOST SENSITIVE'' AREAS.

2...BOUATTURA HAD ADDED THAT THE ARABS WANTED EARLY REFERENCE IN THE COUNCIL, WHERE THEY WOULD NOT HAVE TO SPEAK UNLESS THEY WISHED TO DO SO. THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE TAKEN RIGHT AWAY. IGNATIEFF COMMENTED THAT HE THOUGHT THIS CONVERSATION PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT COMING FROM AN ALGERIAN.

3...HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD ALSO TALKED TO EL FARRA, THE JORDANIAN /REPRESENTATIVE,

REPRESENTATIVE, WHO HAD BEEN MORE NEGATIVE. EL FARRA MAINTAINED THAT THE ARAB STATES COULD HARDLY BE EXPECTED TO RECEIVE A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WHOSE TERMS OF REFERENCE WERE NOT PRECISELY DEFINED. HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT THAT A SPELLING OUT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE TWO PRINCIPLES OF WITHDRAWAL AND NON-BELLIGERENCY WOULD BE A GOOD FIRST STEP.

4...I SAID I THOUGHT THE ALGERIANS REMARKS ENHANCED THE NEED TO SEIZE THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY.

F O PASS MOSCOW 466, PARIS 447, AMMAN 330, TEL AVIV 463 AND ALGIERS 27.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0203Z/17

RECD AT 0204Z/17

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

EASTERN DEPT.
ADEN DEPT.
ARABIAN DEPT.
N.E.A.D.
U.N.D.
D.I.S.M.O.D.

DDDDD

JB

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 2733 16 OCTOBER, 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2733 OF
16 OCTOBER, RFI TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, AMMAN AND TEL AVIV.
M.I.R.T.: MIDDLE EAST.

I CALLED THIS AFTERNOON ON THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (TSURUOKA, JAPAN) WHO IS CONDUCTING CONSULTATIONS ON HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED.

2. HE ASKED HOW I ENVISAGED THE NEXT STEPS. I SAID THAT AS NONE OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS SEEMED WILLING OR ABLE TO MOVE, AND AS THERE WAS A GENERAL WILL TO RETURN TO THE COUNCIL THE INITIATIVE WOULD BEST COME FROM THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS, UNDER HIS GUIDANCE. HE SAID THAT NIGERIA, ETHIOPIA, INDIA, MALI, BRAZIL AND ARGENTINE, WOULD BE HAVING A MEETING TOMORROW MORNING. (THEY HAD PLANNED TO MEET TODAY BUT POSTPONED THEIR MEETING, POSSIBLY TO SEE IF ANYTHING WOULD COME OF GOLDBERG'S MUCH PUBLICISED INTERVIEW THIS AFTERNOON WITH RIAD.)
AFTER TOMORROW MORNING'S MEETING, TSURUOKA SAID HE INTENDED TO HOLD A MEETING OF ALL THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS. THEY WOULD THEN TOGETHER CONSIDER THE NEXT STEP.

3. HE ASKED IF I HAD ANY VIEWS ON DRAFTING OF A TEXT.
I SAID WE HAD NEVER HAD A TEXT. AS TO A NEW FORMULATION, I STRESSED THE NECESSITY OF BALANCE, I.E. THE EQUALITY OF OBLIGATION ON BOTH SIDES, AND THE NEED TO PROVIDE FOR A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. I SUGGESTED THAT AT THE

/APPROPRIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

APPROPRIATE TIME TSURUOKA AND THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS MIGHT WISH TO NOMINATE A SMALL DRAFTING COMMITTEE FROM THE NON-PERMANENTS (POSSIBLY ONE LATIN, ONE ASIAN, ONE AFRICAN, AND ONE EUROPEAN). THIS WOULD BE A MANAGEABLE NUMBER, AND THEY COULD CONSULT OTHER MEMBERS BEFORE ANY FINAL POSITIONS WERE TAKEN UP.

4. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT MANESCU OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAD TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS NOW THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S OPPORTUNITY TO ACT. MANESCU WAS THINKING OF REPORTING TO THE ASSEMBLY AT THE END OF THIS WEEK ON WHAT PROGRESS (IF ANY) HAD BEEN ACHIEVED TOWARDS A RETURN TO THE COUNCIL. HE WOULD THEN LEAVE IT TO THE ASSEMBLY TO DECIDE HOW MUCH LONGER THE DEBATE IN PLENARY ON THE MIDDLE EASTERN ITEM SHOULD BE DEFERRED.

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS AMMAN 331, MOSCOW 467, PARIS 448 AND TEL AVIV 464.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT Ø11ØZ/17
RECD AT Ø12ØZ/17

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EASTERN DEPT.
ADEN DEPT.
ARABIAN DEPT.
U.N. DEPT.
N.E.A.D.
D.I.S. M.O.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

FFFFF

JB

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 2734 16 OCTOBER, 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2734 OF
16 OCTOBER, RFI TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, AMMAN AND TEL AVIV.
M.I.P.T.: MIDDLE EAST.
BERARD (FRANCE) CALLED THIS AFTERNOON TO FIND OUT WHERE WE STOOD ON A RETURN TO THE COUNCIL. I TOLD HIM THAT, AS HE KNEW, WE WERE FOR AN EARLY RETURN TO THE COUNCIL, ON THE BASIS OF A BALANCED RESOLUTION WITH PROVISION FOR APPOINTING A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE.
2. BERARD HAD TWO MAIN POINTS. HE SAID HE HAD NOTICED THAT THE REQUIREMENT THAT ISRAELI VESSELS SHOULD PASS THROUGH THE CANAL REMAINED A MAIN DIFFICULTY. HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT THE AMERICANS SEEMED TO BE ASKING TOO MUCH OF THE ARABS IN INSISTING ON DECLARATIONS FROM THEM IN ADVANCE. BUT HE THOUGHT THAT ARAB PUBLIC OPINION COULD ACCEPT FREE PASSAGE OF ALL SHIPS TO AND FROM ELATH AS SOON AS A RESOLUTION WAS PASSED. THEREAFTER, IT WAS HIS OWN OPINION THAT THE ARABS MIGHT ALLOW ISRAELI SHIPS THROUGH THE CANAL, ONCE PUBLIC OPINION COULD BE ASSURED THAT THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WAS ON THE WAY TO SOLUTION. THEREIN LAY THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LINKAGE OF THESE TWO MATTERS.
3. I SAID THAT IF WE TIED FREEDOM OF TRANSIT FOR ALL SHIPPING TO THE REFUGEES, THE PROBLEM WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLY COMPLICATED AND DELAYED. THE FACT THAT THE TWO MATTERS HAD BEEN MENTIONED IN ONE PARAGRAPH DID NOT IMPLY ANY LINKAGE: THERE HAD BEEN NO SUCH LINKAGE IN THE ORIGINAL LATIN AMERICAN TEXT FOR WHICH WE (BUT NOT THE FRENCH) HAD VOTED IN JULY.
4. BERARD THEN SAID HE THOUGHT THAT SOME REFERENCE TO THE DATE 5 JUNE SHOULD BE MADE IN THE WITHDRAWAL PARAGRAPH. WHILE THE CANAL TRANSIT PROBLEM WAS NOT, IN HIS VIEW, INCAPABLE OF A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT, THE ISSUE OF FRONTIERS WAS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT, AS THE ISRAELIS SEEMED DETERMINED TO

/EXCLUDE

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCLUDE JERUSALEM FROM A SETTLEMENT. I SAID THAT I WAS AGAINST INCLUSION OF A DATE, AND I DOUBTED IF THE ARABS WOULD IN THE END INSIST ON IT. ''WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE RECENT CONFLICT'' WAS A BETTER PHRASE.

5. BERARD REFLECTED THAT IN SPITE OF THE APPEARANCE OF A LARGE AREA OF AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY ON THE NEED TO GO TO THE COUNCIL, ''SERIOUS DISAGREEMENT'' ON SUBSTANTIAL MATTERS SEEMED TO LIE JUST BELOW THE SURFACE. HE SUGGESTED THAT EVERY POSSIBLE PRESSURE SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE ISRAELIS TO CONVINCE THEM THAT THEY MUST NOT BE TOO INFLEXIBLE. THEY SHOULD, ABOVE ALL, PUT ASIDE THE IDEA THAT THE ARABS COULD BE BROUGHT TO TALK TO THEM DIRECTLY.

6. FINALLY, HE WARNED ME THAT SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WERE HOSTILE TO THE IDEA OF GETTING BACK INTO THE COUNCIL NOW, BECAUSE THEIR HEADS OF DELEGATIONS WANTED TO PLAY A PUBLIC ROLE, AS IN JULY, IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATES ON THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SUGGESTED THAT ARGENTINE AND BRAZIL, THE TWO SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS, SHOULD DISSUADE THESE OTHER LATINS FROM THESE DESIGNS.

7. IN SPITE OF HIS EMPHASIS ON THESE SNAGS AND PITFALLS, BERARD SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE FRENCH AIMS WERE VERY SIMILAR TO OURS.

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS MOSCOW 468, PARIS 449,
AMMAN 332, TEL AVIV 465.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0120Z/17
RECD AT 0125Z/17

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EASTERN DEPT.
ADEN DEPT.
ARABIAN DEPT.
N.E.A.D.
U.N. DEPT.
D.I.S. M.O.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

FFFFF

JB

CONFIDENTIAL

A useful summary of the position.

CYPHER: CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 2735 16 OCTOBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 2735 OF 16 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS AMMAN AND TEL AVIV.

MIDDLE EAST:

MYTELS NOS 2731, 2732, 2733 AND 2734. - Below

I HAVE THESE GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE REPORTS OF MY DISCUSSIONS TODAY WITH THE AMERICANS, CANADIANS, JAPANESE AND FRENCH.

2...ALTHOUGH IT IS NOW WIDELY AGREED THAT THE AIM SHOULD BE ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT NEITHER THE AMERICANS NOR THE RUSSIANS WILL TAKE THE INITIATIVE (EITHER SEPARATELY OR TOGETHER). WE CONSEQUENTLY HOPE THAT THE
* NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WILL TAKE UP THE RUNNING, AND THEY ARE MEETING TOMORROW UNDER THE JAPANESE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL.

3...THERE IS WIDE AGREEMENT THAT THE TWO MAIN PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE SPELT OUT IN A COUNCIL RESOLUTION (POSSIBLY IN THE PREAMBLE) AND A DECISION TAKEN TO SEND A U N SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

4...MOST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL SHARE OUR SENSE OF URGENCY, BUT THE AMERICANS DO NOT WISH TO BE SEEN TO BE IN A HURRY.

5...THE ARABS (AND CONSEQUENTLY PROBABLY THE RUSSIANS) ARE EAGER TO AVOID DELAY. THE ISRAELIS, WHILE RECONCILED TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, WISH HIS TERMS OF REFERENCE TO BE AS LITTLE AND AS VAGUE AS POSSIBLE.

6...THE REMAINING OBSTACLE WHICH MAY BE A MOST SERIOUS ONE IS THE NEW DRAFTING OF A FAIR AND BALANCED RESOLUTION. WE THOUGHT WE HAD IT IN THE TRUE GROMYKO/GOLDBERG TEXT (OUR TELEGRAM 1833) BUT THE WORK OF SETTING OUT A BALANCED OBLIGATION MUST NOW BE TACKLED AGAIN BY THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS.

F O PASS ROUTINE PARIS 450, MOSCOW 469, AMMAN 333 AND TEL AVIV 466.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT 0003Z/17
RECD AT 0004Z/17
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EASTERN DEPT.
ADEN DEPT.
ARABIAN DEPT.
N.E.A.D.
UNITED NATIONS DEPT.
DIS MOD

ADVANCE COPIES SENT:

* Yugoslavia is NOT on the Council.

CONFIDENTIAL

:::::

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Tel. No. 1128 16 October, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1128 of 16 October.
Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Washington, Amman and Saving Paris.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text of Mr. Eshkol's Memorandum:-

Begins.

I am troubled by and feel bound to convey to you something of the sense of disquiet which has arisen here of late regarding Britain's policies inside and outside of the United Nations in relation to the situation in the Middle East.

In doing so I should like to emphasize that there is in Israel a deep and genuine fund of goodwill towards Britain, which of recent years appeared increasingly to have found a solid basis in common interests and mutual understanding.

We realize that Britain has interests in the Arab countries and more particularly that the continued closure of the Suez Canal involves her in serious economic loss. As against these interests we for our part see at stake the very existence of our people in Israel, a nation surrounded by enemies still bent on its destruction. I do not wish to dwell here on what the Jewish people has endured and suffered in the course of the 2,000 years of its wandering, and more particularly within the last generation. I would only add in the latter context that we cannot dismiss from our mind the thought that if the major Powers had at the critical time acted differently many who perished might have been saved.

To return to the issues immediately confronting us we cannot help feeling that the efforts to which Britain is reportedly giving its support on behalf of what are essentially superficial and temporary arrangements designed to preserve the Arab States from the necessity of making peace with Israel while at the same time securing an Israel withdrawal, will in the end serve neither Britain's nor Israel's interests. They fail yo go to the root of the problem and will before long recreate the very situation which led to the crisis of last June.

We are convinced that pursuit of any short-term solution is a profound error and that an opportunity now exists which, given patience and perseverance, could lead to a break-through to genuine peace.

/We

We for our part are determined on the basis of hard experience not to lend ourselves to any programme which under cover of guarantees by external factors or in other ways fails directly to engage the parties themselves in mutual recognition, commitment and responsibility to one another.

We believe that in considerable measure this is also the view of the United States. It has been a source of disappointment and anxiety that that position does not seem to have been shared by the British Government. In the face of Soviet pressures aimed at a return to a status quo which can only bring in its wake new disasters, the need to avoid any erosion of the Western position as expressed at the meeting of the Special General Assembly seems imperative.

As to the more detailed aspects of the issues immediately confronting us permit me in order not unduly to lengthen this comment to refer to and associate myself with the letter addressed by Foreign Minister Eban to Ambassador Caradon on 8 October, 1967.

I would conclude by saying again, how much we value the maintenance of a relationship of understanding and confidence between our two countries and our conviction that in the long-term interests of all and not least of the Arab countries themselves, the opportunity which presents itself for achieving a lasting peace should be steadfastly pursued.

Ends.

2. See my immediately following telegram.

3. Foreign Office pass UKMIS New York 247, Washington 259 and Saving Paris 5.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1510Z/16 October
Recd. 1638Z/16 October

[Repeated as requested]

FO/CO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES SENT.

Eastern Dept.

xxxxx

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Tel No. 1127 16 October. 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1127 of 16 October
Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Washington, Amman and Saving to Paris.

Anglo/Israel relations.

I was asked to see the Israel Prime Minister in Jerusalem at 10 a.m. this morning

2. Mr Eshkol spoke with great earnestness and emotion albeit in his habitual rambling and convoluted style. Yafeh (Prime Minister's Political Secretary) and Savir (Foreign Ministry) were present. The conversation lasted for an hour and twenty minutes and at the end of it Mr. Eshkol handed me a memorandum which he asked me to transmit as an informal expression of his views and to which he hoped you and the Prime Minister would give your earnest attention Text is in my immediately following telegram.

3. Record of conversation is in my second and third following telegrams.

4. Foreign Office pass UKMIS New York 246. Washington 258 and Saving Paris 4.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1432Z/16 October
Recd 1500Z/16 October

[Repeated as requested]

FO/CO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES SENT.

Eastern Dept.

xxxxx

CONFIDENTIAL

Israel (Prime Min.)

A. M. Palliser, Esq., CMG,

10, Downing Street.

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

1915.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1

19 October, 1967.

Registry

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

ADVANCE COPY

Ed. (3746)

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT RECORD

To:—

No. 10.

Type 1 +

From

Mr. J. C. Moberly

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND GENERAL ANKRAH AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE ON MONDAY, 16 OCTOBER, 1967

Present:

The Rt. Hon. George Brown, M.P.
Mr. D.J.D. Maitland
Lt-General J.A. Ankrah
Mr J.E.O Nunoo
Mr E.N. Omaboe
HE Mr S.K. Anthony
Mr N. Quao

Mr. Brown asked General Ankrah about the ~~how~~ situation ~~was~~ in Ghana now. General Ankrah replied that there were no problems and that everything was under control. Mr. Brown enquired about the numbers of unemployed and General Ankrah confirmed that ~~this~~ unemployment was a difficulty at the present time.

2. Turning to the Middle East, Mr. Brown said that he had been interested in what Mr. Harlley had said in his speech at the General Assembly in New York. It looked from this as though our two governments took very much the same ~~attitude~~ line about the present situation in the Middle East.

/General Ankrah

General Ankrah said that the essential requirement at this stage was that the Arabs should recognise the existence of Israel. Mr. Brown said that the difficulty was to get a balanced approach: the Israelis would have to admit that they could not hold on indefinitely to territories conquered during war and, on the other hand, the Arabs would have to accept not only that Israel existed but that it had the right to exist in peace and security. The difficulty arose over the question of who should make the first move. At ~~the~~ present ~~moment,~~ the Arab attitude was a good deal more realistic than Mr. Brown had ever known it before. If we could persuade the Israelis to be more flexible, this might be as good a moment as was ever likely to occur for making progress towards a solution. What was needed was ~~to get the~~ United Nations ~~into the area so that they could conduct talks~~ over for any talks, but for the moment the Israeli attitude was very hard. General Ankrah commented that, if both sides could be induced to meet and talk, then there could be a reasonable give and take between them and there would be a real chance of progress towards a lasting settlement.

3. Mr. Brown said that the Israelis, with some justice, felt that they could not agree to withdraw until they had something tangible in return. This was understandable but we had also to bear in mind that, if time was lost now, the

/relatively

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Dd.033009 Gp.863

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

relatively more helpful situation in the Arab world might disappear. Mr. Brown doubted whether it would really be possible to achieve the direct talks which the Israelis would like to see. It might be possible, however, to arrange something through a United Nations' representative. General Ankrah thought it desirable that the Arabs should at least make some move as it would be impossible to settle the Arab/Israel problem without negotiations. For the time being the occupied areas could not be used as a staging ground for an attack on Israel. Israel could therefore reasonably ask for some assurance that, if she gave them up, they would not be used for an attack against her. Somebody must give a guarantee to Israel and perhaps the United Nations could help here. Mr. Brown commented that we were still suffering from the consequences of what he regarded as U Thant's precipitate withdrawal of U.N.E.F. It was difficult for Israel now to have any faith in a United Nations' guarantee.

4. Turning to the current situation at the United Nations, Mr. Brown said that it looked as though the Arab/Israel question would go to the Security Council within a few days. If so, this would prevent an unpleasant and acrimonious debate in the General Assembly. There was some hope that progress might be made in the Security Council. There were

/no

no Arab members of the Council and therefore they would not be required to do more than acquiesce in what the Council proposed without necessarily saying specifically that they agreed to it. The Russians would probably go along with whatever the Arabs would acquiesce in. General Ankrah said that the Russians had lost a good deal of face over the Arab/Israel situation. Mr. Brown agreed and said that ~~we had~~ the United Kingdom lost a good deal more than face as a result of what had occurred. General Ankrah said that the Arabs had clearly under-estimated Israel's air power and this was ~~clearly~~ the reason for the allegations about British and American involvement. Mr. Brown pointed to the danger that the lesson of the value of a pre-emptive air strike would not be lost on others. This was one of the reasons why we did not want to leave things as they were. Our information was that the Russians were replacing some of the Arab losses of arms and military equipment, though not all. However, we could not be certain that this situation would last.

5. Mr. Brown said that he wanted to take the opportunity of thanking General Ankrah for the help given by the Ghanaian representative at the United Nations last June in avoiding an unhelpful resolution over Rhodesia. This took a good deal of

/courage

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

D4.033009 Gp.863

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

courage in the mood then prevailing amongst many African colleagues. In conclusion, General Ankrah and Mr. Brown agreed that there were no significant bilateral problems between the United Kingdom and Ghana at the present time.

).-).

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 1129 16 October 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1129 of 16 October Repeated for information to U.K.Mission New York, Washington Amman and Saving to Paris

My two immediately preceding telegrams: Anglo/Israel Relations.

Mr. Eshkol said he had been extremely worried and unhappy for some time about British activities in regard to the Middle East. He had thought of sending a message to the Prime Minister, but he felt this stage had not been reached yet. He had therefore decided to talk to me so that I could report in a more informal way his feelings. (I understand a great deal of yesterday's Cabinet was taken up with the question of United Kingdom activities in the United Nations and it is therefore possible that this course of action was decided then).

2. He fully appreciated that Britain had important interests in the Middle East, but in effect these now really rested on the procurement and passage of oil. Israel's interests were even more vital. It was a question of the life and death of a State and a people. This was the last ditch for the Jews of the world. The response from world Jewry, in Israel's hour of crisis, showed that they too understood this.

3. There followed a longish passage on Zionist history and ideals with some handsome references to the rôle played by Britain and by Lord Balfour.

4. Israel had not wanted this war. God knows, he himself by counselling restraint and delay had done himself grave political damage. He did not regret this and he thought that people in Israel were beginning to appreciate more the rôle he had played. But the war had come. It was not certain Israel could succeed against the powerful forces assembled against her. But she had achieved her deliverance and was now in a position where she saw great possibilities for a final and lasting peace. He wondered if the British Government understood how vital (in the true sense of the word) were Israel's interests and how firm was her resolve to use her present position to obtain this peace. As he had said to the troops in Sinai "we are here". This was said in no spirit of boasting or vain glory. It was a fact and a great responsibility and Israel, despite all the pressures of her enemies and her friends, was not going to give the position up except for a peace which was truly binding on the Arabs. He thought the Americans showed great understanding over this.

5. Israelis felt however that there was a great lack of understanding by you of her position. They could not but feel from your public statements over the years that you were

/hostile

hostile to Israel. He believed that you had recently (and so had Mr. Wilson) said that you believed there should be no return to the situation apertaining under the old armistice agreements. But this had been said in private. Why could it not be said in public? Instead Britain was seen to be taking the lead in every effort to whittle away Israel's position: First of all over Jerusalem and now in the United Nations generally but Israel was not going to throw away her survival however great the pressures exerted on her. The Israelis had a bad experience of the United Nations. The Security Council was an unbalanced forum from the Israeli point of view because of the Russian veto. Israel was not interested in forms of words or formulae, which the Russians and the Arabs could later renege upon. She was not even enamoured of "guarantees". There had been "guarantees" under the tripartite declaration - about the Suez Canal and about the Straits of Tiran, but when it came to the point Israel was left to stand on her own. He was not grumbling. Israel had not asked anybody to come to her aid in the present crisis.

6. He felt it almost unnecessary to ask us to reflect where the West would be now if Israel had not fought. There would have been precious little Western influence left in the Middle East and the Arabs would have seen the Soviets and Nasser as the only power with which to make an accommodation. King Hussein and our other friends would not be here, even though they had abandoned us in the hopes of climbing on the new bandwagon. The situation was different now. Nasser was not the sane man as he was before the war. A situation had been created which the West could exploit. Yet Britain now seemed bent on building Nasser up again. He had seen the statements of Sir Dingle Foot, a well known pro-Arab and anti-Israeli. Now we were sending Sir Harold Beeley, another personality with unfortunate memory for Israel. Of course, our relations with Egypt and our interests in that country were our own business. But our present anxiety to renew relations coupled with our activities in the United Nations made it inevitable that Israel at this juncture must draw her own conclusions.

7. Jews had long memories. They remembered and loved their friends: Lord Balfour, a majority of personalities in British public life and the British Labour Party. But equally they remembered their enemies. He knew that we in Britain considered Mr. Bevin to have been a great Foreign Secretary and I myself had on several occasions made this point in speaking in Israel. But from an Israeli point of view he had been an enemy. He had thought that the foundation of the State of Israel was a blunder and against British interests. You, Sir, were known to hold the same view. Nor had Israel forgotten the rôle played by Mr. Malcolm MacDonald and the "traps" he had set for Mr. Ben Gurion, which fortunately Mr. Ben Gurion had avoided.

8. He hoped most passionately and earnestly that while

Israel was still able to talk to Britain his appeal to us to show more understanding and less activity which was prejudicial to Israel's long-term interests of peace, would be listened to.

9. The above took about an hour and at the end it was indicated that the conversation was over. I said, however, that I felt that I must take up a little more of his time, since I should like immediately to try to allay some of his misconceptions and anxieties.

10. See my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office pass U.K.Mission New York 248, Washington 260, Saving to Paris 6.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1725Z 16 October 1967
Recd 2025Z 16 October 1967

[Repeated as requested]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES SENT:

Eastern Dept.

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 1130 16 October. 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1130 of 16 October,
Repeated for information to UKMIS New York, Washington, Amman, Saving to Paris.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Anglo Israel Relations.

I said I had naturally been reading the Israel Press and had for some weeks known from private and official conversations with Israelis of the growing anxiety about Britain. I was sure too that ever since the end of the war I had done my best to report as fairly and objectively as I could on Israeli thinking, attitudes and policies. It was perhaps on the Israel side that there was some misconception.

2. There was, in fact, no difference in 'policy' between our two countries. There was a lot of talk about our interest in opening of the Suez Canal and our oil interests. But I hoped Mr. Eshkol did not think we were as short sighted as that. We knew that our interests in the Middle East were best safe-guarded by peace and stability and this is what we wanted to bring about. Surely this was Israel policy too?

3. There was clearly a difference between us of appreciation and of how to achieve our policy. The Israelis believed that if absolutely nothing was done the Arabs would be forced to come to the conference table directly with the Israelis. Our best advice, and after all we had representatives in Arab countries and many years experience in the Middle East, was that the Arabs would simply not do this. We did believe, however, that there was a new climate in the Arab world of which advantage could be taken to work towards a peace. But this would take time, perseverance and flexibility. One could not go from black to white in one bound. There was certain to be a long intervening period of grey.

4. We therefore believed that the opportunity of making some progress must be taken now, or lost for ever (with all the unfortunate consequences for Israel). One could only work on the Arabs through the United Nations. That is why we favoured some action in the Security Council. We were not asking for hard and fast solutions there. All we sought was a definition of principles and the sending up to the area of a representative of the Secretary-General, who could then get to work with both sides within the framework of these principles.

/We were

We were aware of the pitfalls of vague formulas which would enable the Russians and Arabs to renege. I could assure him that our representative at the United Nations Lord Caradon, was very aware of the need to bind the Arabs to their side of the bargain. Furthermore, we were not acting for ourselves, but our belief in action through the Security Council was shared by the vast majority of members of the United Nations and by the Americans. You, sir, had in your recent conversations with Mr. Remez pointed out that Israel had nothing to fear since she, after all, was in possession and need make no move until she was satisfied that the other side were fulfilling their obligations. I did not see why this situation need lead to bitterness or recrimination between us. Mr. Eshkol interjected "not bitterness, but anxiety and sadness".

5. For good measure, (since I rarely have the opportunity of a direct talk with Mr. Eshkol) I put in a plea along lines of my telegram No. 1055 that Israel, who seemed to consider she had so many vital issues at stake, should at least try to gain some world sympathy and understanding on more inessential matters to her such as the return of all the refugees to the West Bank.

6. I am afraid Mr. Eshkol's response was not encouraging and indicated that apart from the family reunion scheme, he considered the return of the great bulk of the refugees to the West Bank now lay within the area of a final and definitive solution of the whole problem.

Foreign Office pass UKMIS New York 249 Washington 261 and Saving Paris 7.

Mr. Hadow.

Sent 1920Z/16 October

Recd 2210Z/16 October.

[Repeated as requested]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

Eastern Dept.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

DDDDD

US/UK Confidential Text

Goldberg/Yakomyko Draft adapted to Security Council
(Including U.N. Special Representative)

The Security Council,

Bearing in mind resolution 2256 adopted at the 5th Emergency Session of the General Assembly and having taken note of the records of that Session,

Having further considered the grave situation in the Middle East,

Considering that the crisis in the Middle East merits the attention of all Member States and indeed requires the full participation of all Members to achieve a just and lasting peace,

1. Declares that peace and final solutions to this problem can be achieved within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations;

2. Affirms the principle under the U.N. Charter of:

(a) Without delay withdrawal by the parties to the conflict of their forces from territories occupied by them in keeping with the inadmissability of the conquest of territory by war;

(b) Without delay acknowledgement by all Member States of the United Nations in the area that each enjoys the right to maintain an independent national state of its own and to live in peace and security, and renunciation of all claims and acts inconsistent therewith;

3. Determines to work directly with the parties and utilise a United Nations presence in order to achieve appropriate and just

solutions of all aspects of the problem, in particular bringing to an end the long-deferred one of the refugees and ensuring freedom of transit through international waterways.

4. Requests accordingly that the Secretary-General appoint a personal representative to assist him in seeking implementation of the present resolution in agreement with the parties concerned;

5. Decides to continue examining the situation in the Middle East with a matter of urgency and requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council advised of the progress and results of the consultations by the personal representative with the states concerned.

(469 E

TOP COPY

RECEIVED 21
ARCHIVES No. 15
21 JUL 1967
FCR 2/14

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1833 21 JULY 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1833 OF 21 JULY

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW AMMAN TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO OTTAWA BEIRUT AND CAIRO.

MY I.P.T.

MIDDLE EAST EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ALTERNATIVE PROPOSED REVISION OF LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT.

QUOTE.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

HAVING EXAMINED THE GRAVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

CONSIDERING THAT THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST MERITS THE ATTENTION OF ALL MEMBER STATES AND INDEED REQUIRES THE FULL PARTICIPATION OF ALL MEMBERS TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND LASTING PEACE,

1. DECLARES THAT PEACE AND FINAL SOLUTIONS TO THIS PROBLEM CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

2. AFFIRMS THE PRINCIPLE UNDER THE CHARTER OF:

(A) WITHOUT DELAY, WITHDRAWAL BY THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT OF THEIR FORCES FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY THEM, IN KEEPING WITH THE INADMISSABILITY OF CONQUEST OF TERRITORY BY WAR:

(B) WITHOUT DELAY, ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY ALL MEMBER STATES IN THE AREA THAT EACH HAS THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL STATE OF ITS OWN, AND TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY:

(C) RENUNCIATION OF ALL CLAIMS AND ACTS INCONSISTENT WITH THE ABOVE:

3. REQUESTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONTINUE EXAMINING THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY, WORKING DIRECTLY WITH THE PARTIES AND UTILIZING A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AN APPROPRIATE AND JUST SOLUTION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE

/PROBLEM,

CONFIDENTIAL

UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1833 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

PROBLEM, IN PARTICULAR BRINGING TO AN END THE LONG-DEFERRED ONE OF THE REFUGEES, AND GUARANTEEING FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS.
UNQUOTE.
FO PASS PARIS NO. 344, MOSCOW NO. 332, AMMAN NO. 212, TEL AVIV NO. 341 AND SAVING TO BEIRUT NO. 75 AND CAIRO NO. 126.
LORD CARADON

SENT Ø154/22Z JULY
RECD Ø335/22Z JULY

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION. REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS.]

FO/CO/WH.DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

AM

394

TOP COPY

E

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES [illegible]
[illegible] 1967
FR2 | 14

EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NO 1796
UNCLASSIFIED

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
18 JULY 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1796 OF 18 JULY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW AMMAN BEIRUT TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO CAIRO AND OTTAWA.

MIDDLE EAST:

EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

M I P T.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER DATED 18 JULY FROM DR SOLOMON OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, PRESIDENT OF THE LATIN AMERICAN GROUP TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND TO CHAIRMEN OF THE VARIOUS REGIONAL GROUPS:-

'' AS YOU ARE AWARE NEGOTIATORS FROM THE LATIN AMERICAN GROUP HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING WITH DELEGATIONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES IN AN EFFORT TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE RESOLUTION TO DEAL WITH THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. THE RESULTS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN MAINLY NEGATIVE AND IN SPITE OF RECENT HOPEFUL SIGNS THAT SOME RECONCILIATION BETWEEN DIVERGENT POINTS OF VIEW MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, THE POSITION HAS REMAINED UNRESOLVED.

IN OUR MOST RECENT DISCUSSIONS DIFFERENCES HAVE BEEN NARROWED DOWN TO THE POINTS INDICATED IN THE ACCOMPANYING DRAFT RESOLUTION APPROPRIATELY ANNOTATED.

THIS DOCUMENT IS FORWARDED TO YOU FOR INFORMATION AND CIRCULATION WITHIN YOUR GROUP AND FOR SUCH OTHER ACTION AS YOU MAY CONSIDER SUITABLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. ''

2...TEXT OF DRAFT LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION ENCLOSED WITH LETTER IS AS FOLLOWS:-

'' THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

/HAVING

HAVING EXAMINED THE GRAVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

CONSIDERING THAT THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST MERITS THE ATTENTION OF ALL MEMBER STATES AND INDEED REQUIRES THE FULL PARTICIPATION OF ALL MEMBERS TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND LASTING PEACE.

1. DECLARES THAT PEACE AND FINAL SOLUTIONS TO THIS PROBLEM CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS;

2. AFFIRMS THE PRINCIPLE THAT CONQUEST OF TERRITORY BY WAR IS INADMISSIBLE UNDER OUR CHARTER AND CONSEQUENTLY THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI'S FORCES TO THE POSITIONS THEY OCCUPIED BEFORE JUNE 5, 1967, IS EXPECTED:

3. AFFIRMS LIKEWISE THAT THE POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF MEMBER STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST ALLOW THEM A RIGHTFUL FREEDOM FROM THREAT OF WAR AND CONSEQUENTLY THAT THE TERMINATION OF A STATE OR CLAIM OF BELLIGERENCY BY ALL SUCH STATES IS EXPECTED:

4. REQUESTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONTINUE EXAMINING THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY, WORKING DIRECTLY WITH THE PARTIES AND UTILIZING A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AN APPROPRIATE AND JUST SOLUTION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM, IN PARTICULAR BRINGING TO AN END THE LONG-DEFERRED ONE OF THE REFUGEES AND GUARANTEEING FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS.''

3...TEXTS OF AMENDMENTS SUGGESTED BY OTHER PARTIES ARE AS FOLLOWS:-

'' 1. IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 INSERT THE WORDS ''WITHOUT DELAY''

/IN

IN LINE THREE BETWEEN ''FORCES'' AND ''TO''.

2. (A). IN PARAGRAPH THREE DELETE THE WORD ''LIKEWISE'' AFTER ''AFFIRMS''.

(B). SOME DELEGATIONS FOUND THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT THE WORDING ''AND CONSEQUENTLY THAT THE TERMINATION OF A STATE OR CLAIM OF BELLIGERENCY BY ALL SUCH STATES IS EXPECTED'' AND THE FOLLOWING POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE WAS DISCUSSED:

''AND CONSEQUENTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER THE RENUNCIATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THE LEGALLY RECOGNISED CAPACITY TO WAGE ACTS OF WAR BY SUCH STATES IS EXPECTED.''

3. REPLACING THE PHRASE ''GUARANTEEING FREEDOM OF TRANSIT'' BY THE PHRASE ''SETTLING THE QUESTION OF TRANSIT''.

F O PASS PARIS 327, MOSCOW 315, AMMAN 196, BEIRUT 126, TEL AVIV 329 AND SAVING TO CAIRO 115.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT Ø215/19 JULY
RECD AT Ø215/19 JULY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

F.O./C.O./WH DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT.

RH

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
LIMITED

A/L.523/Rev.1
4 July 1967
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

Fifth emergency special session
Agenda item 5

LETTER DATED 13 JUNE 1967 FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (A/6717)

Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela: revised draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Considering that all Member States have an inescapable obligation to preserve peace and, consequently, to avoid the use of force in the international sphere,

Considering further that the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council and accepted by the State of Israel and the States of Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic is a first step towards the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East, a step which must be reinforced by other measures to be adopted by the Organization and complied with by the parties,

1. Urgently requests:

(a) Israel to withdraw all its forces from all the territories occupied by it as a result of the recent conflict;

(b) The parties in conflict to end the state of belligerency, to endeavour to establish conditions of coexistence based on good neighbourliness and to have recourse in all cases to the procedures for peaceful settlement indicated in the Charter of the United Nations;

2. Reaffirms its conviction that no stable international order can be based on the threat or use of force, and declares that the validity of the occupation or acquisition of territories brought about by such means should not be recognized;

3. Requests the Security Council to continue examining the situation in the Middle East with a sense of urgency, working directly with the parties and relying on the presence of the United Nations to:

(a) Carry out the provisions of operative paragraph 1 (a) above;

(b) Guarantee freedom of transit on the international waterways in the region;

(c) Achieve an appropriate and full solution of the problem of the refugees and guarantee the territorial inviolability and political independence of the States of the region, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

4. Reaffirms, as in earlier recommendations, the desirability of establishing an international régime for the city of Jerusalem, to be considered by the General Assembly at its twenty-second session.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
LIMITED

A/L.522/Rev.3
3 July 1967
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH

Fifth emergency special session
Agenda item 5

LETTER DATED 13 JUNE 1967 FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (A/6717)

Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mali, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia: revised draft resolution

Immediate withdrawal of the armed forces of Israel from territories belonging to Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic

The General Assembly,

Having discussed the grave situation in the Middle East,

Noting that the armed forces of Israel occupy areas including territories belonging to Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic,

1. Calls upon Israel to withdraw immediately all its forces to the positions they held prior to 5 June 1967;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure compliance with the present resolution and to secure, with the assistance of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization established by the Security Council, strict observance by all parties of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab countries;

3. Requests further the Secretary-General to designate a personal representative who will assist him in securing compliance with the present resolution and be in contact with the parties concerned;

4. Calls upon all States to render every assistance to the Secretary-General in the implementation of the present resolution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to report urgently to the General Assembly and to the Security Council on compliance with the terms of the present resolution;

6. Requests that the Security Council consider all aspects of the situation in the Middle East and seek peaceful ways and means for the solution of all problems - legal, political and humanitarian - through appropriate channels, guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular those contained in Articles 2 and 33.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 2721 15 OCTOBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 2720 OF 15 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS AMMAN AND TEL AVIV.

MIDDLE EAST.

I HAD A LONG TALK WITH AMBASSADOR MALITZA (RUMANIA) YESTERDAY. HE IS WELL INFORMED (HE WAS IN THE RUMANIAN TEAM WHICH VISITED CAIRO AFTER THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION) AND, I THOUGHT, VERY FAIR AND SENSIBLE. HIS COMMENT IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTING IN THAT HE NO DOUBT SPEAKS FOR HIS FOREIGN MINISTER MANESCU, THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY.

2...HIS MAIN THEME WAS THAT FOR OPPOSITE REASONS NEITHER THE AMERICANS OR THE RUSSIANS WILL TAKE ANY INITIATIVE. NOR WILL THE RUSSIANS WISH TO MAKE A MOVE IN COOPERATION WITH THE AMERICANS. (HE SAID THAT FEDORENKO'S RECENT OBJECTION TO THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS CONSULTING TOGETHER UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE JAPANESE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL WAS NOT OBJECTION TO CONSULTATION AS SUCH BUT TO THE PROPOSAL THAT THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS SHOULD JOIN TOGETHER TO APPEAL TO THE U S AND U S S R TO ACT TOGETHER.) IF WE WAITED FOR THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS TO AGREE WE SHOULD THEREFORE WAIT INDEFINITELY. BUT SPEED WAS ESSENTIAL. ALREADY DRAFT RESOLUTIONS WERE BEING PREPARED (PRESUMABLY BY THE ARABS AND THEIR FRIENDS) FOR A BIASED RESOLUTION TO BE RAISED IN THE ASSEMBLY. THIS MIGHT RUIN THE HOPES OF A FAIR AND BALANCED RESOLUTION IN THE COUNCIL. SO, AS THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS WERE BOTH HOLDING BACK, IT WAS FOR THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE. THEY SHOULD DO SO AT ONCE. MALITZA THOUGHT THAT IF THEY DID BOTH THE AMERICANS AND THE RUSSIANS WOULD GO ALONG AND BE RELIEVED NOT TO HAVE TO EARN THE ODIUM OF EITHER TAKING A LEAD THEMSELVES OR BEING ACCUSED OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR A DRIFT TO DEADLOCK.

/ 3...MALITZA

3...MALITZA ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS SHOULD TAKE THE LATIN AMERICAN TEXT AS A STARTING POINT RATHER THAN THE GROMYKO/GOLDBERG TEXT, THE EXACT TERMS OF WHICH WERE IN DISPUTE.

4...MUCH MUST NOW DEPEND ON U S INTENTIONS AND I HOPE TO SEE GOLDBERG TOMORROW BUT I THINK THAT THERE IS MUCH IN WHAT MALITZA SAYS. WE KNOW THAT SEVERAL NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING TAKING AN INITIATIVE AT THE RIGHT TIME (SEE MYTELS NOS 2666 AND 2667). IT MAY WELL BE THAT THEY WILL DECIDE TO GO AHEAD NOW.

F O PASS PARIS 445, MOSCOW 464, TEL AVIV 461 AND AMMAN 328.

LORD CARADON

SENT 1734Z/15 OCT
RECD 1800Z/15 OCT

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
U.N.D.
D.D. & P.U.S.D.
N.E.A.D.
ADEN DEPT.
ARABIAN DEPT.
C.O. M.E.W. & U.N.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

Dorrel, Pt 7.

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office
S.W.1

17 October, 1967

My dear Michael, 17/10

You may like to have by you the enclosed copy of a note that we prepared yesterday on the various draft resolutions on the Middle East that have been discussed in the United Nations.

As you will know events move rapidly in New York and the situation described in the attached note is even today somewhat out of date. You may nevertheless find it useful to have this factual information handy.

...

Yours ever,

Derek.

A. M. Palliser, Esq., C.M.G.,
10 Downing Street.

CONFIDENTIAL

Draft Resolutions on the Middle East

1. The following texts of draft resolutions concerning the general problem of the Middle East are attached at Annex:

Flag A. the non-aligned resolution defeated on 4 July (A/L. 522 (Rev. 3)).

Flag B: the Latin American draft resolution defeated on 4 July (A/L. 523 (Rev. 1)).

Flag C: the Latin American draft resolution as it evolved in subsequent discussion, not put to the vote.

Flag D: "Goldberg/Gromyko" draft resolution as agreed at the end of July.

Flag E: the Goldberg/Gromyko resolution adapted for use in the Security Council and including provision for a U.N. Special Representative.

Other proposals which are relevant but have not been put into the form of a draft resolution (and are not attached) are a Jordanian draft resolution (Amman telegram No. 1160), the Tito proposals and a Brazilian Aide Mémoire (UKMIS telegram No. 2539).

2. The U.K. Mission to the United Nations have confirmed that the Latin American text referred to by the Rumanian delegate as a possible alternative to the Goldberg/ ..... Gromyko draft (paragraph 3 of UKMIS New York telegram 2720) should be taken to be the original Latin American draft ..... (Flag B). The following are the main points of similarity

and difference between this text and the Goldberg/Gromyko

.... text (Flag D):-

(a) They are alike in balancing Israeli withdrawal and provision for recognition for Israel's right to existence. The Goldberg/Gromyko text only "affirms the principle under the Charter" instead of "urgently requests" the action specified. But this lesser degree of urgency is somewhat offset by the insertion of the words "Without delay" before each of the balanced principles (2 (a) and (b)).

(b) The Goldberg/Gromyko passage on withdrawal (2 (a)) although it does not specifically mention Israel, is very close to the Latin American paragraph 1 (a). The Israelis particularly object to the phrase in the Goldberg/Gromyko text about "inadmissability of conquest of territory by war".

(c) On ending belligerency, paragraph 2 (b) of the Goldberg/Gromyko draft resolution is weaker than the Latin American equivalent 1 (b) since it does not ask the parties "to end the state of belligerency". Freedom of passage through international waterways is covered in paragraph 3 of both drafts.

(d) Neither resolution contains a provision for a U.N. Special Representative, although both request the Security Council to work directly with the parties and to establish a U.N presence to carry out specified aims. There would be no technical difficulty in inserting a request for the appointment of a U.N. Special Representative in the Latin American text; this has, of course, been done in the U.S. revision of the

..... Goldberg/Gromyko text (Flag E).

/ (e) ....

CONFIDENTIAL

(e) The Latin American draft resolution is tougher so far as the Israelis are concerned both in its reference to refugees and in its call (paragraph 4) for an international régime for Jerusalem.

P. Hayman

(P.T. Hayman)
16 October, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT.A AND BY BAG

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO UKMIS NEW YORK

TELNO. 5596 17 OCTOBER 1967 (U.N.DEPT.)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 5596 OF 17 OCTOBER
AND TO WASHINGTON, BELGRADE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN,
TEL AVIV AND CAIRO AND SAVING TO BEIRUT.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 10946 TO WASHINGTON (NOT TO ALL): MIDDLE EAST.

WHEN THE YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER CALLED ON ME THIS MORNING I ASKED HIM TO GIVE ME HIS ANALYSIS OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEM AS HE HAD SEEN IT BEFORE LEAVING NEW YORK.

2. THE MAIN POINTS IN MR. NIKEZIC'S ANALYSIS ARE THE FOLLOWING :

(A) SO FAR THE ARABS HAD BEEN UNREALISTIC IN REFUSING TO DISCUSS WHAT CONCESSIONS THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE. THE YUGOSLAVS HAD TOLD THEM THAT THEY MUST TALK SERIOUSLY TO THE AMERICANS WHO WERE NOT ONLY SUPPORTERS OF ISRAEL BUT HAD WIDE INTERESTS IN THE AREA. THE PROCESS OF ARAB/U.S. CONSULTATION HAD NOW BEGUN.

(B) THE RUSSIANS WERE WAITING FOR THE UNITED STATES TO SAY WHETHER OR NOT THEY WOULD ENDORSE THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO FORMULA WITHOUT ELABORATION.

(C) ISRAEL MUST NOW MAKE UP ITS MIND WHETHER IT WANTS (I) PEACE AND SECURITY BROADLY WITHIN ITS ESTABLISHED BOUNDARIES, TO SECURE WHICH HAD BEEN SUPPOSEDLY THE MOTIVE OF ITS MILITARY ACTION: OR (II) UNDER COVER OF THIS REQUIREMENT, AND OF THE ARAB VACILLATIONS, TO GAIN SUBSTANTIAL TERRITORIES OR A SPECIAL POSITION OF DOMINANCE OVER THE SURROUNDING ARAB STATES. A YEAR AGO MR. NIKEZIC HAD TOLD THE ISRAELIS HE FEARED THEY HAD AMBITIONS FOR THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE AND WOULD START A CONFLICT TO FURTHER THEM. THEY HAD DENIED THIS.

/(D)

(D) THE AMERICANS NOW APPEARED TO BE BACKING AWAY FROM THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO DRAFT. THEY, LIKE THE ISRAELIS, FACED AN IMPORTANT DECISION. THEY HAD ORIGINALLY SAID THAT THEY WERE AGAINST TERRITORIAL INCREASES BUT BY THEIR SUBSEQUENT SILENCE ON THE POINT THEY GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF SUPPORTING THEM.

(E) THE YUGOSLAVS WERE NO LONGER SPEAKING OF THEIR FIVE POINTS WHICH HAD ONLY BEEN DESIGNED TO BREAK A SITUATION OF IMMOBILISM AND AS A PART OF PRESIDENT TITO'S TOUR TO PROBE ARAB REACTIONS. THEY HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED THAT A NUMBER OF THE ARABS WERE RADICALLY RE-THINKING THEIR ATTITUDES.

(F) THE WAY FORWARD NOW SHOULD BE TO FIND A FORMULA WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR A SOLUTION BY EXCLUDING UNACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS, E.G., OCCUPATION OF ANOTHER COUNTRY'S TERRITORY, TERRITORIAL CONQUEST, THE THREATENING OF THE EXISTENCE OR SECURITY OF STATES IN THE AREA, THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY, THE INTERFERENCE WITH FREE NAVIGATION OF WATERWAYS. PRESSURE FROM ALL SIDES WOULD BE NECESSARY TO BRING ABOUT A SOLUTION WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK. THE TIME ELEMENT WAS IMPORTANT. IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR ISRAELI SHIPS TO GO THROUGH THE CANAL IN THE FIRST STAGES BUT THEIR RIGHT TO DO SO WOULD HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED IN A FINAL AGREEMENT. THIS MUST BE A DURABLE ONE WHICH WOULD SATISFY THE INTERNATIONAL CONCERN WITH THE SECURITY OF THE AREA. WHETHER OR NOT THE COUNTRIES OF THE AREA BUILT ON SUCH A SOLUTION TO ESTABLISH ACTIVE DIPLOMATIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WOULD BE THEIR CONCERN.

(G) THE NEXT STEP MUST COME FROM ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES.

3. MR. NIKEZIC SAID HE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM, IN PARTICULAR BY MY SPEECH TO THE ASSEMBLY AND OUR CURRENT MOVES TO RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.A.R.

4. I SAID THAT I AGREED WITH MOST OF WHAT MR. NIKEZIC HAD SAID,

/IN PARTICULAR

IN PARTICULAR WITH HIS REMARKS ABOUT THE ARAB FAILURES TO PRESENT THEIR CASE OR TO ANALYSE THEIR OWN TRUE LONG-TERM INTERESTS CORRECTLY. AS REGARDS ISRAEL, THERE WERE SEVERAL STRANDS OF OPINION WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. THERE WERE THOSE WHO REALIZED THE LONG-TERM DANGERS AND DIFFICULTIES OF ISRAEL'S POSITION. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT IT WAS NOW MOST IMPORTANT TO GET GENERAL UNDERSTANDING, AND PARTICULARLY BY THE UNITED STATES, OF THE NEED TO ACT RAPIDLY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE ISRAELI ARGUMENT THAT TIME WAS ON THEIR SIDE WAS SURELY MISTAKEN UNLESS THEY INTENDED TO HANG ON TO WHAT THEY HAD GOT, IN WHICH CASE THERE WAS THE DANGER THAT EVENTUALLY THE ARABS WOULD LEARN THE LESSON THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD TAUGHT ABOUT THE VALUE OF A PREEMPTIVE STRIKE. IF WE DID NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE RELATIVELY REALISTIC ATTITUDE NOW BEING DISPLAYED BY THE MORE MODERATE ARAB STATES THE PRESENT REGIMES THERE MIGHT WELL GET OVERTHROWN. IF WE COULD NOT FORESTALL A DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL POSITIONS WOULD BE LIKELY TO HARDEN ALL ROUND. I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT BOTH THE RUSSIANS AND THE AMERICANS WERE NOW FOR THEIR OWN REASONS BACKING AWAY FROM THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO DRAFT, AND THAT NEITHER WERE ANXIOUS TO TAKE THE LEAD IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THERE WAS TALK AMONGST SOME OF THE LATIN AMERICANS OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS PUTTING FORWARD A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ADAPTED FROM THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT WHICH HAD FAILED IN THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IT SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO FIND LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE BALANCING PRINCIPLES OF WITHDRAWAL AND RECOGNITION, AND NOMINATE A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT THE RESOLUTION SHOULD INCLUDE A CLEAR STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES TO GIVE THE REPRESENTATIVE A BASIS TO WORK ON. WE HAD VERY LITTLE TIME, AS QUITE APART FROM THE DANGERS OF AN ASSEMBLY DEBATE, IT WOULD BE VERY MUCH BETTER FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACT THIS MONTH, AS MALI TOOK OVER THE PRESIDENCY FROM JAPAN IN NOVEMBER. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF MR. NIKEZIC COULD SEND INSTRUCTIONS TO THE YUGOSLAV REPRESENTATIVE AT THE UNITED NATIONS TO ENCOURAGE AN INITIATIVE BY THE NON PERMANENT MEMBERS.

/F.N. 5

5. MR. NIKEZIC SAID THAT HE WOULD WISH TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE ARABS AND TO FEEL SURE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE OPPOSED TO A MOVE OF THIS KIND BY THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS. HE FEARED THAT IF THEY WERE IT WOULD GET NOWHERE. I SAID THAT FOR HIS PERSONAL INFORMATION I HAD THIS MORNING HAD REPORTS FROM YOU WHICH INDICATED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD FIND SUCH AN INITIATIVE BY THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS NOT UNWELCOME.

SOSFA SENT 1828Z/17 OCTOBER 1967

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

U.N. DEPT.
NORTHERN DEPT.
N.E.A.D.
ARABIAN DEPT.

Extract from the Times - 19-10-67

Eshkol rebukes Gen Dayan

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT—Tel Aviv, Oct. 18

Mr. Levi Eshkol, the Prime Minister, today criticized the manners of Major-General Moshe Dayan, his Minister of Defence, publicly.

The criticism was a reaction to derisive statements made by General Dayan about Mr. Eshkol as a guest speaker at a council meeting of the National Religious Party, a member of Mr. Eshkol's coalition. The two are bitter political rivals.

Mr. Eshkol had to be forced by party and coalition colleagues to invite the General to join the Government shortly before the six-day war and General Dayan is one of the leaders of the Rafi Party, whose main *raison d'être* is to oust Mr. Eshkol.

Negotiations for a merger of Mr. Eshkol's Mapai Party and Rafi have broken down because General Dayan's party wanted terms which would make an internal revolt against Mr. Eshkol's leadership possible. Mr. Eshkol's friends wanted to block any possible test of strength.

General Dayan seemed to be subverting Mr. Eshkol's leadership when he appeared recently before Mr. Eshkol's coalition partners of the National Religious Party and asked derisively why Mr. Eshkol, who claimed to have been able to get a war vote through the Cabinet at a meeting on May 24 (more than a week before General Dayan joined the Cabinet), had not exercised that power. Why had he dismissed the start of the Egyptian mobilization on May 15 as a "show parade" if, as he later claimed, he had forecast a year ago that war was coming

Mr. Eshkol's retort was given in an interview published today in *Yediot Ahronot*. He attacked the practice of a Minister taking issue with the Prime Minister on such matters in such a manner. He said:—

"He may claim it was a closed meeting, but I assume he was not so naive as not to know his words would be made public. I am amazed at such manners."

As to the substance of General Dayan's criticisms, Mr. Eshkol said the Cabinet vote on May 24 had been deadlocked and he could have swung a number of votes if he had used his influence, but he refrained from doing so out of considerations of statesmanship. (According to reliable sources, Mr. Eshkol himself voted with the "hawks" that night.)

He denied having discounted Egypt's military movements on May 15 and said that he ordered a partial mobilization of the Israel reserves the following day. He also said he had never claimed to know when war was coming, but he had not been lulled by experts who said it could not break out before the 1970s.

In the same interview, Mr. Eshkol said it was painful to observe "the resurrection of the spirit of Bevin in 19[illegible] in the Foreign Office of a Labour Government". Mr. Bevin, as Foreign Secretary after the Second World War, was held responsible for barring Jewish survivors of the Nazi holocaust from reaching British-ruled Palestine because he wanted to appease the Arabs.

Mr. Eshkol said oil interests were behind present British efforts to get a Security Council decision calling for an Israel withdrawal from the Suez Canal in exchange for a declaration of Arab non-belligerency.

"This is a case of economic interests versus the interests of our security and survival", he said.

He said the 1949 Egypt-Israel armistice was dead and there could be no negotiations on that basis. "I am prepared to listen to any proposal concerning us and our neighbours, but not from a third party which is not in a position to implement it," he added.

"Moreover, I don't believe that ending a state of war—which is a hostile and illegal act—merits any prize." On navigation through the Suez canal, he proposed the opening of the waterway to shipping of all nations and that Israel forces remain on the east bank to assure mutuality.

Israel

Telegrams + Cleaners
22.10.67

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

TELNO. 2188 20 OCTOBER 1967 (ED)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 2188 OF 20 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND AMMAN AND SAVING TO CAIRO AND BEIRUT.

YOUR TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 1127, 1128 AND 1129.
[ANGLO/ISRAEL RELATIONS]
YOU SPOKE WELL.

2. MR. ESHKOL'S REMARKS AND ACCOMPANYING MEMORANDUM REVEAL THE TOTAL SUBJECTIVITY OF CURRENT ISRAELI THINKING. HIS ACCUSATION THAT I AM HOSTILE TO ISRAEL IS, AS HE WELL KNOWS, TOTALLY UNTRUE AND I SHALL WISH YOU TO TELL HIM THIS. A MOMENT'S OBJECTIVITY WOULD HAVE PERSUADED HIM, THAT APART FROM OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, TO MAKE ACCUSATIONS OF THIS KIND, WHICH HE HAS NOW REPEATED PUBLICLY IN HIS PRESS INTERVIEW REPORTED IN THE QUOTE TIMES UNQUOTE OF 19 OCTOBER, WAS NOT THE BEST WAY OF FURTHERING HIS PURPOSES AND POLICIES.

/3.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. YOUR TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 1143 AND 1144 SUGGEST THAT LACK OF GRIP AND COHESION IN THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP MAY BE A PARTIAL EXPLANATION OF THE CURRENT ANTI-BRITISH ATTITUDES IN ISRAEL, AND OF THE INCREASINGLY UNYIELDING AND UNREALISTIC ISRAELI APPROACH TO THE ARABS GENERALLY.

4. ALL THIS REPRESENTS A DANGEROUS TREND. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD BE LISTENED TO SERIOUSLY BY BOTH THE ISRAELIS AND THE ARABS IF WE ARE TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. I AM PREPARED TO MAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO STRAIGHTEN THE ISRAELIS OUT. I HAVE CONSIDERED SENDING YOU A MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ESHKOL BUT HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS A GREATER RISK THAT ANY WRITTEN TEXT WOULD BE MISUSED FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES BY THE ISRAELIS, THAN WOULD BE THE CASE WITH AN ORAL REPLY. MOREOVER, A MEMORANDUM MIGHT INVOLVE US IN FURTHER FRUITLESS AND POSSIBLY POLEMICAL WRITTEN EXCHANGES.

5. INSTRUCTIONS WILL REACH YOU ON MONDAY EVENING TO GO OVER THE GROUND THOROUGHLY WITH MR. ESHKOL. I SHOULD LIKE YOU NOW TO ASK FOR AN INTERVIEW ON TUESDAY NEXT. IN SO DOING YOU SHOULD MAKE IT PLAIN THAT YOUR INSTRUCTIONS WILL CONTAIN A DIRECTIVE TO REACT SHARPLY TO MR. ESHKOL'S ACCUSATIONS, AND TO THE FACT THAT HE HAS SEEN FIT TO GIVE PUBLIC EXPRESSION TO THESE IN HIS INTERVIEW WITH YEDIOT AHRONOT.

SOSFA

SENT 1737Z/20 OCTOBER

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

EASTERN DEPT.
N.E.A.D.
ARABIAN DEPT.
J.I.P.G.D.
J.I.R.D.
NEWS DEPT.

DDDDD

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister.

Although you will almost certainly not be Ebor next week this would be a good weekend, a good way of bringing forward up to date our Middle East Would be Grand this way and the attached Telegrams.

P.A. DW 21/10

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Pallister

Private Secretary

I attach a brief for The Secretary of State's meeting with Mr. Eban on 21 October.

(A. R. Moore)
20 October, 1967

c.c. Mr. Brenchley

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH
MR. EBAN ON 21 OCTOBER

Mr. Eban's Situation

HM Ambassador Tel Aviv has reported that Mr. Eban has recently been under attack from inside the Israel Cabinet on the grounds that he has failed to convince the world of the strength of Israel's position and Israel's determination. It is probable that instructions have gone out to Israeli Embassies to speak in stronger terms. Mr. Hadow reported that Mr. Eban successfully resisted a proposal that special emissaries should be despatched. Tel Aviv tel. No. 1144.

Flag A

Anglo-Israel Relations

2. The Secretary of State will have in his mind the burden of the instructions which he is sending to HM Ambassador in Tel Aviv on replying to Mr. Eshkol's recent attacks. He may wish to let Mr. Eban know how much he has resented Mr. Eshkol's untrue accusations, and to make the point that this is not how one expects the Prime Minister of an advanced country to conduct international affairs. Tel Aviv tels 1127, 1128, 1129 and 1130, and the Times report of 20 October.

Flags B, C, D, E & F.

The Position at the UN

3. The non-permanent members of the Security Council have begun their meetings aimed at producing a first balanced draft for a Security Council resolution to take the place of the Goldberg/Gromyko draft which has been dropped by its original sponsors. The Japanese President of the Council has reported

/a general

a general consensus among the non-permanent members that their initial soundings have been fruitful and that a hopeful movement is starting. We shall have to wait until next week to see the outcome.

4. In the meantime, however, the Secretary of State may like to reaffirm to Mr. Eban that our preference for an early meeting at the Security Council is dictated by our concern to achieve progress towards a settlement in the Middle East before the present relatively favourable situation in the Arab world disappears, and to avoid an unconstructive and ill-tempered debate in the General Assembly. He may like to rebut again any idea that in urging early action at the UN, we are mainly concerned with our own economic interest in the opening of the Suez Canal or that we should be prepared to prejudice Israel's essential security requirements in pursuit of this.

Sir H. Beeley's Mission to Cairo

5. Sir H. Beeley's main task was to see whether diplomatic relations could be restored. He naturally mentioned other bilateral issues when he was in Cairo, in particular the question of releasing the four British ships blocked in the Great Bitter Lake. Fawzi agreed to examine the proposal carefully but warned that we might be disappointed. It is not yet clear what form a scheme to clear the southern end of the Canal would take, e.g. whether the UN would be involved, but the Secretary of

/State

State might ask whether Israel would be prepared to acquiesce in arrangements to clear the Canal to this extent. We have been given to understand by the Israeli Embassy atworking level that the Israelis would not raise objection.

6. Sir H. Beeley did not negotiate with the UAR authorities about the settlement of broader problems. He is seeing President Nasser on Saturday, 21 October, and we shall therefore not have his account of the meeting before the Secretary of State sees the Israel Ambassador; but in any case, the Secretary of State will wish to take the line that Sir H. Beeley's conversations were confidential.

Eastern Department,

20 October, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Soviet Ambassador's Call on Prime Minister -
Monday, 23 October

Middle East

Talking Points

While we may not agree on the origins of the crisis in the Middle East, I think it is common ground between Her Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government that neither West nor East can afford to allow a recurrence of the events of June. The risks of direct confrontation between the Great Powers and their escalation are altogether too great and have been further underlined only this weekend by the attack on the Israel destroyer "Eilat". While it would probably be pointless to seek to establish the degree of blame attaching to each side in the case of an incident of this kind, the incident itself does illustrate the precariousness of the ceasefire and also the dangers inherent in the supply of ever more sophisticated weapons to the area. The successful use of missiles on this occasion is bound to make the Israel Government's attitude towards a settlement more rigid and to strengthen the hand of those in Israel who advocate the development of an Israeli nuclear weapon. The Soviet Government would surely agree that the nuclearisation of the Arab/Israel conflict would bring with it untold dangers for the whole world.

2. We remain, therefore, convinced of the urgent need to make progress towards a settlement and we should be grateful for confirmation that the Soviet Government still share our view that this can best be achieved by means of a balanced resolution in the Security Council. Renewed intemperate and partisan debate in the General Assembly would, we believe, be bound to lead to a further hardening of attitudes and to the building up of new

/resentment

Copy on Soviet Union (Gen) Oct 64

resentment making any progress towards a settlement more difficult.

3. In these circumstances, as the Soviet Government know, we have welcomed the measure of agreement achieved by the Soviet and the United States Governments in July on the terms of a balanced draft resolution, which came to be known as the Goldberg/Gromyko draft. While in no way seeking to apportion blame for the failure to make progress on that common ground, we very much regret that the Soviet and U.S. Governments did not find it possible to sponsor a resolution on that basis.

4. We are not, however, necessarily wedded to the particular wording then under discussion. We very much hope that any formulation which emerges will contain the two balancing elements which appeared in the original Latin American draft resolution and also in the Goldberg/Gromyko text, i.e. withdrawal on the one hand and the recognition of the right of Israel to live in peace and security on the other. We also consider it essential that the resolution should provide for the appointment of a U.N. Special Representative.

5. In our view the more explicit the statement of these principles the more useful the resolution will be as a guide to the efforts of the U.N. Representative. The actual details of how the resolution would be put into practice could, however, be appropriately left to the representative to work out in his contacts with the parties concerned.

6. We have welcomed the growing signs of realism on the part of some of the Arab States and we have certainly been doing, and will continue to do, all we can to achieve a more flexible

/approach

approach on the part of the Israel Government. The use of Soviet missiles against the Israeli destroyer will unfortunately not have helped our efforts in this regard.

7. As it has become impossible to make progress on the basis of the Goldberg/Gromyko text, we believe that every encouragement should now be given to the efforts of the non-permanent members of the Security Council to arrive at a balanced and acceptable draft authorising the appointment of a U.N. Representative. We, for our part, will do all we can to facilitate their efforts and we very much hope that the Soviet Government will do the same.

/Background.

BACKGROUND

U.N. SITUATION

(a) Emergency Session

The Soviet Union called for the Emergency Session on the Middle East in June to regain some credit with the Arabs by demonstrating moral support for their cause. But by the end of July the Soviet Government had decided that a settlement must be reached politically and was prepared to agree informally with the United States Government on a resolution which not only did not condemn Israel but was not very far removed from the balanced Latin American draft resolution for which the U.K. had voted but against which the Arabs and the Soviet Union had fought strongly. This resolution ("Goldberg/Gromyko") was never tabled, although it was acceptable to the UAR and Jordan, because the more extreme Arabs continued to resist (and thereby annoyed the Russians). At the time we were shown two versions by the Americans; more recently it has appeared that the Russians may have used two different texts in discussion with the Arabs.

Flag A

2. After the adjournment of the Emergency Session, the Russians retired to their dachas and were not ready to negotiate again until Mr. Gromyko reached New York at the beginning of the XXIInd Session in mid-September. We had hoped to get a resolution on the lines of the Goldberg/Gromyko draft plus the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General through the Security Council during August, both because we have all along thought it urgent to get negotiations going and saw no other way to do so and because we wanted to avoid the resumption of acrimonious debate in the General Assembly.

/(b)

(b) XXIIND GENERAL ASSEMBLY: US/USSR DISCUSSIONS

3. The Americans first contacts with the Russians in September left them doubtful whether the Soviet Government stood by the agreement reached in July. The Foreign Secretary's talk with Mr. Gromyko was reassuring in that it showed the latter still ready to take the Goldberg-Gromyko formula - to which the Arabs had by then rallied - as the basis; he also thought action should be in the Security Council. Over the following three weeks, however, US/USSR talks failed to produce agreement, which was generally thought essential before the Security Council took action. Meanwhile near unanimity developed among members in favour of an early meeting of the Council before the Assembly debated the Middle East.

4. The Soviet Government has given the Americans the impression that it would like to make some progress but not at the price of offering to weaken its support for the Arabs. Its unwillingness to ~~give~~ move ahead of the Arabs ~~a lead~~ has been one point of difficulty in the talks with the Americans. Another is confusion over the text; the Russians have argued that the agreed text called for withdrawal within the lines of June 5, a precision which makes difficulties for Israel. But the breaking point came over the interpretation of the operative paragraphs of the Goldberg/Gromyko draft: the Americans say that in July it was clearly understood that paragraph 2(b), calling for acknowledgement of the right to independence and peace, carried with it the ending of the claim to belligerence and hence the free use of the Suez Canal by all vessels, including Israeli flag ships. The Israeli position on this, however, remains that they will not withdraw from Suez

/without

without certainty on this point. The UAR says it is politically impossible now to acknowlege that the Suez Canal should be open to all shipping (the Gulf of Aqaba is not so difficult and Israeli cargoes through the Canal might be negotiable). The Soviet position, following Arab arguments, is that freedom of transit of international waterways must be linked with the solution of the refugee problem; they claim that this is the effect of the reference to both in the last paragraph of the draft resolution.

5. The Americans, in the light of Israeli toughness, are not able to take our view of the Goldberg/Gromyko formula as guidelines for the U.N. representative whose detail can be filled in only in the course of negotiation. They argue that without the understanding they had reached in July with the Russians on the meaning of paragraph 2(b), the resolution becomes unacceptable because provision for Israeli withdrawal in paragraph 2(a) is explicit but nothing else is. They therefore now prefer to leave it to the non-permanent members of the Security Council to devise a formula, which the Americans would like to be "an even-handed" but general recitation of Charter principles, together with the appointment of a Special Representative. We have agreed that since nothing has come of the US/USSR discussions, we must hope the non-permanent members can succeed. Lord Caradon is from the side-lines encouraging them to move fast and not to be too imprecise since this would not advance things. Both the Americans and the Canadians understand that the UAR may now be prepared to dispense with a call for withdrawal; the Indians, on the other hand, show

/signs of

of being more Arab than the Arabs.

(c) Recent Soviet Approaches

6. The Russians are keen to spread the impression that they are being reasonable and the Americans unreasonable; they may be varying their line with their audience. Mr. Gromyko told
Flag B Sir G. Harrison on 16 October that the Soviet Government was ready to seek the agreement of the Arab countries to the resolution (Moscow tel. no. 1734, para.2) but that the Americans were running out on "their own draft": he disclaimed a joint draft. On 19 October Mr. Kuznetsov asked to see Lord Caradon (UKMIS New York tel.
Flag C no. 2787) and took a discouragingly hard line (Israeli withdrawal must be required to pre-5 June positions, balanced only by Charter principles on ending the state of war, freedom of passage through international waterways and territorial integrity). A Special Representative should be given specific terms of reference. Mr. Kuznetsov urged that H.M.G. should press the US Government to agree to the Goldberg/Gromyko principles. On 20 October, we heard that Mr. Morozov of the Soviet Mission had told the Canadian Permanent Representative that they hoped for early agreement in the Security Council on a balanced resolution and that this need not include the date of 5 June to define the line of withdrawal
Flag D (UKMIS tel. no. 2795).

/Arms Supplies

Arms Supplies to the Middle East

7. It would appear that the initial stop-gap replacement flow of arms to the Arab countries for a credible defence ceased in July. It further seems unlikely that the U.S.S.R. is especially anxious to hasten deliveries of outstanding orders though deliveries under agreements made before the June war have continued to be fulfilled. Further agreements have been made for arms deliveries by the U.S.S.R. to Iraq, Syria and the U.A.R.none of which appear to provide for delivery of any new types, or perhaps even greater,quantities of weapons.

8. Deliveries to Arab countries of armour would appear to place present U.A.R. holdings at some 30% below those of the 5 June, but those of Syria and Iraq are now above pre-war holdings. (The war losses were comparatively few; on the other hand we now know that the Israel modern armour is substantially higher than we thought.)

9. The present U.A.R. holdings of jet fighters are 30% below pre-war operational strength. Those in Syria are slightly less than 20% below, and Iraq, who had very small losses, slightly above. It should be remembered that many of the fighters delivered to the three Arab countries of stop-gap replacements are of older types. We have no information of any post war delivery to Israel though delivery of Skyhawks from the U.S.A. may have begun.

10. On the naval side the U.A.R. are to receive one R class submarine in November. Algeria and the U.A.R. are each to receive two OSA guided missile fast patrol boats since the war. A few small patrol craft have also delivered to the U.A.R. and to Algeria.

Unofficial translation

PRIME MINISTER'S

PERSONAL MESSAGE

SERIAL No T259 AA/67.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

The Soviet Government believes it necessary to approach you, as well as President Johnson and President De Gaulle, on one of the most acute issues of the present international situation, e.g. the problem of removing the consequences of the armed aggression by Israel against the Arab states, and of restoring peace in the Middle East.

The fact that up to now there has been no progress towards political settlement in the Middle East, causes concern. Although the known decisions taken by the Security Council and supported by our two states have led to the end of hostilities, the occupation of the Arab territory seized by Israel in the course of aggression, continues. The Israeli leaders are more and more bluntly putting forward the plans for the annexation of these territories, or at least part of them, and are even taking practical steps to colonize them.

There is information about the concentration of Israeli troops on the positions which cannot but be considered as starting points for organizing new military actions against Syria and Jordan. The Government of Lebanon displays concern with regard to the threats which are now addressed to this government as well. More and more facts show that the arms deliveries to Israel from abroad grow.

As the tension continues to increase lately, one cannot exclude serious complications in the Middle East, and the possibilities that armed incidents provoked by Israel, taking place incessantly along the Suez Canal, and the Israeli-Jordanian and Israeli-Syrian fronts will develop into an all-out military confrontation.

All the states but the aggressor recognized during the emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly that the use of force should not give any advantages or gains and that Israel must withdraw her troops from the occupied Arab

Subject on:- Soviet Union
CCEW Oct. 67.

territories. That was true for the general discussion during the present General Assembly session.

We have taken note of the statement made by the Foreign Minister of Great Britain at this session, as well as other recent pronouncements of the British Government. It is emphasized in these statements that no state must be allowed territorial aggrandizement as a result of the war and that Israel should withdraw her troops from the occupied Arab territories. This is indeed a correct thought.

The leaders of Israel, who continue to behave in a provocative and defiant manner, seem to rely, first of all, on the US aid and support. The Soviet representatives' contacts with responsible officials of the US Government as well as the whole course of proceedings during the present UN General Assembly session show that the expansionist designsof Israel are in fact encouraged by the US connivance.

Where can the calculations by the Israeli leaders banking on the US support lead to if carried out? Some will support one side, others - the opposite side. And so the chain of events will develop. Is it really the way towards the consolidation of peace in the Middle East? Will that do any good to our countries and other states?

One thing should be perfectly clear: if the question of immediate withdrawal of the Israeli troops is not solved, there will be no peace in that area. An unstable and explosive situation will prevail and will be causing complications in the international relations as a whole.

The Soviet Government proceeds from the necessity to remove without delay the consequences of the aggression and also to prevent a new military conflict in that area in the near or more distant future.

The Soviet Government firmly believes that objectively there exists now an opportunity to put an end to a further dangerous delay in the political settlement in the Middle East. It can and must be done through an immediate adoption, say, by the Security Council, of a resolution which was discussed at

the end of the emergency session of the UN General Assembly, providing for the withdrawal of the troops without delay from the occupied territories to the positions prior to June 5, 1967 alongside with the recognition of the principle of the independent national existence of all states of that region, their right to live in peace and security.

Each side would be obliged to observe such a decision taken by the Security Council.

Naturally, there is in addition to those mentioned above a number of other issues which are to be solved. There is a problem of the freedom of navigation. We believe that these problems should also be solved in the interests of all nations on the basis of the mentioned resolution if it is adopted by the Security Council.

References to the effect that the Arab states are allegedly not prepared to recognise Israel's right to independent national existence, are groundless. You undoubtedly know that the Arab states, at least those to whom this issue is of primary concern show a sound and realistic approach to this problem.

After the opening of the present session we were greatly surprised to learn that the American side not only has made no steps forward in the search for a political settlement in the Middle East but it has also displayed a different attitude even to its own proposals set forth during the emergency session of the UN General Assembly.

The statements of the US representatives in New York create an impression that the American side actually tries to retreat from its own proposals. Under the disguise of interpretation of these proposals new additional conditions in the spirit of Israel's aggressive claims are actually being put forward. Attempts are being also made to take negotiations along the curved and boggy path with many stops and retreats. We have drawn the attention of the US Government to undesirable consequences which all this may lead to.

The time has come to undertake resolute measures in order to put an end to the present dangerous developments in the Middle East. The political settlement must not be frustrated just

because that Israel would like to realise its extreme demands disguising its indisputable expansionist ambitions.

It seems that the Israeli leaders care little as to how their state will live tomorrow. They do not think of the consequences which their political short-sightedness may lead to.

We are confident that the overwhelming majority of states, perhaps all countries will support every positive step towards the settlement. It is doubtful that somebody can speak against the decision of the Security Council corresponding to the interests of the states and dictated by the desire to remove tension and lead to stable peace in the Middle East.

Positive results of such efforts would be regarded by the mations not only as a contribution to the consolidation of peace in this region but also as an opening in the settlement of other problems facing the humanity and, not in the least, our states.

I hope, Mr. Prime Minister, to have your reply in the near future. I would like to believe that this reply will contribute to removing from the agenda the problem which has become a source of dangerous friction and conflicts.

Sincerely yours,

A. KOSYGIN

20th October, 1967.

Москва, 20 октября 1967 г.

Уважаемый г-н Премьер-Министр,

Советское правительство считает необходимым обратиться к Вам, а также к Президенту Джонсону и Президенту де Голлю по одному из наиболее острых вопросов в нынешней международной обстановке, а именно - по вопросу ликвидации последствий вооруженного нападения, совершенного Израилем против арабских государств, и восстановления мира на Ближнем Востоке.

Вызывает беспокойство, что до сих пор нет никакого прогресса в деле политического урегулирования на Ближнем Востоке. Хотя в результате известных решений Совета Безопасности, которые поддержали оба наших государства, военные действия на Ближнем Востоке удалось прекратить, оккупация арабских территорий, захваченных Израилем в ходе агрессии, продолжается. Израильские руководители все откровеннее выдвигают планы аннексии этих территорий или по крайней мере части из них и осуществляют даже практические шаги по их колонизации.

Имеются данные о сосредоточении израильских войск на позициях, которые трудно рассматривать иначе, как исходные для организации новых военных акций против Сирии и Иордании. Правительство Ливана проявляет тревогу по поводу угроз, которые раздаются теперь уже и в его адрес. Множатся факты, свидетельствующие о растущем поступлении в Израиль вооружения из-за границы.

При такой усиливающейся в последнее время напряженности нельзя исключать серьезных осложнений на Ближнем Востоке, возможности того, что провоцируемые Израилем вооруженные инциденты, которые почти непрерывно происходят вдоль Суэцкого канала, на израильско-иорданском и израильско-сирийском фронтах, перерастут в широкую военную конфронтацию.

Его Превосходительству
Гарольду Вильсону,
Премьер-Министру Великобритании
г.Лондон

Все государства, кроме агрессора, признавали на чрезвычайной сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН, что применение силы не должно давать каких-либо выгод и преимуществ и что Израиль должен вывести свои войска с захваченных арабских территорий. Та же картина характеризовала и общую дискуссию на нынешней сессии Генассамблеи.

Мы обратили внимание на заявление министра иностранных дел Великобритании на этой сессии и на ряд других последних заявлений Английского правительства. В этих заявлениях подчеркивается, что ни одному государству не должно быть позволено расширять свои границы в результате войны и что Израиль должен вывести свои войска с захваченных арабских территорий. Это совершенно правильная мысль.

Продолжая вести себя провокационно и вызывающе, руководители Израиля полагаются, очевидно, прежде всего, на помощь и поддержку США. Из контактов советских представителей с ответственными деятелями правительства США, из всего хода дел во время нынешней сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН видно, что экспансионистские устремления Израиля действительно встречают с американской стороны благосклонное попустительство.

К чему может привести осуществление расчетов израильских лидеров на помощь США? Одни будут помогать одной стороне, другие - другой. И так звено за звеном потянется цепь событий. Разве это путь к упрочению мира на Ближнем Востоке? Разве это пойдет на пользу наших и других государств?

Должна быть полная ясность: если не будет решен вопрос о безотлагательном выводе израильских войск, то не будет мира в этом районе. Неустойчивое, взрывоопасное положение будет довлеть над всеми и вносить осложнения в международные отношения в целом.

Советское правительство исходит из необходимости без промедлений устранить последствия агрессии и, вместе с тем, предотвратить возникновение нового военного конфликта в этом районе в близком или более отдаленном будущем.

Советское правительство твердо уверено в том, что сейчас есть объективная возможность покончить с дальнейшей опасной затяжкой политического урегулирования на Ближнем Востоке. Это

можно и должно сделать путем безотлагательного принятия, скажем, в Совете Безопасности резолюции, которая обсуждалась в конце чрезвычайной сессии Генассамблеи ООН и которая предусматривает незамедлительный отвод войск с оккупированных территорий на позиции до 5 июня 1967 г., одновременно с признанием принципа независимого национального существования всех государств этого района, их права на жизнь в мире и безопасности. Такое решение Совета Безопасности каждая сторона была бы обязана соблюдать.

Разумеется, помимо названных, есть и ряд других вопросов, которые ждут своего решения. Есть вопрос о свободе судоходства. Мы считаем, что и эти вопросы должны быть решены в интересах всех стран на базе упомянутой резолюции в случае принятия ее Советом Безопасности.

Ссылки на то, будто арабские государства не идут на признание за Израилем права на независимое национальное существование, лишены оснований. Вы, несомненно, знаете, что арабские страны, во всяком случае те, кого больше всего затрагивает данный вопрос, проявляют здравый, реалистический подход к этому вопросу.

После открытия текущей сессии мы с большим удивлением узнаем, что американская сторона не только не пошла вперед в поисках политического урегулирования на Ближнем Востоке, но что у нее появилось какое-то иное отношение даже к собственным предложениям, которые были выдвинуты ею в ходе чрезвычайной сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН. Складывается впечатление, что американская сторона пытается фактически отойти от своих же предложений, если судить по заявлениям ее представителей в Нью-Йорке. Под видом интерпретации этих предложений выдвигаются по существу новые, дополнительные условия в духе агрессивных требований Израиля. Предпринимаются также попытки пустить переговоры по кривой и топкой дороге, со множеством остановок и отступлений. Мы обратили внимание правительства США на нежелательные последствия, которые все это может иметь.

Настало время предпринять решительные шаги, чтобы положить конец нынешнему опасному состоянию на Ближнем Востоке. Нельзя допустить срыва политического урегулирования из-за того, что Израиль хотел бы реализовать свои крайние требования, за которыми скрывается безудержное стремление к экспансии. Израильские руководители, видимо, мало заботятся о том, как это государство будет жить завтра, не задумываются над последствиями, к которым их политическая близорукость может привести.

Мы уверены, что подавляющее большинство государств, пожалуй, все страны поддержат каждый позитивный шаг в направлении урегулирования. И вряд ли кто-либо сможет выступить против решения Совета Безопасности, отвечающего интересам государств, продиктованного стремлением снять напряженность и привести к прочному миру на Ближнем Востоке.

В положительных результатах таких усилий народы увидели бы не только вклад в укрепление мира в этом районе, но и просвет в деле разрешения других проблем, которые стоят перед человечеством, и не в последнюю очередь - перед нашими государствами.

Я надеюсь получить Ваш, г-н Премьер-Министр, ответ в ближайшее время. Хотелось бы думать, что этот ответ будет содействовать тому, чтобы снять с повестки дня вопрос, ставший источником опасных трений и конфликтов.

С уважением

Косыгин

А.Косыгин

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Tel. No. 1054 21 October, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

√ HAW

Following from Beeley.

The most interesting of the conversations before I saw the President was that with Mohieddin, on whom I called this morning. As with most of the others it turned largely on the Arab/Israel situation. When I said, in answer to a sceptical remark about the value of United Nations resolutions, that I supposed a resolution in itself would help the U.A.R. to hold the Arab States to the line agreed in Khartoum, Mohieddin said he "did not care about the views of Algeria or Syria: absolutely not". As for Egyptian opinion, the Government would have no difficulty in controlling that. The most important problem in Egypt was economic, not political. He went on to say that they had been misled about the strength of the Army, and that too many people had talked nonsense about its invincibility. It was now in better hands, and he believed that it would soon be a more effective force. They hoped to settle the Arab/Israel problem by political means, but of course they could not tolerate Israel's presence in Sinai indefinitely. This was not the Palestine problem: this was foreign occupation of Egypt.

Mr. Tesh

Sent 1730Z/21 October
Recd. 1806Z/21 October

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. N.E.A.D.
Eastern Dept.
Arabian Dept.
Aden Dept.
J.I.R.D.
J.I.P.G.D.
U.N. Dept.
D.D. & P.U.S.D.
E.R.D.
J.R.D. (Econ.)
News Dept.
C.O. M.E.W. & U.N. Dept.
DIS. MOD.

xxxxx

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 10

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTER AT DORNEYWOOD ON 21 OCTOBER, 1967, AT 6 p.m.

Present:

The Rt. Hon. George Brown, M.P.
Mr. T.F. Brenchley
Mr. D.J.D. Maitland
Mr. Abba Eban
Mr. A. Remez

Mr. Eban began by saying that he thought there might be a misunderstanding over the Israel Government's attitude to the timing of moves towards a settlement. It was not the Israel Government's intention to stand pat for ever. They thought that the attitude of some at least of the Arabs was evolving in such a way that they might be prepared to talk about a settlement in, say, six months time.

2. Mr. Eban went on to say that the reasons for the Israel Government's aversion to action in the Security Council lay in the history of the past sixteen years. As he had said to Lord Caradon, no resolution that was equitable would be passed by the Security Council and any resolution passed by the Security Council would not be equitable. The Soviet attitude to Middle East questions in the Security Council tended to be a function of the Arab attitude.

3. The Israel Government also had misgivings about the proposal for a representative of the Secretary-General to go to the Middle East. They feared that the appointment of this representative could be used by the Arabs as a substitute for negotiations. The Israelis would not mind if this representative played the same sort of rôle as Mr. Bunche in 1949. Mr. Bunche had not mediated, but had used his good offices to facilitate direct discussion between the Israelis and the Arabs.

4. The Israel Government felt strongly that there were fundamental difficulties in the present situation which should be faced now. For example, there was no point in evading the issue of what lines the Israelis would withdraw to. Nor should the question of free

/navigation

navigation for all states, including Israel, be evaded. Unless an understanding were reached on this and other basic issues before any resolution was passed, the Israel Government thought that the present opportunity for reaching a permanent settlement based on peace would slip by.

5. Mr. Eban went on to say categorically that Israel would not in any circumstances withdraw to the 4th June line. They would withdraw to secure and properly recognised frontiers. He had an intuition that early in 1968 there would be developments in Cairo, and perhaps also in Jordan, which would provide an opportunity for progesss towards a settlement. The Israelis already had it on good authority that the Egyptians would be prepared to accept the old international frontier between Egypt and Palestine.

6. Mr. Brown said that he could not comment on Mr. Eban's intuitive guess. On the question of movement towards a settlement he thought that everything would be held up if there were to be no Security Council Resolution until all the issues had been clarified. If the Security Council were to proceed in this way he wondered what the representative would do. He emphasised that the British Government were not looking for an armistice agreement. He believed that the broad principles on which a settlement must be made should now be established. The subsequent negotiations would be about the practical application of those principles.

7. On Mr. Eban's reference to Mr. Bunche, Mr. Brown pointed out that the 1948 negotiations did not get Israel accepted by her neighbours. A war in the Middle East was dangerous for British interests and Mr. Brown thought that a situation should be created in which, through the acceptance of Israel by her neighbours, Britain could avoid being drawn into a future war. Our interest in the Suez Canal was not overriding, since tankers were being developed which would make the Suez Canal of less importance. Our main concern was one which we shared with Israel, namely the stability and security of the area on a permanent basis. He still felt that it would be best to get a balanced set of principles accepted. The Secretary-General's representative could then work out with the authorities how these principles should be implemented.

/8. Mr. Brown

8. Mr. Brown went on to say that his latest information was that neither the Russians nor the Americans would sponsor a resolution in the Security Council. He did not agree with Mr. Eban's assessment of the effects of the link between the Arabs and the Russians. If other countries tabled a reasonable resolution, the Arabs, who were not represented on the Security Council, might acquiesce in it.

9. Mr. Brown said he saw dangers in getting into the arguments too early in the process of moving towards a settlement. He had never said what lines the Israelis should withdraw to, since he thought that this must depend on what the Israelis would get out of the negotiations.

10. Mr. Eban said that the Russians and Arabs had made very clear what they would insist on. Mr. Brown said he did not agree that the Arabs were determined to use the Soviet Union to block agreement. Mr. Eban replied that the Russians had told the Americans that Syria was a negative factor in the situation, but that the Soviet Union would accept anything agreeable to the Egyptians. If a resolution were passed calling for the Israelis to withdraw to certain lines, the Arabs could not thereafter accept less. The Israelis might have to say that such a resolution was weighted against them and that they would not accept it. This would create a new dangerous situation.

11. Mr. Brown then turned to the question of the Suez Canal. He asked whether the Israelis would insist on sending an Israeli flag-ship through the Canal on the first day after the Egyptians accepted freedom of navigation. If the Israelis would hold back for a period, he thought there was a chance the Egyptians would accept unlimited freedom of navigation. Mr. Eban replied that political pressure in Israel was such that they would have to send a ship through the Canal within a few days of its being opened. The Israelis could not withdraw from the banks of the Canal and let the ships of 120 nations go through but not the ships of the 121st. They could not withdraw from the Canal without knowing their own position as regards the navigation through it. Mr. Brown said that if the Israelis said this too clearly now, negotiations could not start. Mr. Eban replied that he thought the Arabs must now be brought to face

/one

one or two unpleasant facts. One of these was that they could only get the Israelis to withdraw from the Canal in return for Israeli freedom of navigation. Mr. Brown asked whether it was necessary for a resolution to provide specifically for freedom of navigation for Israeli ships. He could not imagine any resolution which excluded this. Mr. Eban said that his Government felt this point must be specifically included. Mr. Brown said that in that case the Arabs would want to be equally specific on the matters which interested them, e.g. withdrawal. This would mean that the negotiations would take place before the resolution. Mr. Eban thought that there must indeed be negotiations first, since he feared that the positions of the two sides were so far apart that it would be beyond the limits of language to find acceptable wording. Mr. Brown said he did not share Mr. Eban's pessimism.

12. Mr. Eban then said that he thought negotiations would be more promising outside the U.N. framework. The U.N. was too public a forum and the only time the Israelis had made progress with the Arabs was when they had talked to them direct. Mr. Brown said that the advantage of working in a U.N. forum was that each side had someone to turn to if the talks got stuck. The appointment of a U.N. representative did not exclude direct negotiations. In any case to negotiate in the U.N. before a resolution was passed was to negotiate in public. It would be better to get the guide-lines laid down in the Security Council and then negotiate in another and more private forum. Mr. Brown then asked whether Mr. Eban still wanted to consider straightforward words such as "peace" rather than "end to the state of belligerency" to be used in any resolution. Mr. Eban said he still thought this best. He also thought that the territorial position must be made clear. Israel would agree to withdraw to new boundaries to be fixed, but would not state in advance what these boundaries should be. Mr. Brown agreed that the Israelis should make it clear that the new boundaries should emerge from the negotiations. He said that the Israelis were not going to be asked to do anything before negotiations began.

13. Mr. Eban said that his Government were sceptical of the chances of progress in the Security Council. The Israelis felt that they had lost ground in the

Soviet/American

Soviet/American talks last July when the Russians had not been committed. Mr. Brenchley commented that as these talks had broken down, no ground had been lost by anyone except perhaps the Russians. Mr. Eban went on to say that one had to give weight to the Soviet position in the Security Council. Over the years the Council had thrown out every resolution favourable to Israel.

14. Mr. Brown said that the situation now was different; the June war had induced realism in most of Israel's neighbours. The Arabs he had spoken to in New York had said that the virtue of going to the Security Council was that since there was no Arab on the Council they would not have to vote on any resolution. Mr. Eban said that the trouble was that the Arabs would not in this event be committed.

15. At this point Mr. Remez asked whether anything had transpired on this subject during Sir H. Beeley's talks in Cairo. Mr. Brown said that Sir H. Beeley had been under strict instructions not to express any views on this question in Cairo. It would be wrong to transfer the discussion from New York to Cairo. Sir H. Beeley had however raised the question of getting the stranded ships out of the Canal to the South. This, apart from its practical advantages, would have a symbolic value as a step towards opening the Canal. We had been pressing the Egyptians hard to agree to this and he hoped it would present no problems to Israel. Mr. Eban did not demur, but said it would be important to ensure that full details of any move to get these ships out should be given to the Israelis so that incidents could be avoided.

16. Mr. Eban then referred to what he called atmospheric questions, namely reports mainly in the Israel press of misunderstandings between Britain and Israel. He wished to say that he himself had never encountered any hostility. He had met only candour.

17. Mr. Brown then said that he had found Mr. Eshkol's statement to Mr. Hadow rather painful. He read to Mr. Eban, who appeared to be unaware that this interview had taken place, extracts from Mr. Hadow's report and in particular those passages in which Mr. Eshkol described

/Mr. Brown's

Mr. Brown's alleged hostility to Israel over many years. Mr. Brown said it must be a long time since the Prime Minister of one country had described the Foreign Minister of another friendly country as an enemy. Mr. Brown emphasised that he sought a lasting peace. He believed that he and Mr. Eban differed not on ends but only on means. He hoped that the Israelis would get it out of their heads that he was trying to do some Anglo/U.A.R. deal. Our position was that if we had relations with the U.A.R. this could only help in the search for a settlement. But it could not possibly be against Israel's interests for us to have strong representation in Cairo. Mr. Eban agreed that there was no misunderstanding between him and Mr. Brown. He said it was true that both Governments wanted peace, stability and security for all states in the Middle East. Their only difference was in regard to the means of achieving this.

18. Mr. Eban then raised the question of arms supplies to the Middle East. The Russians were still supplying large quantities of aircraft. This was restoring the Arabs' position since they had lost very few pilots. The Israelis could never compete in quantity with the Arabs, but would continue their policy of going for quality. He had just heard from the U.S. Government that they had cancelled the suspension of the supply of arms to Israel and to certain Arab States which had not been engaged in the June hostilities. The Israelis were now looking to the Americans for aircraft and to the British for armour. Mr. Remez said that there was no urgency until the beginning of 1968 about the Chieftain, but the Israelis needed 50 Centurion replacements phased in monthly deliveries from November. Mr. Brown said that we were considering the whole arms question urgently. Mr. Eban said that the French were in a dilemma. They had suspended the supply of Mirage aircraft but were tempted to resume shipments now that there was a possibility of the Americans replacing them.

19. Finally, Mr. Brown asked Mr. Eban to think over one question on his flight to New York. Was he right in discounting King Hussein? Mr. Eban said that the Israelis' current disillusionment with Hussein derived partly from the too high hopes they had had of him before the events of the summer. No-one in Israel had wanted a war with Jordan but when Hussein threw in his lot with

/Nasser

Nasser on 30 May the Israelis had been shocked. It was also an important psychological factor that the Israelis had suffered more casualties on the Jordan front than elsewhere. He himself could not understand King Hussein's present purpose in visiting Spain and Latin America. He should stay in Jordan to deal with the situation there.

Israel (Pt 7)

c.c. Goldfield Jones

CONFIDENTIAL

October 25, 1967

Russian text on Soviet Union (Gen) Oct 64 attached.

The Soviet Ambassador called on the Prime Minister at his own request at 3.00 p.m. today in the House of Commons to deliver a message about the Middle East from Mr. Kosygin, a copy of which, together with a copy of the unofficial translation provided by the Ambassador, is enclosed.

After reading the message the Prime Minister said, with reference to its last paragraph, that he would urgently consult his colleagues concerned and would then let Mr. Kosygin have an early reply. Meanwhile, however, and in view of the general urgency of the problem he thought it would be useful for him to make some interim comments about the attitude of the British Government.

The Prime Minister then spoke more or less verbatim from the talking points on the first three pages of the Foreign Office brief which you sent us this morning. For ease of reference, I enclose a copy of those talking points.

When the Prime Minister had finished Smirnovsky said with a smile that the Soviet Government referred to the Goldberg rather than the Gromyko-Goldberg resolution. Moreover, the Americans themselves now appeared to be retreating from the terms of that

Copy on Soviet Union (Gen) Oct 64.

resolution; could not the British Government encourage them to be more constructive? The Prime Minister said that this was not entirely our impression of the situation. But in any case if it were now the fact that the United States and Soviet Governments could not reach agreement on a text there seemed every advantage in doing what we could to help the non-permanent members of the Council to come up with a draft.

Commenting on what the Prime Minister had said about the attack by the Egyptians on the Israeli destroyer and the alleged use of Soviet missiles, Smirnovsky said that these missiles had been in Egyptian hands well before the June crisis and there was no reason why the Israelis should now seek to create difficulties because of their use in this skirmish. In any case, as the Prime Minister had said, there was no point in trying to apportion blame for the clash. The Prime Minister agreed on the latter point but said that the use of the missiles gave rise to greater difficulties than if they had not been used. Smirnovsky admitted this. But he commented that whatever the origin of the missiles, the Israeli destroyer had also been "given to Israel by someone else". The Prime Minister said that this was a long time ago. In any event the main point he was concerned to make was the danger of eventual escalation which could result from this kind of action and particularly the danger of eventual nuclear escalation. Smirnovsky said that he entirely agreed that those dangers existed.

The Ambassador then asked what had been the purpose of the Israeli Foreign Minister's visit to Britain over the weekend. The Prime Minister dealt with this by saying that he himself had not seen Eban and had not yet had an account of his talks with the

Foreign Secretary. But, as he had said to the Ambassador, we were doing what we could to persuade the Israelis of the need to adopt a more flexible attitude. Smirnovsky said that there was precious little sign of this; and the Prime Minister said that the Israelis were not on the whole very flexible people. Smirnovsky said that they had usually been more flexible than at present; to which the Prime Minister retorted that yesterday's incident over the destroyer was unlikely to lessen their inflexibility.

Before leaving Smirnovsky said that the Soviet Government were sending Kuznetsov to handle the next stage of the discussions at the United Nations. They hoped that Lord Cadogan could keep in close touch with him. The Prime Minister said that he was sure Lord Cadogan would be glad to do this.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Gruffydd Jones (Cabinet Office).

A Walls

D.J.D. Maitland, Esq., C.M.G., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office.

Private Secretary,
10. Downing Street.

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1

24 October, 1967

file

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 2833 23 OCTOBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2833 OF 23 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, AMMAN AND NICOSIA (FOR JIG).

ISRAELI DESTROYER.

WHEN THE ISRAEL REPRESENTATIVE CALLED ON ME THIS AFTERNOON HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT DISTINGUISHED THREE NEW AND DANGEROUS ELEMENTS IN THE ATTACK ON THE EILAT. FIRST SOVIET ROCKETS HAD BEEN USED FOR THE FIRST TIME AND THIS REPRESENTED AN ESCALATION OF WEAPONRY IN THE AREA. SECOND, UAR MARITIME BELLIGERENCY, WHICH HAD STARTED WITH THE CANAL AND AT TIRAN, HAD BEEN EXTENDED TO THE HIGH SEAS. THIRD, THE UAR ATTITUDE TO THE CEASE-FIRE HAD BECOME ONE OF QUOTE CEASE FOR US, FIRE FOR THEM UNQUOTE. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD RETURNED TO THE ATTACK ON THE CRIPPLED ISRAELI DESTROYER AFTER AN INTERVAL OF TWO HOURS. THIS SHOWED PREMEDITATION NOT A RANDOM ACT TAKEN IN CONFUSION AND ERROR. HE HAD NO INFORMATION YET ON HIS GOVERNMENT'S ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT, EITHER IN ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE UAR'S ACTIONS OR EVEN IN PARTICIPATION IN THEM. HE HAD SPOKEN ON THE ABOVE LINES TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WHEN I SAID THAT I WAS CALLING ON DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KUZNETZOV LATER IN THE EVENING, MR. RAFAEL SAID HE HOPED I WOULD BE ABLE TO EXPRESS CONCERN OVER THE PRESENT SITUATION. I UNDERTOOK TO DO SO.

F.O. PASS TEL AVIV 489, CAIRO 114, AMMAN 355 AND NICOSIA (FOR JIG) 82
LORD CARADON SENT Ø212Z/24

[REPETITION TO CAIRO REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

FO/CO/WH. DISTRIBUTION ADVANCE COPIES SENT
EASTERN DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

file

EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 2839 24 OCTOBER 1967
UNCLASSIFIED
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 2839 OF 24 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW, PARIS, BEIRUT AND SAVING TO CAIRO.

MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM U.A.R. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH WAS RELEASED AT 1600 HOURS NEW YORK TIME THIS AFTERNOON:-

'' I HAVE THE HONOUR UPON INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT TO INFORM YOU THAT A NEW, PREMEDITATED, AND FLAGRANT ACT OF AGGRESSION BY THE ISRAEL FORCES BEGAN AT 12.30 P.M. G.M.T. TODAY IN THE FORM OF CONCENTRATED SHELLING OF THE CITY OF SUEZ. THIS NEW AND SERIOUS VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE ORDER WAS UNPROVOKED BY U.A.R. FORCES, WHO DID NOT TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT HAVE LED TO THIS NEW AND WANTON ACT OF AGGRESSION.

2. IT SHOULD BE APPARENT BY NOW TO THE WORLD AND TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT THE VERY MAGNITUDE OF THIS MILITARY OPERATION, WHICH TOOK PLACE IMMEDIATELY AFTER AN EXTRAORDINARY MEETING OF THE ISRAEL CABINET, PROVES THAT IT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AN ISOLATED INCIDENT BY ANY CRITERION, BUT RATHER A MOST SERIOUS VIOLATION OF ISRAEL'S OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IT FURTHER INDICATES BEYOND ANY DOUBT THAT THESE ISRAELI ACTIONS EPITOMISE THAT COUNTRY'S AGGRESSIVE POLICIES, WHICH HAVE BEEN CONDEMNED BY THE COUNCIL ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LATEST INCIDENTS LIES IN THE TARGETS WHICH ISRAELI FORCES SELECTED IN THE OPERATION WHICH TOOK PLACE TODAY: IN PARTICULAR, IN THE CONTINUOUS SHELLING BY ISRAELI ARTILLERY OF THE CITY OF SUEZ WHICH RESULTED

/IN

IN EXTENSIVE LOSS OF LIFE AND SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE CITY, THE RESIDENTIAL AREAS OF WHICH WERE VIRTUALLY DEMOLISHED. MOREOVER, THE ISRAELIS SYSTEMATICALLY AND CONTINUOUSLY SHELLED INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS, INCLUDING THE PETROLEUM REFINERY, THE NASR FERTILISER PLANT, AND HARBOUR INSTALLATIONS. SEVERAL OTHER INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES WERE BADLY DAMAGED OR COMPLETELY DESTROYED. THE EXTENT OF THE DAMAGE CANNOT BE ESTIMATED FOR THE TIME BEING, BUT WILL BE REPORTED PROMPTLY TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON COMPLETION OF THE NECESSARY INVESTIGATIONS.

3. IT SHOULD BE CLEAR BY NOW THAT THIS PREMEDITATED AGGRESSION BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND ARMED FORCES WAS OFFICIALLY AUTHORIZED. IT WAS CARRIED OUT IN SPITE OF A REQUEST BY U.N. OBSERVERS TO THE ISRAELI FORCES TO CEASE-FIRE. THE ISRAELI FORCES IGNORED THIS REQUEST, AND THE OVERALL PLAN APPROVED BY THEIR GOVERNMENT WAS CARRIED OUT IN FULL.

4. IN VIEW OF THESE FACTS, THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT MUST BE CONSIDERED FULLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS SERIOUS ACT OF AGGRESSION WHICH IS FAR MORE THAN A MERE VIOLATION OF THE COUNCIL'S CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS. THE EXTENSIVE OPERATIONS WHICH TOOK PLACE CANNOT IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCE BE CONSIDERED LESS THAN FULL-SCALE MILITARY OPERATIONS WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE U.N. CHARTER AND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, CONSTITUTE AN ACT OF WAR AGAINST THE U.A.R., A MEMBER STATE OF THE U.N.

5. THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT CANNOT JUSTIFY THIS PREMEDITATED AGGRESSION BY CLAIMING THAT IT WAS INTENDED AS RETALIATION FOR THE SINKING OF THE DESTRYER ''EILAT'' IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE U.A.R. THERE CANNOT BE ANY CONNEXION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN THE TWO INCIDENTS, BECAUSE THE MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE ISRALEI FORCES WERE AIMED SYSTEMATICALLY AT CIVILIAN AND INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS, NOT AT MILITARY TARGETS. THIS IN ITSELF SHOWS THAT THERE CANNOT BE ANY LINK BETWEEN THE ENGAGEMENTS IN U.A.R. WATERS A FEW DAYS AGO AND THE LATEST ISRAELI MILITARY OPERATION.

/6.

6. I AM SURE THAT ALL THE FACTS PROVING ISRALEI GUILT AND RES-PONSIBILITY WILL BE SUBSTANTIATED BY THE REPORT OF GENERAL ODD BULL, CHIEF OF STAFF OF UNTSO, WHICH SHOWS BEYOND DOUBT THAT ALTHOUGH THE U.A.R. AUTHORITIES ACCEPTED THE REQUESTS OF THE U.N. OBSERVERS TO ABIDE BY THE CEASE-FIRE ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS, THE ISARAELI AUTHORITIES EITHER CATEGORICALLY REFUSED SUCH REQUESTS OR RESORTED TO DELAYING TACTICS, THUS EVADING UNTSO'S REQUESTS, UNTIL THEIR PREMEDIATED ACT OF AGGRESSION HAD BEEN FULLY CARRIED OUT.

7. FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I REQUEST THE CONVENEING OF AN URGENT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONSIDER THE GRAVE SITUATION RESULTING FROM THESE ISRAELI ACTS OF AGGRESSION, SO THAT PROMPT ACTION MAY BE TAKEN AGAINST ISRAEL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT ARTICLES OF THE U.N. CHARTER.''

F.O. PASS PRIORITY TO AMMAN 359, TEL AVIV 493, MOSCOW 487, PARIS 468, BEIRUT 182 AND SAVING TO CAIRO 174.

LORD CARADON

SENT 2206Z 24 OCTOBER.
RECD 2206Z 24 OCTOBER.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
U.N. DEPT.
N.E.A.D.
NEWS DEPT.
J.I.P.G.D.

C.O. M.E.W. & U.N.D.

DIS MOD

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

RA

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT/A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 2851 24 OCTOBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO. 2851 OF 24 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, MOSCOW, PARIS AND SAVING TO CAIRO AND BEIRUT.

MY TELNO. 2839: MIDDLE EAST: SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.
THE COUNCIL THIS EVENING OPENED WITH THE EXPECTED EXCHANGE OF RECRIMINATIONS BETWEEN THE UAR AND ISRAEL ON THE SHELLING OF SUEZ AND THE SINKING OF THE EILAT. THE UAR CALLED FOR THE CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL AND CHAPTER VII MEASURES AGAINST HER. SPEAKING IN SUPPORT OF THE UAR THE SOVIET UNION INTRODUCED ORALLY A DRAFT RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ISRAEL AND CALLING UPON HER TO PAY COMPENSATION. AS EXPECTED JORDAN SPOKE IN SUPPORT OF THE UAR AS DID INDIA (ALTHOUGH INDIA ALSO EXPRESSED SERIOUS CONCERN OVER THE SINKING OF THE EILAT AND ASKED FOR A FULL INVESTIGATION).
2. I SPOKE AFTER THE UAR AND ISRAEL TO DEPLORE THE DELAY WHICH HAD ALREADY TAKEN PLACE AND URGE THE NEED TO PASS URGENTLY A FAIR AND BALANCED RESOLUTION. BOTH CANADA, ARGENTINE AND ALSO ETHIOPIA AND INDIA SPOKE IN SUPPORT OF THIS. GOLDBERG INTRODUCED A RESOLUTION CALLING
FOR THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND FOR BOTH SIDES TO OBSERVE IT SCRUPULOUSLY. HE ADDED THAT NEW STEPS WERE NEEDED TOWARDS A DURABLE PEACE AND THE U.S. WERE READY TO SUPPORT THIS.
3. IF EITHER RESOLUTION HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO A VOTE TONIGHT WE COULD CLEARLY HAVE VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE AMERICAN TEXT: AND ABSTAINED ON THE SOVIET TEXT WHICH WOULD HAVE FAILED FOR LACK OF 9 VOTES. IF THEY ARE PRESSED TO VOTE TOMORROW MORNING WE CAN FOLLOW THE SAME COURSE. BUT EVEN IF THE U.S. TEXT IS PASSED WE
/SHOULD

SHOULD CLEARLY INSIST THAT THIS SHOULD BE ONLY AN INTERIM MEASURE AND SEEK TO SET THE COUNCIL, NOW THAT IT HAS BEEN CONVENED, TO WORK URGENTLY ON DRAWING UP THE FAIR AND BALANCED RESOLUTION APPOINTING A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR WHICH WE HAVE BEEN WORKING FOR SO LONG.

4. THIS IS I BELIEVE THE WISH OF MOST OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS AND GOLDBERG SAID TONIGHT THAT HE THINKS THE TIME HAS COME TO GO AHEAD WITH A BALANCED RESOLUTION. BUT THERE ARE STILL SNAGS.

F.O. PASS TEL AVIV 497, AMMAN 361 MOSCOW 490, PARIS 471 AND SAVING TO CAIRO 178 AND BEIRUT 98.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0527Z 25 OCT.
RECD 0529Z 25 OCT.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. EASTERN DEPT:
U.N.D.
N.E.A.D.
NEWS DEPT.
RA J.I.P.G.D.
C.O. M.E.W. AND U.N.D.
DIS MOD

ADVANCE COPIES SENT.

file

Israel (Pt. 7)

EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK

TELNO 2852 UNCLASSIFIED

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

24 OCTOBER 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2852 OF 24 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, PARIS, MOSCOW, AND SAVING TO CAIRO AND BEIRUT.

MIDDLE EAST : SECURITY COUNCIL.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL MET THIS EVENING IN RESPONSE TO A U.A.R. COMPLAINT OF ISRAELI SHELLING OF SUEZ TODAY. WHEN THE COUNCIL CONVENED AT 9.30 P.M., THE UAR, ISRAEL, JORDAN AND SYRIA WERE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCEEDINGS WITHOUT VOTE.

2. EL-KONY (UAR) DESCRIBED THE ATTACK ON THE SUEZ AREA AS THE MOST BARBARIC ACT OF WAR SINCE 5 JUNE. TWO OIL REFINERIES HAD BEEN LEFT IN FLAMES: THE FERTILIZER AND PETRO-CHEMICAL PLANTS, AND MUCH OF THE SUEZ HARBOUR INSTALLATIONS HAD BEEN WRECKED. THERE HAD BEEN GREAT LOSS OF CIVILIAN LIFE. THE UNTSO REPORTS REVEALED THE PREMEDITATION OF THE ISRAELI ATTACK, SINCE THEY SHOWED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD DELAYED ACCEPTING THE CEASE FIRE FOR TWO HOURS. THE ISRAELI ACTION AGAINST SUEZ FOLLOWED THE VIOLATION BY THE DESTROYER ''EILAT'' OF UAR TERRITORIAL WATERS ON 21 OCTOBER. IT WAS WORTH NOTING THAT ON 12 JULY THE ''EILAT'' SANK TWO UAR VESSELS, IN AN UNPROVOKED ATTACK, IN EGYPTIAN WATERS. THE FACT THAT THE EILAT WAS IN UAR WATERS ON 21 OCTOBER HAD BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE ISRAELI LIAISON OFFICER'S REPORT TO GENERAL BULL. ISRAELI REACTIONS OVER THE SINKING OF THE ''EILAT'' HAD BEEN TYPICALLY ARROGANT AND SHOWN THAT ISRAEL WOULD CONTINUE TO DISREGARD ITS OBLIGATIONS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THEREFORE THE COUNCIL MUST NOW FACE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AND APPLY THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER TO ISRAEL.

3. RAPHAEL (ISRAEL) SAID THAT ON 21 OCTOBER AN EGYPTIAN NAVAL CRAFT SUPPLIED BY THE USSR AND EQUIPPED WITH SOVIET

/KOMAR

KOMAR MISSILES HAD ATTACKED THE ''EILAT'' WHILE ON ROUTINE PATROL ON THE HIGH SEAS, OUTSIDE EGYPTIAN WATERS. THE FIRST ATTACK HAD BEEN FOLLOWED AN HOUR AND A HALF LATER BY A SECOND FATAL ATTACK. THE EGYPTIAN HIGH COMMAND HAD ADMITTED THAT IT HAD AUTHORISED THE SECOND STRIKE. CASUALTIES WERE 19 KILLED, 28 MISSING, AND 91 WOUNDED, 20 SERIOUSLY. THE UAR ACTION WAS AN EXTENSION OF EGYPTIAN MARITIME LAWLESSNESS HITHERTO DEMONSTRATED IN NAVAL BLOCKADES OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS, TO THE HIGH SEAS. EGYPTIAN USE OF MISSILES WAS A DELIBERATE ESCALATION OF WEAPONRY IN THE AREA. AS TO EGYPTIAN BREACHES OF THE CEASE FIRE, THESE HAD BEEN NUMEROUS AND UNPROVOKED. IF THERE WAS NO RECIPROCITY ON THE CEASE FIRE, THE WHOLE SYSTEM WOULD COLLAPSE. ISRAEL WAS READY TO MEET REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UAR, OR ANY OTHER ARAB STATE, TO DISCUSS MEASURES TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF ALL IN THE AREA.

4. I THEN SPOKE. (FULL TEXT TELEXED SEPARATELY).

5. IGNATIEFF (CANADA) SAID THAT THE CURRENT OUTBREAK POINTED UP THE PRECARIOUS NATURE OF THE CEASE FIRE, WHICH WAS ONLY A FIRST STEP TOWARDS PEACE, BUT HAD NOT BEEN FOLLOWED UP SINCE JUNE. HE HOPED THE COUNCIL WOULD ADOPT THE FOLLOWING SERIES OF MEASURES,

(A) CALL UPON THE PARTIES TO OBSERVE THE CEASE FIRE:

(B) ASK THE SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR AS FULL INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE FROM GENERAL BULL ON THE SURVEILLANCE OF THE CEASE FIRE IN THE AREA, ALSO, TO ASCERTAIN WHAT ADDITIONAL AUTHORISATION U THANT MIGHT NEED TO ENABLE UNTSO TO CARRY OUT ITS TASK, UNDER THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S CONSENSUS OF JULY:

(C) AUTHORISE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DESPATCH A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO START THE PROCESS OF RESTORING PEACEFUL RELATIONS IN THE AREA. HE SAID HE FULLY RECOGNISED THE DIFFICULTY OF AGREEING A FRAMEWORK OF BALANCED PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE, BUT COULD NOT BELIEVE IT WAS BEYOND THE COUNCIL'S WIT TO ARRIVE AT A BALANCED RESOLUTION AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE RESTORATION OF PEACE.

6. FEDORENKO (USSR) SAID THAT THE EVENTS OF 24 OCTOBER AT SUEZ HAD SHOWN THAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST ARAB

/COUNTRIES

COUNTRIES REMAINED UNLIQUIDATED. THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S CEASE FIRE RESOLUTIONS HAD BEEN SERIOUSLY BREACHED, AND THE CHARTER SPURNED. HE POURED SARCASM ON THE ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES EFFORT TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE ''EILAT'S'' VIOLATION OF UAR TERRITORIAL WATERS. YET MR. RAPHAEL HAD NOT EXPLAINED BY WHAT RIGHT INNOCENT CIVILIAN LIVES AND INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS AT SUEZ HAD BEEN DESTROYED. THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST ASSUME ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IMMEDIATELY OVER THE ISRAELI VIOLATION OF THE CEASE FIRE. HE THEN PRESENTED A DRAFT RESOLUTION (TEXT IN M.I.F.T.) CALLING FOR CONDEMNATION OF THE ISRAELI ATTACK AND FOR ISRAEL TO PAY COMPENSATION.

7. RIFAI (JORDAN) SAID THAT THE FACTOR OF DELAY HAD AGGRAVATED THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN THE FIVE MONTHS SINCE ISRAEL FIRST OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORY. THE UN WAS ABANDONING ITS PRINCIPLES AFTER 20 YEARS. TODAY'S ATTACK WAS ONE MORE LINK IN THE CHAIN OF ISRAELI MILITARY AGGRESSION AND AN EXAMPLE OF ITS HOSTILE AIMS AGAINST ARAB PEOPLES. IN JORDAN, ISRAELI FORCES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR HIDEOUS CRIMES. THESE CONTINUE BECAUSE THE ORGANS OF THE UN ESPECIALLY THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHRINK FROM RESPONSIBILITY. THE UNDER-LYING REASON FOR THIS WAS TO BE FOUND IN THE ATTITUDE OF CERTAIN MAJOR POWERS WHO SUBORDINATED THE PRINCIPLES OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE TO POLITICAL CONSIDERATION. ISRAEL MUST BE STRONGLY CONDEMNED AND HE WELCOMED THE USSR DRAFT RESOLUTION. FURTHERMORE THE COUNCIL MUST ALSO ADOPT A RESOLUTION CALLING UPON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES TO THE LINES PRIOR TO 5 JUNE.

8. GOLDBERG (USA) STATED THAT THE U.S. SHARED THE UNIVERSAL SENSE OF ANXIETY OVER THE INCIDENTS WHICH HAD LED TO THIS MEETING OF THE COUNCIL I.E. THE SINKING OF THE ''EILAT'' AND THE SHELLING IN THE AREA OF SUEZ. THE INFRINGEMENT OF THE CEASE FIRE WAS MOST SERIOUS AND IF THERE WAS ANY HOPE OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IT MUST BE SCRUPULOUSLY MAINTAINED. THE U.S. WAS PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE COUNCIL IN MAINTAINING THE CEASE FIRE AND IN

/ANY MEASURES

ANY MEASURES NECESSARY TO STRENGTHEN THE U.N. PRESENCE IN THE AREA. THE COUNCIL HAD A RIGHT TO INSIST THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD STOP THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND THAT A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE SHOULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT IN THE AREA. THE U.S. WAS READY NOT ONLY TO REAFFIRM THE CEASE FIRE, DEMAND SCRUPULOUS ADHERENCE TO IT AND CONDEMN ANY VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE FIRE BUT IT WAS ALSO PREPARED TO SUPPORT FURTHER STEPS TO BRING ABOUT A DURABLE AND REAL PEACE. THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS ONE-SIDED AND WOULD NOT BRING PEACE ANY NEARER. U.S. WAS THEREFORE TABLING A DRAFT RESOLUTION (SEE MY TELEGRAM NO. 2854) REAFFIRMING THE CEASE FIRE.

9. PARTHASARATHI (INDIA) SAID THAT THE REFUSAL OF THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES TO ACCEPT THE CEASE FIRE SHOWED THE DELIBERATE NATURE OF THE ATTACK AND THAT THE PURPOSE HAD BEEN TO CARRY OUT COMPLETE DAMAGE TO THE INSTALLATIONS AT SUEZ. THE PRACTICE OF REPRISALS HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY CONDEMNED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IN PARTICULAR RESOLUTION 228 OF NOVEMBER 25, 1966 HAD REMINDED ISRAEL OF THE IMPERMISSIBILITY OF REPRISALS AND HAD STATED THAT IF THEY WERE REPEATED THE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL UNDER THE CHARTER. FURTHERMORE RESOLUTION 236 OF JUNE 12, 1967, CONDEMNED ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE FIRE. WHILST THE ATTACK ON THE DESTROYER WAS SERIOUS THERE WAS NO CLEAR-CUT EVIDENCE TO SHOW WHETHER OR NOT THIS WAS JUSTIFIED. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD ORDER AN INVESTIGATION INTO THIS. THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST TAKE THE FIRST STEP TO ORDER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES TO THE POSITIONS HELD PRIOR TO 5 JUNE. IF THIS WERE NOT DONE THERE WOULD BE A REPETITION OF INCIDENTS. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD JOIN WITH THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE U.K. IN THE ADOPTION OF A FAIR AND BALANCED RESOLUTION AND HOPED THAT THE U.K. REPRESENTATIVE WOULD AGREE WITH HIM THAT IT SHOULD BE BASED ON FUNDAMENTAL GUIDE-LINES TO BE GIVEN TO A U.N. REPRESENTATIVE WHO SHOULD PROCEED URGENTLY TO THE AREA.

10. SIHLOS (BRAZIL) SAID THAT HIS DELEGATION HAD LEARNED WITH DEEP SORROW OF THE SINKING OF THE ''EILAT'' AND THE DESTRUCTION

/OF THE

OF THE INSTALLATIONS AT SUEZ. HE URGED BOTH PARTIES TO ABIDE BY THE CEASE FIRE RESOLUTION.

11. TARABANOV (BULGARIA) SAID THAT THE EVENTS AT SUEZ WERE ANOTHER LINK IN THE CHAIN OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION WHICH STARTED ON 5 JUNE. THE ATTACK ON SUEZ WAS PREMEDITATED. THE ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE HAD CONFIRMED THIS WHEN HE INTIMATED THAT THE SINKING OF THE ""EILAT"" WAS A PRETEXT FOR REPRISALS. THE ISRAELI FORCES HAD REFUSED TO AGREE TO A CEASE FIRE IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM TIME TO KILL THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND DESTROY INSTALLATIONS. THE SECURITY COUNCIL MUST RESOLUTELY CONDEMN ISRAELI AGGRESSION IN THE TERMS OF THE SOVIET RESOLUTION. A BALANCED APPROACH WOULD NOT SUFFICE. AGGRESSION MUST BE CONDEMNED AND MEASURES MUST BE TAKEN TO REDRESS THE SITUATION.

12. BERARD (FRANCE) REGRETTED THE RESORT TO FORCE AND THE RE-OPENING OF THE CYCLE OF REPRISALS AND COUNTER-REPRISALS. HE SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO PASS JUDGEMENT BEFORE HE HAD MORE INFORMATION. THE FIRST DUTY OF THE COUNCIL WAS TO SEE THAT THE CEASE FIRE WAS RESPECTED AND THAT UNTSO WAS ALLOWED TO CARRY OUT ITS DUTIES SUCCESSFULLY.

13. BORCH (DENMARK) SAID THAT HIS DELEGATION WOULD CONTINUE TO HELP IN THE SEARCH FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION.

14. KANTE (MALI) SPOKE IN SUPPORT OF THE DRAFT SOVIET RESOLUTION, MAINTAINING THAT THE UAR HAD SUFFERED A BARBAROUS AND PREMEDITATED ATTACK.

15. MAKONNEN (ETHIOPIA) SAID THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD INSIST ON STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE CEASE FIRE. GENERAL BULL SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO SUBMIT A FULL REPORT ON THE INCIDENTS OF 21 AND 24 OCTOBER. THERE WAS A CONSENSUS OF ACTION AMONG THE MEMBER-SHIP WHICH SHOULD ENABLE THE COUNCIL TO TAKE POSITIVE STEPS, SUCH AS THOSE ADVOCATED IN THE BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE'S SPEECH. THE TIME WAS OVERDUE TO SEND A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA, TO ACT WITHIN GUIDE-LINES SET OUT IN THE RESOLUTION AUTHORISING HIS DESPATCH.

/16.....

16. RUDA (ARGENTINA) SAID THAT HIS DELEGATION HAD BEEN DISAGREEABLY SURPRISED AT THE INCIDENTS WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE, ESPECIALLY AS PROMISING CONSULTATIONS WERE CONTINUING AT THE SAME TIME. THE SITUATION REVEALED BY GENERAL BULL'S REPORTS WAS DISTURBING AND SHOULD BE CAREFULLY ANALYSED. IN ANY CASE THE CONFRONTATION OF FORCES SHOULD FORCE THE COUNCIL TO TAKE DYNAMIC ACTION. A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE PARTIES MUST BEGIN: WITHOUT IT MORE VIOLENCE WAS INEVITABLE. HE APPEALED FOR THE TABLING OF A RESOLUTION OF SUBSTANCE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

17. THERE BEING NO MORE SPEAKERS THE PRESIDENT ADJOURNED THE MEETING UNTIL 11 A.M. NEW YORK TIME ON 25 OCTOBER.

FO PASS TEL AVIV NO. 498, PARIS NO. 472, MOSCOW NO. 491 AMMAN NO. 362 AND SAVING TO CAIRO NO. 179 AND BEIRUT NO. 99.

LORD CARADON

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FO/CO/WH. DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

MB I

Israel Main file

CONFIDENTIAL

R. Pollard, No 10.

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND PRINCE FAHAD OF SAUDI ARABIA,

24 OCTOBER 1967

Present:

The Rt. Hon. George Brown M.P.

Mr. D.J.D. Maitland

Mr. M.S. Weir

Mr. W.N. Hillier-Fry

H.R.H. Prince Fahad

H.E. Sheikh Abdulrahman al Helaissi.

22/10

Prince Fahad, the Saudi Minister of the Interior, accompanied by the Saudi Ambassador, paid a courtesy call on Mr. Brown on 24 Octobe during an official visit to the United Kingdom. After expressing his pleasure at seeing Prince Fahad again in this country, Mr. Brown invited His Royal Highness to comment on the situation in the Middle East.

2. Prince Fahad said that the main problem i the Middle East was that of relations between the Arab world and the Israelis. The war in June was a clear act of aggression by Israel, whatever might have preceded it. The Arabs only wanted justice and understanding.

3. Mr. Brown said that if we were to reach an agreement, the Arabs, like the Israelis, must face up to some awkward problems. His own view was that the United Nations must insist on Israeli withdrawal from territory captured as a result of war, but that the Arabs for their part must accept in the same resolution that Israel exists and must be allowed to exist peacefully within agreed boundaries. The resolution must also deal with such matters as the refugees, development and [illegible] through international waterways. The

/ must

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

There must be a balance in the resolution and the Arabs must accept this.

4. Mr. Brown went on to say that he understood that King Faisal had some doubts about what we were doing in South Arabia, although he thought that His Majesty misunderstood our actions. We did not let down the Federal Ministers and/~~Rxxxiixxx~~ Rulers; he (Mr. Brown) had gone on doing his utmost in support of the Federal Government long aft people thought that he should have stopped. It was the Federal Rulers who had run away not we who had pushed them out. He said this because he did not think it would help either the Saudis or us to go putting fear into the ~~Royalists~~ Rulers of the Gulf States. We wanted to build up the confidence which the Rulers felt in themselves and in us/ and would like His Majesty to encourage this sense of confidence.

some of whom he understood had recently been visiting the King

5. Prince Fahed replied that both in South Arabia and in the Gulf the Sauds' first objective was to have stability, as instability would do harm both to Saudi Arabia and Great Britain. He hoped and believed that there would be complete identity of view between us provided we could get rid of dangerous influences. The people both in South Arabia and in the Gulf knew that the only aim of the Saudis was that people should live in peace. The Saudis would have preferred to see the situation in South Arabia stabilised under Federal Government and could not see much prospect of stability after our withdrawal. They foresaw great opposition between the

CONFIDENTIAL

/NLF

CONFIDENTIAL

NLF and FLOSY. King Faisal knew that the Gulf Rulers feared that the same thing would happen in the Gulf as had happened in South Arabia. Just as in South Arabia we were ~~ready~~ to hand over power to FLOSY and NLF which were not recognised a little time ago, so in the Gulf organisations at present unknown could come into existence to which we ~~would~~ might likewise hand over power. In ~~XXXXXX~~ Bahrain there were disturbances two years ago; it could happen again. It was of the greatest importance to ~~South~~ Saudi Arabia that there should be stability in the Gulf.

N° 6. Reverting to the Middle East as a whole, Prince Fahad said that peace in the Middle East could only come after the withdrawal of Israel from occupied territory. The Arabs would not agree to discussions under duress. The great powers should be able to get Israel to agree.

7. Mr. Brown said that he understood Prince Fahad's and His Majesty's view, but he must say, as a friend of the Arabs, that they must accept that results could only be achieved if Arabs agreed that action to meet both the Arabs' and the Israelis' ~~disentanta~~ desiderata must be taken at the same time. As far as South Arabia and the Gulf were concerned, he would only say that no ~~known~~ new Arab outsider could support the Rulers if they could not support themselves.

8. Prince Fahad said that there were organisations intent on corrupting people and disturbing the status quo. These organisations had to be maintained from

/ outside

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

outside the territory. Great Britain and South Arabia were co-operating all round and we should be able to insulate the Arabian Peninsula from outside influences.

9. In conclusion Mr. Brown repeated that there was no parallel between South Arabia and the Gulf. The important thing was that nothing should be done to disturb the confidence of the Gulf States.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO UKMIS NEW YORK

TELNO. 5748 25 OCTOBER 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 5748 OF 25 OCTOBER, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW TEL AVIV WASHINGTON PARIS AMMAN JERUSALEM CAIRO BEIRUT JEDDA KUWAIT TEHRAN BELGRADE AND SAVING TO PRAGUE SOFIA BUDAPEST WARSAW BUCHAREST TUNIS TRIPOLI RABAT UKDEL NATO.

MIDDLE EAST: SOVIET MESSAGE.

THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR CALLED ON THEHPRIME MINISTER ON 23 OCTOBER TO DELIVER A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM MR. KOSYGIN WHICH IS SUMMARISED IN M I F T. PARALLEL MESSAGES HAVE GONE TO PRESIDENTS JOHNSON AND DE GAULLE. THE PRIME MINISTER PROMISED AN EARLY REPLY AND MADE THE FOLLOWING INTERIM COMMENTS ABOUT H M G'S ATTITUDE.

2. NEITHER WEST NOR EAST COULD AFFORD TO ALLOW A RECURRENCE OF THE EVENTS OF JUNE. THE RISKS OF DIRECT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS AND THEIR ESCALATION WERE ALTOGETHER TOO GREAT, AND HAD BEEN FURTHER UNDERLINED ONLY THIS WEEKEND BY THE ATTACK ON THE ISRAEL DESTROYER QUOTE EILAT UNQUOTE. WHILE IT WOULD PROBABLY BE POINTLESS TO SEEK TO ESTABLISH THE DEGREE OF BLAME ATTACHING TO EACH SIDE IN THE CASE OF AN INCIDENT OF THIS KIND , THE INCIDENT ITSELF ILLUSTRATED THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF THE CEASEFIRE AND THE DANGERS INHERENT IN THE SUPPLY OF EVER MORE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS TO THE AREA. THE SUCCESSFUL USE OF MISSILES ON THIS OCCASION WAS BOUND TO MAKE THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT MORE RIGID AND TO STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THOSE IN ISRAEL WHO ADVOCATED THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ISRAELI NUCLEAR WEAPON.

3. WE REMAINED, THEREFORE, CONVINCE D OF THE URGENT NEED TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT BY MEANS OF A BALANCED RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. RENEWED INTEMPERATE AND PARTISAN DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WOULD BE BOUND TO LEAD TO A FURTHER HARDENING OF ATTITUDES AND TO THE BUILDING UP OF NEW RESENTMENTS MAKING ANY PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT MORE DIFFICULT.

/ 4.

4. WE HAD WELCOMED THE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ACHIEVED BY THE SOVIET AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERMENTS IN JULY ON THE TERMS OF A BALANCED DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH CAME TO BE KNOWN AS THE GOLDBERG/ GROMYKO DRAFT. WHILE IN NO WAY SEEKING TO APPORTION BLAME FOR THE FAILURE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THAT COMMON GROUND WE VERY MUCH REGRETTED THAT THE SOVIET AND U S GOVERNMENTS DID NOT FIND IT POSSIBLE TO SPONSOR A RESOLUTION ON THAT BASIS.

5. WE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT ANY FORMULATION WHICH EMERGED WOULD CONTAIN THE TWO BALANCING ELEMENTS WHICH APPEARED IN THE ORIGINAL LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION AND ALSO IN THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO TEXT I E WITHDRAWAL ON THE ONE HAND AND THE RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE OTHER. WE ALSO CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE RESOLUTION SHOULD PROVIDE FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A U N SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. IN OUR VIEW THE MORE EXPLICIT THE STATEMENT OF THESE PRINCIPLES THE MORE USEFUL THE RESOLUTION WOULD BE AS A GUIDE TO THE EFFORTS OF THE U N REPRESENT-ATIVE. THE ACTUAL DETAILS OF HOW THE RESOLUTION WOULD BE PUT INTO PRACTICE COULD, HOWEVER, BE APPROPRIATELY LEFT TO THE REPRESENTATIVE TO WORK OUT IN HIS CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

6. WE HAD WELCOMED THE GROWING SIGNS OF REALISM ON THE PART OF SOME OF THE ARAB STATES AND WE HAD CERTAINLY BEEN DOING, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO, ALL WE COULD TO ACHIEVE A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH ON THE PART OF THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT. THE USE OF SOVIET MISSILES AGAINST THE ISRAELI DESTROYER WOULD UNFORTUNATELY NOT HAVE HELPED OUR EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD.

7. AS IT HAD BECOME IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE BASIS OF THE GOLDBERG/GROMYKO TEXT, WE BELIEVED THAT EVERY ENCOURAGEMENT SHOULD NOW BE GIVEN TO THE EFFORTS OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ARRIVE AT A BALANCED AND ACCEPTABLE DRAFT AUTHORISING THE APPOINTMENT OF A U N REPRESENTATIVE. WE, FOR OUR PART, WOULD DO ALL WE COULD TO FACILITATE THEIR EFFORTS AND WE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD DO THE SAME.

/ 8.

8. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT THE U S GOVERNMENT APPEARED TO BE RETREATING FROM THE TERMS OF THE GROMYKO/GOLDBERG RESOLUTION AND ASKED WHETHER HMG COULD NOT ENCOURAGE THEM TO BE MORE CONSTRUCTIVE. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT HOW WE SAW THE SITUATION BUT SUGGESTED THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF A TEXT AGREED BETWEEN THE U S AND U S S R THERE WAS EVERY ADVANTAGE IN HELPING THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A DRAFT.

9. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT RUSSIAN MISSILES HAD BEEN IN U A R HANDS SINCE BEFORE THE CRISIS AND THEIR USE IN THIS SKIRMISH WAS NO GROUND FOR ISRAEL COMPLAINT. THE DESTROYER HAD BEEN QUOTE GIVEN TO ISRAEL BY SOMEONE ELSE UNQUOTE . THE PRIME MINISTER EMPHASISED THAT HE WANTED TO POINT OUT THE DANGER OF ESCALATION, INCLUDING EVENTUALLY NUCLEAR ESCALATION, WHICH COULD RESULT FROM THIS KIND OF ACTION. SMIRNOVSKY AGREED THAT THESE DANGERS EXISTED.

10. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WERE SENDING KUZNETSOV TO HANDLE THE NEXT STAGE OF THE DISCUSSIONS IN THE U N AND HOPED THAT LORD CARADON WOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH HIM. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE WAS SURE LORD CARADON WOULD BE GLAD TO DO THIS.

SOSFA

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

EASTERN DEPT.

DDDDD

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A & BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO U.K.MIS. NEW YORK

TELNO 5749 25 OCTOBER, 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 5749 OF 25/10 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW TEL AVIV WASHINGTON PARIS AMMAN JERUSALEM CAIRO BEIRUT JEDDA KUWAIT TEHRAN BELGRADE, AND SAVING TO PRAGUE SOFIA BUDAPEST WARSAW BUCHAREST TUNIS TRIPOLI RABAT AND UKDEL NATO.

M.I.P.T.

MIDDLE EAST: SOVIET MESSAGE.

THE MESSAGE, DESCRIBING THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISUPUTE FROM THE FAMILIAR RUSSIAN STANDPOINT, NOTED WITH APPROVAL MY STATEMENTS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND ALLEGED U.S ENCOURAGEMENT OF ISRAEL'S QUOTE EXPANSIONIST DESIGNS UNQUOTE. IT ARGUED THE NECESSITY FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO SECURE ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL BY THE IMMEDIATE ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION ALONG THE LINES DISCUSSED AT THE END OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH ARE DESCRIBED AS BALANCING WITHDRAWAL TO PRE-5 JUNE POSITIONS AGAINST QUOTE THE RECOGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF INDEPENDENT NATIONAL EXISTENCE OF ALL STATES OF THE AREA AND THEIR RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY UNQUOTE, AND DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. THE U S GOVERNMENT ARE CHARGED WITH TRYING TO QUOTE RETREAT FROM THEIR OWN PROPOSALS UNQUOTE BY PUTTING FORWARD NEW CONDITIONS UNDER THE GUISE OF INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREED PROPOSALS. THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS ARE STATED TO HAVE REALISTIC APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE.

2. (MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKMISSION NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, BELGRADE, CAIRO ONLY). FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

SOSFA

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3356 25 OCTOBER
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 3356 OF 25 OCTOBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK AMMAN BEIRUT CAIRO
AND TEL AVIV.
MY TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 3342 AND 3345: VISIT OF ISRAELI FOREIGN
MINISTER TO WASHINGTON.
EUGENE AND WALT ROSTOW TODAY GAVE ME SEPARATE ACCOUNTS OF
MR EBAN'S VISIT HERE ON 23/24 OCTOBER IN THE COURSE OF WHICH
HE HAD TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT, MR. RUSK, MR. KATZENBACH,
THE TWO ROSTOWS AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS IN THE STATE DEPART-
MENT.
2. THE AMERICANS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN FRIENDLY BUT FIRM. I
UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRESIDENT IN PARTICULAR WAS VERY SOLEMN
THROUGHOUT HIS MEETING WITH EBAN AND AT PAINS TO STRESS THAT
HE WAS AWARE OF AND FULLY SUPPORTED THE LINE PREVIOUSLY
TAKEN BY MR. RUSK AND STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS.
3. THE AMERICANS EMPHASISED THAT THEY HAD NEVER FULLY SHARED
THE ISRAELI VIEW ON THE ADVANTAGE OF ALLOWING MORE TIME TO
ELAPSE AND HOPED THAT IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT EVENTS THE ISRAELIS
NOW AGREED ON THE URGENCY OF PROGRESS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
LEADING TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A U.N. REPRESENTATIVE TO GO
TO THE AREA. THEY STRESSED REPEATEDLY TO EBAN THAT TIME WAS
NOT ON THE ISRAELI SIDE AND THAT BOTH ISRAELI AND U.S.
NATIONAL INTERESTS REQUIRED AN EARLY SETTLEMENT.
4. THERE WAS DETAILED DISCUSSION OF SOME OF THE SPECIFIC
PROBLEMS AT ISSUE:
(I) EBAN ASSERTED THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S POSITION
WAS ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED. WHILE MANY DIFFERENT VOICES
WERE BEING HEARD IN ISRAEL AND THERE HAD BEEN SOME HARDENING
OF PUBLIC OPINION, IN HIS VIEW THE DESIRE FOR PEACE AND THE
/WISH TO

WISH TO MAINTAIN AN ESSENTIALLY JEWISH STATE (I.E. WITHOUT ADDING LARGE NEW ARAB ELEMENTS TO THE POPULATION) WOULD PREVAIL ONCE THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE UNDER WAY:

(II) ON SPECIFIC TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS, EBAN MAINTAINED THAT THE GAZA STRIP WAS ISRAEL'S ONLY TERRITORIAL CLAIM ON THE U.A.R. IN REFERRING TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, EBAN MENTIONED THE DESIRABILITY OF QUOTE TOPOGRAPHICAL ADJUSTMENTS UNQUOTE (PREVIOUSLY THE ISRAELIS HAD ONLY MENTIONED DEMILITARISATION TO THE AMERICANS). WHEN PRESSED EBAN ADMITTED THAT THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN SOME MODIFICATION OF THE ISRAELI POSITION IN REGARD TO SYRIA BUT STRESSED THAT IT WAS NEGOTIABLE, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT THINK THE QUESTION WOULD COME UP SOON AS THE SYRIANS SHOWED NO WISH TO NEGOTIATE. FOR SINAI THE ISRAELIS WANTED DEMILITARISATION. THIS WOULD REQUIRE ISRAELI/U.A.R.AGREEMENT BUT EBAN DID NOT EXCLUDE A U.N. ROLE:

(III) ON JERUSALEM EBAN SAID ISRAEL WANTED A UNIFIED CITY UNDER A SINGLE ADMINISTRATION, BUT WITH SOME SORT OF ENCLAVE FOR JORDAN. HOWEVER HE ACCEPTED THE NEED TO PROTECT INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN JERUSALEM, REPEATED THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CITY WERE NEGOTIABLE AND THAT THE STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM IN THE PRESIDENT'S 5 POINTS OF 19 JUNE WOULD BE A GOOD STARTING POINT FOR NEGOTIATIONS. GENE ROSTOW COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH THE U.S. WAS NOT TAKING A FIRM POSITION AT THIS STAGE ON WHAT THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM SHOULD BE, IF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN WERE TO GET GOING AND JERUSALEM PROVED THE STICKING POINT THE AMERICANS WOULD BE WILLING TO LEAN VERY HEAVILY ON THE ISRAELIS TO PERSUADE THEM TO REACH AN AGREEMENT:

(IV) THE WEST BANK AND MILITARY SETTLEMENTS. EBAN CLAIMED THAT ETZION WAS SEPARATE QUESTION BECAUSE OF ITS PAST HISTORY BUT STRESSED THAT ALL THE REMAINING SETTLEMENTS WERE UNDER PARAMILITARY NAHAL AUSPICES AND COULD BE MOVED WHEN NECESSARY. EBAN ALLUDED TO ISRAELI CONSULTATIONS NOW IN PROGRESS WITH PALESTINIANS ON THE WEST BANK AND THE AMERICANS URGED THAT

/THESE

THESE SHOULD NOT BE PURSUED AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT WAS OVER. THE AMERICANS ALSO PRESSED FOR THE RE-OPENING OF ARAB BANKS ON THE WEST BANK:

(V) ON REFUGEES THE AMERICANS STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY OF AN EARLY ISRAELI PUBLIC STATEMENT AND EBAN SAID THAT THIS WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION:

(VI) WHEN EBAN RESTATED THE ISRAELI JURIDICAL VIEW THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS HAD CEASED TO EXIST AND NEGOTIATIONS WOULD START FROM THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT CEASE FIRE LINES, THE AMERICANS REPLIED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO WIPE OUT TWENTY YEARS OF HISTORY THIS WAY.

5. I UNDERSTAND THAT MR. RUSK PRESSED EBAN HARD ON THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE TO THE U.K. (MY TEL 3323 PARAGRAPH 6). EBAN SAID HE HAD BEEN VERY SATISFIED BY HIS TALK WITH YOU IN LONDON, BUT THAT HE FELT THE TIMING OF THE BRITISH ATTEMPT TO RESUME RELATIONS WITH THE U.A.R. WAS UNFORTUNATE AND HAD MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE U.K. TO PLAY AN IMPARTIAL ROLE IN THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT. MR. RUSK REPLIED THAT THE TIMING WAS NOT RELEVANT TO THE WIDER ISSUES, THAT ANGLO-AMERICAN CONSULTATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST WAS VERY CLOSE AND THAT THERE WAS NOTHING TO JUSTIFY THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE. WHEN PRESSED FURTHER EBAN APPARENTLY ADMITTED THAT HE HAD NOTHING AGAINST RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH THE U.A.R. UNDERLINE FOLLG TWO WORDS PER SE AND REPEATED THAT IT WAS ONLY THE TIMING WHICH HAD UPSET THE ISRAELIS.

6. IN CONCLUSION I ASKED GENE ROSTOW HOW THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAW THE LATEST SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAID THAT IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW YESTERDAY'S ISRAELI BOMBARDMENT OF SUEZ WAS THEIR REPRISAL FOR THE SINKING OF THE QUOTE ELATH UNQUOTE AND THAT UNLESS THE EGYPTIANS PROVOKED THE ISRAELIS AGAIN THINGS WOULD NOW QUIETEN DOWN. ON THE EGYPTIAN MOTIVE FOR SINKING THE SHIP ROSTOW QUOTED LUKE BATTLE AS SAYING TO EBAN THAT ONE MUST NEVER UNDERRATE EGYPTIAN INEPTITUDE. EBAN APPARENTLY EXPRESSED PUZZLEMENT AND CONCERN TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON ABOUT THE POSSIBLE SOVIET ROLE IN THE AFFAIR AND SAID THE ISRAELIS HAD ALSO BEEN SURPRISED AT THE SPEED WITH WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAD REARMED THE U.A.R.: THEY ESTIMATED 75-80 PER CENT OF EGYPTIAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES HAD NOW BEEN MADE GOOD.

/N.P.7.

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 3356 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

7. THE UNITED NATIONS: ROSTOW MENTIONED THAT MR GOLDBERG HAD HAD A LONG TALK WITH KUZNETSOV AND WAS DINING WITH HIM AGAIN TONIGHT.THERE HAD BEEN MUCH DISCUSSION WITH THE RUSSIANS AT THE U.N. AND MUTUAL ACCUSATIONS ABOUT WHAT HAD OR HAD NOT BEEN AGREED IN JULY. THE AMERICANS FULLY SHARED OUR VIEW ON THE NEED TO GET A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OUT TO THE AREA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

F.O. PASS PRIORITY AMMAN 144 BEIRUT 67 CAIRO 56 AND TEL AVIV 153.

SIR P DEAN

SENT Ø249Z/26
RECD Ø25ØZ/26

[REPETITION TO CAIRO REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
U.N. DEPT.
N.E.A.D.
NEWS DEPT.
J.I.P.G.D.
C.O. M.E.W. & U.N. DEPT.
DIS. MOD.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT.

JPC

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO U.K.MIS NEW YORK

TELNO 5787 27 OCTOBER (E)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDSD TO UK MIS NEW YORK TELNO 5787 OF 27/10 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW TEL AVIV WASHINGTON PARIS AMMAN JERUSALEM CAIRO BEIRUT JEDDA AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO.

THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR CALLED ON THE MINISTER OF STATE ON INSTRUCTIONS LAST NIGHT TO SAY THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT REGARDED THE LATEST ISRAELI INFRINGEMENTS OF THE CEASE-FIRE, BY THE INTRUSION OF THE EILAT INTO U A R WATERS, AND THE BOMBARDMENT OF SUEZ, AS BANDIT ACTS IN KEEPING WITH THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENTS AGGRESSIVE AND ARROGANT ATTITUDE, AND THEIR RECENT DECLARATIONS ABOUT ANNEXATION OF AREAS OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL. THE ISRAEL INTENTION WAS TO DISRUPT THE MOVES WHICH WERE BEING MADE IN NEW YORK TO PROMOTE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

MR SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WERE CONCERNED AT THE NEW SITUATION WHICH HAD ARISEN AS A RESULT OF THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION

2. THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE AT THE U N HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO WORK FOR STRICT OBSERVANCE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND TO COUNSEL MODERATION AND RESTRAINT. HE ASKED THAT SIMILAR INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD BE SENT TO YOU. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ALSO COMPLAINED THAT WHEREAS THE ARABS HAD MADE A NUMBER OF CONCESSIONS THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT CONCEDED AN INCH.

3. THE MINISTER OF STATE MADE THE OBVIOUS POINTS IN REPLY.

SOSFA

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. EASTERN DEPT
U.N.D.
N.E.A.D.
NORTHERN DEPT
J.R.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

Israel Pt 7

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T268/67

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT.A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOW

TELNO. 3040 27 OCTOBER 1967 (E)

CONFIDENTIAL

KOSYGINS MESSAGE TO THE P.M. ON THE MIDDLE EAST (COPY SENT BY BAG)
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR. KOSYGIN.
BEGINS.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF THE 20TH OF OCTOBER ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF RESTORING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
WHILE WE MAY NOT AGREE ON THE ORIGINS OF THE PRESENT CRISIS, I FULLY SHARE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT THE CONTINUED LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A MORE STABLE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
THE SINKING OF THE ISRAEL DESTROYER 'EILAT' AND THE SHELLING OF SUEZ ILLUSTRATE ALL TOO VIVIDLY THE PRECARIOUS NATURE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND THE DANGERS OF ALLOWING THE PRESENT SITUATION TO CONTINUE. A STERILE ARGUMENT ABOUT THE PRECISE DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF EITHER SIDE FOR THESE INCIDENTS WILL GET US NOWHERE, BUT THE RISK OF FURTHER ESCALATION AND ULTIMATE GREAT POWER CONFRONTATION IS PLAIN FOR ALL TO SEE.
IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT REMAIN CONVINCED OF THE NEED FOR VERY EARLY ACTION BY THE UNITED NATIONS, AND WE BELIEVE THAT THIS CAN BEST TAKE THE FORM OF A BALANCED RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL PROVIDING FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE TO GO TO THE MIDDLE EAST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO MAKE A START ON HIS CONCILIATORY MISSION.
AS YOU KNOW, WE WELCOMED THE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ACHIEVED BY THE SOVIET AND UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS IN JULY ON THE TERMS OF A BALANCED DRAFT RESOLUTION. WHILE I HAVE NO INTENTION OF SEEKING TO APPORTION BLAME FOR THE FAILURE TO BUILD ON THAT COMMON GROUND, I COULD NOT ACCEPT THE INTERPRETATION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S POLICY WHICH YOU PUT FORWARD IN YOUR LETTER.
THE PRESENT NEED IS THAT ALL WHO CARE ABOUT PEACE SHOULD ASSIST THE EFFORTS OF THOSE IN NEW YORK WHO ARE SEEKING AGREEMENT ON A FRESH DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH WILL BE BOTH BALANCED AND ACCEPTABLE. WHATEVER THE DIFFERENCES OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS MAY HAVE BEEN IN THE PAST ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, I AM GLAD TO NOTE FROM YOUR LETTER THAT WE SHARE A COMMON PURPOSE IN ACHIEVING

Subject Copy on Soviet Union (gen) Oct. '64

/THE EARLY

THE EARLY ADOPTION OF SUCH A RESOLUTION.
AS TO THE FORM OF THE RESOLUTION, WE ARE CERTAINLY NOT TIED TO ANY PARTICULAR WORDING, BUT WE VERY MUCH HOPE THAT ANY FORMULATION WHICH EMERGES WILL CONTAIN THE TWO BALANCING PRINCIPLES WHICH APPEARED IN THE ORIGINAL LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION AND ALSO IN THE TEXT DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND U.S.A. IN JULY, I.E., WITHDRAWAL ON THE ONE HAND AND RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL, AND ALL OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE AREA, TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE OTHER. IN OUR VIEW, THE MORE EXPLICIT THE STATEMENT OF THESE PRINCIPLES WHICH CAN BE AGREED ON, THE MORE USEFUL WILL THE RESOLUTION BE AS A GUIDE TO THE EFFORTS OF THE U.N. REPRESENTATIVE. THE ACTUAL DETAILS OF HOW THE RESOLUTION WOULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT COULD, HOWEVER, APPROPRIATELY BE LEFT TO THE REPRESENTATIVE TO WORK OUT IN CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED.
HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WARMLY WELCOME THE SIGNS OF REALISM ON THE PART OF THE ARAB STATES MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED, TO WHICH YOU DRAW ATTENTION IN YOUR LETTER. WE, LIKE YOU, ARE KEEN NOT TO LOSE THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY THIS FAVOURABLE DEVELOPMENT. WE CONTINUE TO DO ALL WE CAN TO INFLUENCE THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT TOWARDS A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH, AND WE SHALL URGE RESTRAINT ON THEM. WE CERTAINLY DO NOT CONDONE THE ISRAELI RETALIATION AGAINST SUEZ. I MUST POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE USE BY THE U.A.R. OF SOPHISTICATED MISSILES OF SOVIET ORIGIN TO ATTACK AN ISRAEL WARSHIP HAS NOT MADE OUR TASK ANY EASIER IN THIS REGARD. WE HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO URGE ON THE U.A.R. AND OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS THE NEED FOR THE GREATEST RESTRAINT IN THIS DELICATE AND DANGEROUS SITUATION.
IN THIS CONNEXION, WITHOUT GOING INTO THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF THE ATTACK ON THE ISRAEL DESTROYER, ABOUT WHICH THE FACTS, IN THE ABSENCE OF IMPARTIAL REPORTS, ARE DEBATABLE, I CANNOT FAIL TO POINT OUT THE VERY SERIOUS NEW ELEMENT OF RISK WHICH THE MISSILE ATTACK HAS INTRODUCED INTO AN ALREADY HIGHLY DANGEROUS SITUATION. YOUR AMBASSADOR MR. SMIRNOVSKY HAS ASSURED ME THAT THE MISSILES CONCERNED HAD BEEN SUPPLIED TO THE U.A.R. WELL BEFORE THE JUNE CRISIS, AND I GLADLY ACCEPT HIS ASSURANCE. IT NEVERTHELESS REMAINS A FACT THAT

/THE USE

THE USE OF THESE MISSILES NOW MAY GIVE THE ARMS SPIRAL A NEW AND DANGEROUS TWIST. IT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY REINFORCE THE ARGUMENTS OF THOSE IN ISRAEL WHO ARE AGAINST ANY CONCESSION AND IT WILL STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THE ADVOCATES OF ISRAEL'S DEVELOPING HER OWN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. YOU WILL ALREADY BE ONLY TOO FAMILIAR WITH THE RISKS OF A NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION IN CIRCUMSTANCES OUTSIDE THE CONTROL OF THE SOVIET UNION OR THE UNITED STATES WHICH WOULD FLOW FROM THE NUCLEARISATION OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE. ALL THIS LEADS ME TO ASK YOU MOST EARNESTLY TO CONSIDER ONCE AGAIN WHETHER YOUR GOVERNMENT COULD NOT AGREE TO SOME MEASURE OF LIMITATION IN THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO THE COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST. IF ALL CONCERNED COULD AGREE NOT TO SUPPLY ARMS OF GREATER SOPHISTICATION THAN ALREADY EXIST IN THE AREA, THIS IN ITSELF WOULD BE A GREAT STEP FORWARD IN THE CAUSE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE.

IN YOUR LETTER YOU HAVE REFERRED WITH APPROVAL TO SOME OF THE STATEMENTS BY OUR FOREIGN SECRETARY ABOUT THE NEED FOR ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL. THIS IS INDEED ONE IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE POSITION WHICH WE HAVE TAKEN UP. THE OTHER POINTS MADE BY MR. BROWN IN JUNE AND SEPTEMBER ARE EQUALLY IMPORTANT AND TOGETHER FORM A BALANCED WHOLE WHICH WE BELIEVE CAN BE THE BASIS FOR FAIR AND REASONABLE SETTLEMENT. YOU MAY REST ASSURED THAT WE SHALL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THIS AND THAT IN SO DOING I ATTACH THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO CONTINUED CLOSE CONTACT BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.

SOSFA

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
NORTHERN DEPT.
J.R.D.
N.E.A.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3367 27 OCTOBER 1967
C O N F I D E N T I A L
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 3367 OF 27 OCT,
AND TO UK MIS NEWYORK, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN MOSCOW
PARIS TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO BEIRUT CAIRO AND UKDEL NATO.

YOUR TELS 5748, 5749 AND 5787: SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE MINISTER SAW BATTLE, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EAST AFFAIRS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, TODAY AND INFORMED HIM OF MR. KOSYGIN'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND ALSO OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON THE MINISTER OF STATE.

2. BATTLE CONFIRMED THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON TOO HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM MR. KOSYGIN ON 20 OCTOBER TO WHICH HE HAD SINCE REPLIED. THE MESSAGE HAD BEEN PROPAGANDISTIC IN TONE AND THE AMERICANS WERE HALF EXPECTING THE RUSSIANS TO PUBLISH IT BUT THEY HAD NOT DONE SO. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON HAD ALSO SEEN FOY KOHLER ON 25 OCTOBER AND DELIVERED AN ORAL STATEMENT VERY SIMILAR TO THAT MADE BY SMIRNOVSKY TO THE MINISTER OF STATE.

3. BATTLE THEN GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF MR. GOLDBERG'S DISCUSSION WITH KUZNETZOV AT DINNER ON 25 OCTOBER IN NEW YORK (MY TEL 3356 PARAGRAPH 7). DOBRYNIN HAD APPARENTLY EXCUSED HIMSELF AT THE LAST MOMENT FROM ATTENDING THE DINNER. THE ATMOSPHERE THROUGHOUT WAS FRIENDLY AND BUSINESSLIKE. NO TIME WAS LOST IN RECRIMINATION OVER THE PAST AND ATTENTION WAS FOCUSSED ENTIRELY ON THE WAY FORWARD. KUZNETZOV STRESSED AT THE OUTSET THE SOVIET WISH TO WORK TOGETHER WITH THE UNITED STATES AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

4. KUTNETZOV EXPRESSED SOVIET CONCERN THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE

/ PLANNING A FURTHER

CONFIDENTIAL

PLANNING A FURTHER ATTACK ACROSS THE SUEZ CANAL (BATTLE COMMENTED THAT THE RUSSIANS NOW SEEMED PRE-OCCUPIED MAINLY ABOUT THE UAR, RATHER THAN SYRIA AS HAD BEEN THE CASE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PRESENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS). GOLDBERG, AFTER STRESSING AMERICAN EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT THE CEASE FIRE WAS OBSERVED BY BOTH SIDES, SAID THAT BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES SHOULD USE THEIR INFLUENCE PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY TO MAINTAIN PEACE IN THE AREA. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE RUSSIANS COULD BE AS EVEN-HANDED AS THE AMERICANS IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

5. KUTZNETZOV DID NOT REPLY DIRECTLY, BUT ASKED TO BE GIVEN AN ACCOUNT OF THE LATEST THINKING ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION. GOLDBERG SAID THE RUSSIANS AND THE AMERICANS SHOULD WORK JOINTLY ON THE BASIS OF THE DANISH TEXT WHICH MET THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES. KUTZNETZOV REPLIED THAT THE RUSSIANS PREFERRED THE INDIAN TEXT WHICH HE AFFIRMED HAD BEEN CLEARED WITH THE ARABS. HE ALSO (AND BATTLE REMARKED THAT THIS WAS MOST UNUSUAL FOR HIM) EXPRESSED A STRONG PERSONAL DISLIKE FOR MR. TABOR WHO HE ALLEGED HAD MISREPRESENTED HIS POSITION TO THE ARABS IN RECENT DAYS. IT WAS GOLDBERG'S STRONG IMPRESSION THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE HOPING THE INDIANS COULD WIN OVER THE LATIN AMERICANS TO THEIR DRAFT AND THAT THEY WOULD SUPPORT THEM IN THEIR EFFORTS TO DO SO.

6. KUTZNETZOV THEN REFERRED TO THE KOSYGIN/JOHNSON EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES (PARA 2 ABOVE) AND SAID THAT BOTH COUNTRIES HAD SHOWN A CLEAR DESIRE TO WORK TOGETHER. HE RESERVED THE OPTION TO CONSULT THE AMERICANS ON ANY TEXT AGREED BY THE NON PERMANENT MEMBERS AND ASKED FOR A FURTHER MEETING WITH GOLDBERG ON 26 OCTOBER SEMICOLON GOLDBERG SAID THIS WAS TOO SOON. IN THE COURSE OF SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION KUTZNETZOV ALLUDED LIGHTLY TO THE POSSIBILITY OF USING THE FIRST VERSION OF THE GOLDBERG/DOBRYNIN TEXT WHICH OMITTED A DATE IN THE PHRASE ON WITHDRAWAL AND THEN MENTIONED THE UAR'S WISH TO INCLUDE A DATE SEMICOLON BUT GOLDBERG'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT MAKE THE INCLUSION OF A DATE A BREAKING POINT IF THEY WERE UNABLE TO MUSTER SUFFICIENT SUPPORT FOR IT.

7. KUTZNETZOV ENDED BY REAFFIRMING THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO WORK

/SERIOUSLY

SERIOUSLY AND CONSISTENTLY WITH THE UNITED STATES FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAD RECENTLY BEEN RENEWED AND ACCORDING TO GOLDBERG THE IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHED TO FURTHER HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS CAME THROUGH LOUD AND CLEAR.

8. BATTLE THOUGHT THAT ALL THIS WAS VERY SATISFACTORY AS FAR AS I WENT, IN THAT THE RUSSIANS NOW AGAIN SEEMED INTERESTED IN TRYING TO MAKE PROGRESS JOINTLY WITH THE AMERICANS AT THE UNITED NATIONS

F O PASS PRIORITY TO PARIS 291, AMMAN 147, MOSCOW 249, TEL AVIV 156 AND SAVING TO BEIRUT 53, CAIRO 30 AND UKDEL NATO 125

SIR P DEAN

SENT AT 2125Z/27
RECD AT 2125Z/27

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
U.N.D.
NORTHERN DEPT.
AMERICAN DEPT.
N.E.A.D.
NEWS DEPT.
C.O. M.E.W. & U.N.D.
D.I.S. M.O.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

RVM

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

IMMEDIATE U K MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2897 27 OCTOBER 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2897 OF 27 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW TEL AVIV AMMAN AND SAVING TO BEIRUT AND CAIRO.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT:

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

EXPRESSING ITS CONTINUING CONCERN WITH THE GRAVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 233 (1967) OF 6 JUNE 1967 ON THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING WHICH CALLED FOR, AS A FIRST STEP, AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND FOR A CESSATION OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA,

RECALLING FURTHER GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2256(ESV),

EMPHASISING THE URGENCY OF REDUCING TENSIONS, RESTORING PEACE AND BRINGING ABOUT NORMALCY IN THE AREA,

1. DECIDES THAT A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST MUST BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND MORE PARTICULARLY OF THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:

(I) OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY MILITARY CONQUEST IS INADMISSIBLE UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND CONSEQUENTLY ISRAEL'S ARMED FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW TO POSITIONS THEY HELD ON JUNE 4, 1967/SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT CONFLICT.

(II) LIKEWISE, EVERY STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE AND COMPLETE SECURITY FREE FROM THREATS OR ACTS OF WAR AND CONSEQUENTLY ALL STATES IN THE AREA SHOULD TERMINATE THE STATE OR CLAIM OF BELLIGERENCY AND SETTLE THEIR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

/(III) LIKEWISE

(III) LIKEWISE, EVERY STATE OF THE AREA HAS THE RIGHT TO BE SECURE WITHIN ITS BORDERS AND IT IS OBLIGATORY ON ALL MEMBER STATES OF THE AREA TO RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ONE ANOTHER.

2. DECIDES FURTHER:

(I) THERE SHOULD BE A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE REFUGEES TAKING DUE ACCOUNT OF THE U.N. RESOLUTIONS ON THE SUBJECT.

(II) THERE SHOULD BE GUARANTEED FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERN ATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IN THE AREA.

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DESPATCH A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA WHO WOULD CONTACT THE PARTIES CONCERNED IN ORDER TO COORDINATE EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THE PURPOSES OF THIS RESOLUTION AND TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE COUNCIL WITHIN 30 DAYS.

ENDS

F.O. PASS PARIS 484 MOSCOW 503 TEL AVIV 511 AMMAN 373 AND SAVING BEIRUT 112 AND CAIRO 192.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0141Z/28
RECD AT 0141Z/28

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
U.N.D.
N.E.A.D.
NEWS DEPT.
C.O. M.E.W. & U.N.D.
D.I.S. M.O.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A
IMMEDIATE U K MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2898
CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
27 OCTOBER 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2898 OF 27 OCTOBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV, AMMAN AND SAVING TO BEIRUT AND CAIRO.

MY TEL. NO. 2897 : MIDDLE EAST.

EL KONY (U.A.R.) ASKED TO SEE ME THIS AFTERNOON. HE TOLD ME THAT HIS DELEGATION HAD SEEN THE DRAFT PREPARED BY THE SIX NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS (SEE MY I.P.T.). HIS FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TWO MAIN COMMENTS. FIRSTLY, THAT IT MUST BE CLEAR THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IS REQUIRED FROM ALL ARAB TERRITORY (THOUGH FROM WHAT HE SAID IT DID NOT APPEAR THAT HE WAS INSISTING ON THE INCLUSION OF THE DATE (5 JUNE)). SECONDLY, WITH REGARD TO THE REFUGEES HE WAS NOT CONTENT WITH THE WORDING QUOTE TAKING DUE ACCOUNT OF THE U.N. RESOLUTION ON THE SUBJECT UNQUOTE. HE THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE U.N. RESOLUTIONS STILL FULLY APPLIED.

2. I TOLD HIM THAT AS I HAD PREVIOUSLY EXPLAINED TO HIS FOREIGN MINISTER I WAS NOT PREPARED TO COMMENT ON ANY DRAFT UNTIL THE DISCUSSION AMONGST ALL THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS HAD BEEN COMPLETED (THOUGH I DID SAY THAT WITH REGARD TO THE REFUGEES I THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE AND UNNECESSARY TO DO MORE THAN ASK FOR QUOTE A JUST SOLUTION UNQUOTE). WHEN THAT DISCUSSION HAD BEEN COMPLETED AND WE COULD SEE WHATEVER DRAFT THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS SUPPORTED WE WOULD BE READY TO COMMENT WITHOUT DELAY.

3. I CONFIRMED THAT WE WISHED TO SEE ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THAT WE WERE MOST ANXIOUS FOR THAT ACTION TO BE URGENTLY UNDERTAKEN, THAT WE WELCOMED THE EFFORTS OF THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A DRAFT RESOLUTION, AND THAT

/WE

CONFIDENTIAL

WE HAD ALL ALONG BEEN PRESSING FOR A FAIRLY BALANCED RESOLUTION. I SAID THAT IT WAS CLEARLY NECESSARY FOR EVERYONE TO BE PREPARED TO MAKE SOME CONCESSIONS AND NOT TO INSIST RIGIDLY ON POINTS OF WORDING. WE ALL NEEDED A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD COMMAND MAXIMUM SUPPORT AND THUS RESULT IN POSITIVE ACTION.

F.O. PASS PARIS 485, MOSCOW 504, TEL AVIV 512, AMMAN 374 AND SAVING TO BEIRUT 115 AND CAIRO 193.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0122Z/28
RECD AT 0122Z/28

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
U.N.D.
N.E.A.D.
NEWS DEPT.
C.O. M.E.W. & U.N.D.
D.I.S. M.O.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 2924 29 OCTOBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 2924 OF 29 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV.

MYTEL NO 2923:

MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MR EBAN'S MESSAGE TO YOU.

BEGINS.

I GREATLY APPRECIATED OUR CONVERSATION AT DORNYWOOD. I CONVEYED TO MY COLLEAGUES YOUR CLEAR EXPLANATION OF THE BRITISH POSITION, AND ESPECIALLY OF YOUR VIEW THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT BE ASKED TO GO BACK EXCEPT TO AGREED, STABLE AND SECURE FRONTIERS.

AN ATTEMPT TO FORMULATE A FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR A U N CONCILIATION EFFORT IS NOW PROCEEDING.

THERE IS AN AFRO-ASIAN TEXT, SUPPORTED BY THE SOVIETS AND ARABS, WHICH IS THE ANTITHESIS OF WHAT YOU AND I HAVE DISCUSSED. IT WOULD CALL FOR ISRAEL TO REPRODUCE THE EXACT POSITION OF 4 JUNE AND THUS FORECLOSE THE BOUNDARY DISCUSSION IN ADVANCE. FOR THIS AND OTHER REASONS, IT WOULD, IF ADOPTED, CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH ISRAEL WOULD BE UNABLE TO COOPERATE WITH A UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE CHARGED WITH UNBALANCED AND PREJUDICIAL DIRECTIVES.

THERE WAS SOME DANGER THAT THE TWO LATIN DELEGATIONS WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO THIS TEXT. I NOW HEAR THAT ON FRIDAY, THEY ANNOUNCED THAT THEY HAD RESERVATIONS ON SOME PARTS OF THE TEXT AND RESERVED THEIR POSITION ON THE WHOLE.

SOME DELEGATIONS, NOTABLY CANADA AND DENMARK, HAVE DRAFTED A TEXT WHICH DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE NEGOTIATION IN ADVANCE, AND WHICH, INDEED, EXPRESSES THE CENTRAL IDEAS WHICH YOU CONVEYED TO ME. WE HAVE MADE PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THIS TEXT FROM OUR VIEWPOINT, BUT AS IT STANDS IT DOES NOT MAKE OUR COOPERATION IMPOSSIBLE.

/ I HOPE THAT

CONFIDENTIAL

I HOPE THAT WE MAY COUNT ON YOUR DELEGATION TO GIVE ACTIVE HELP TO OVERCOME THE SERIOUS DANGER INHERENT IN THE AFRO-ASIAN INITIATIVE, WHICH IS SO MANIFESTLY AT VARIANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES WHICH WE CLARIFIED TOGETHER LAST WEEK.

I AM ENCLOSING A MEMORANDUM ANALYZING THE AFRO-ASIAN DRAFT.

ENDS.

F O PASS TEL AVIV 522.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT 0436Z/30
RECD AT 0437Z/30

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
U.N. DEPT.
N.E.A.D.
NEWS DEPT.

C.O. M.E.W.U.N.D.
DIS. MOD.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

SSSSS

HL

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 2925 29 OCTOBER 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 2925 OF 29 OCTOBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV.

MY I P T:

MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MEMORANDUM ENCLOSED IN MR EBAN'S LETTER. BEGINS.

MEMORANDUM BY THE ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTER
ON THE AFRO-ASIAN DRAFT PROPOSAL.

ONE: THE EFFECT OF THE AFRO-ASIAN TEXT WOULD BE TO REQUIRE ISRAEL TO RETURN TO THE PREVIOUS CONDITIONS OF VULNERABILITY AND DANGER IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SPECIFIC, CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP DEFINING THE POLITICAL, JURIDICAL, TERRITORIAL AND SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE STATES OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THE PROPOSED MISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE FRUSTRATED SINCE THE TERMS OF THE PEACE SETTLEMENT ARE PREJUDICIALLY DICTATED IN ADVANCE.

TWO. THERE IS NOTHING IN THE TEXT TO PREVENT THE REPRODUCTION OF THE JUNE 5 EXPLOSION. ARAB FORCES WOULD TAKE UP POSITIONS IN SINAI, GAZA, AND THE WEST BANK FROM WHICH THEY ENCIRCLED AND THREATENED ISRAEL IN MAY AND JUNE. JERUSALEM WOULD BE AGAIN TORN APART INTO TWO HOSTILE FRAGMENTS.

THREE. THERE IS NO FAIR BALANCE AT ALL BETWEEN PARAGRAPHS 1(I) AND 1(II). WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS IS IRREVOCABLE EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF ANOTHER WAR, WHILE DECLARATIONS OF NON-BELLIGERENCY COULD BE REVOKED AS SOON AS THE WITHDRAWAL WAS SECURED. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN ISRAEL'S

IN ISRAEL'S MIND THAT THIS IS THE INTENTION OF SOME ARAB GOVERNMENTS. THEIR ANNOUNCED POLICY IS TO SECURE WITHDRAWAL AND TO REFRAIN FROM RECOGNISING ISRAEL OR NEGOTIATING WITH HER OR SIGNING A PEACE TREATY. THIS TEXT DOES NOT RUN COUNTER TO THAT POLICY. IT AVOIDS ANY CONCEPT OF NEGOTIATION, AGREEMENT OR PEACE TREATIES. IT IGNORES THE SOVEREIGN RESPONSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENTS TO REACH THEIR OWN AGREEMENTS.

FOUR: THE BLOCKADE OF THE SUEZ CANAL TO ISRAELI VESSELS COMES NEAR TO BEING ENDORSED BY THIS TEXT. THE EGYPTIAN VIEW HAS ALWAYS BEEN THAT '' INTERNATIONAL LAW'' ENTITLES HER TO APPLY DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES, THAT THE SUEZ CANAL IS AN EGYPTIAN FACILITY AND NOT AN ''INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY'', AND THAT THE ''PRACTICE'' HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE EXCLUSION OF ISRAEL SHIPS FROM THE CANAL. THE TEXT BEFORE US COULD WELL HAVE BEEN WRITTEN BY EGYPTIAN HANDS IN DEFENCE OF PAST POLICIES. WE HAVE ASCERTAINED THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS THAT EGYPT WOULD, IN FACT, CONTINUE TO EXCLUDE ISRAEL VESSELS UNDER THIS FORMULA.

FIVE: UNDER THIS TEXT, EGYPTIAN TROOPS WOULD RETURN TO THE STRAIT OF TIRAN AND TO SHARM AL SHAIKH. ISRAEL NAVIGATION WOULD THUS BE AT THE MERCY OF EGYPT'S ATTITUDE, WHICH COULD CHANGE FROM DAY TO DAY. IN ANY SITUATION OF LOCAL TENSION, EGYPT COULD ANNOUNCE THE RETURN OF BELLIGERENCY, CIRCULATE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO ALL GOVERNMENTS (AS IT DID ON JUNE 1, 1967) AND RENEW THE BLOCKADE WITH ALL THE KNOWN CONSEQUENCES. PARAGRAPH 2(II) HAS NO EFFECT ON THIS PROSPECT, SINCE '' INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE'' DO NOT BY THEMSELVES ESTABLISH PHYSICAL GUARANTEES FOR MARITIME FREEDOM, AND EGYPT HAS ALWAYS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED INTERNATIONAL LAW UNILATERALLY.

SIX: THE STATEMENT IN 1(I) IS LEGALLY CONTROVERSIAL. THERE IS NO PROVISION OF THE CHARTER WHICH FORBIDS RECOGNITION OF TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY HAVE A MILITARY HISTORY. THE CHARTER FORBIDS AGGRESSION: IT DOES NOT FORBID

/ NEW TERRITORIAL

NEW TERRITORIAL AGREEMENTS WHICH TAKE ACCOUNT OF SECURITY INTERESTS AND EXPERIENCES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE 4 JUNE SITUATION RESTED - FROM THE JURIDICAL VIEWPOINT - ON THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY ARAB MILITARY CONQUEST IN 1948. IT WAS BY MILITARY CONQUEST IN DEFIANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION OF MAY - JULY 1948 THAT JORDAN AND EGYPT ACQUIRED CONTROL OF THE WEST BANK, EASTERN JERUSALEM AND GAZA. THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS WHICH EXISTED BETWEEN MARCH 1949 AND JUNE 1967 ARE DEFINED IN THEIR TEXTS AS DICTATED BEGIN UNDERLINING SOLELY BY MILITARY END UNDERLINING CONSIDERATIONS, AND AS HAVING NO BEARING ON THE TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT OR ON THE PROBLEM OF FRONTIERS.

THE UNITED NATIONS CANNOT HONORABLY ADOPT A JURISPRUDENCE WHICH WOULD IN EFFECT MEAN THE FOLLOWING: BEGIN UNDERLINING WHAT THE ARAB STATES GAINED IN WAR THEY MAY KEEP. WHAT THEY LOSE IN WAR THEY MUST REGAIN. END UNDERLINING

SEVEN: THE BEST WAY OUT IS TO FOLLOW THE PROCEDURE ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE PARTIES IN 1948. THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS WERE MAINTAINED FOR SEVERAL MONTHS UNTIL THEY WERE REPLACED BY NEW AGREEMENTS DIRECTLY NEGOTIATED WHICH WERE THEN ENDORSED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE PROCEDURE THEN ADOPTED FOR TRANSITION TO ARMISTICE SHOULD NOW BE FOLLOWED FOR TRANSITION TO PEACE. OUR OBJECTIVE IS PEACE AND SECURITY - BUT THESE, IN THEIR TURN, REQUIRE FRONTIER ADJUSTMENTS AND SECURITY AGREEMENTS. THAT THE PERMANENT FRONTIER WOULD DIFFER FROM THE DEMARCATION LINES WAS SPECIFICALLY AGREED IN 1949, AND, ISRAEL'S POSITION ON THIS SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDICED IN ADVANCE OF THE NEGOTIATION.

EIGHT: MOREOVER, THERE IS AN ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN ASSEMBLY DEBATE IN JUNE AND A SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION IN OCTOBER. IN THE FORMER CASE, THERE WAS AN EFFORT TO PROCLAIM PRINCIPLES AND IDEAS. TODAY, THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS INVOLVED IN A DIPLOMATIC EFFORT AT CONCILIATION UNDER CHAPTER VI OF THE CHARTER. THE OPERATIVE PROPOSAL IS TO NOMINATE A CONCILIATOR. ISRAEL PREFERS

/ DIRECT

DIRECT NEGOTIATION. BUT IF A CONCILIATOR IS APPOINTED, THE LEAST THAT CAN BE DONE IS TO AVOID A FORMULATION WHICH CLOSES THE DOOR ON THE ISRAEL CASE IN THE TERRITORIAL NEGOTIATION BEFORE IT HAS BEGUN. THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE PARTIES IS NECESSARY IN THIS CONTEXT.

SOME DRAFT PROPOSALS, SUCH AS THAT OF BRAZIL IN SEPTEMBER, 1967 AND DENMARK AND CANADA IN RECENT DAYS, ARE WORDED BROADLY ENOUGH TO ACCOMMODATE THE POSITIONS OF EITHER PARTY. THEY AT LEAST CONTAIN NOTHING WHICH PREJUDICES THE ARAB OR ISRAELI POSITION. ENDS.

F O PASS TEL AVIV 523.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT 0457Z/30
RECD AT 0458Z/30

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. EASTERN DEPT.
U.N.D.
N.E.A.D.
NEWS DEPT.
C.O. M.E.W. & U.N.D.
D.I.S. M.O.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

HL
FFFFF

CONFIDENTIAL

Middle East (War) Pt. 7

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 1802 30 October 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to F.O. telegram No. 1802 of 30 October
Repeated for information to:
Washington, U.K. Mission New York,
Paris, Tel Aviv, Cairo.

Your telegram No. 3040. Prime Ministers message to Mr. Kosygin.

Mr. Kosygin received me at 10 a.m. (Moscow time) this morning and I handed him the Prime Minister's message. In doing so I emphasised the importance which the Prime Minister attached to the continued maintenance of close contact with Mr. Kosygin on these questions.

2. After listening to a translation of the message, Mr. Kosygin said that it would be studied. He went on to say that he expected the Soviet Government would in due course undertake further steps with a view to solving the Middle East problem. He could not say more about them because they were still in the process of being worked out. But progress depended on an objective approach to the situation by Great Britain and the U.S. Mr. Wilson had expressed concern at the attack on the "Eilat". But why was he not concerned by the entry of this vessel into U.A.R. territorial waters, which was the prime course of the incident, and the systematic bombardment by the Israelis of U.A.R. territory?

3. Mr. Kosygin thereupon closed this part of the interview by saying that he could say no more for the present but that I could tell the Prime Minister that his message would be studied and that we would be given the Soviet Governments views later.

On Vietnam Pt 7

4. Before I could pursue the subject any further, Mr. Kosygin turned to Viet Nam (see my immediately following telegram). But towards the end of the interview I was able to revert to Mr. Kosygin's opening remarks about the Soviet Government contemplating further steps in regard to the Middle East. I asked whether he could not tell me something more. He replied that he could not since they were still being worked out. But he said in answer to a question that they would in the Soviet view be constructive. The Soviet Government, like the British Government, was thinking about how to resolve the basic problems. It wanted to prevent the Middle East becoming a hotbed of war. It wanted to achieve a settlement which would enable the Arabs to get their territory back. I pointed out that useful discussions were meanwhile going on in New York over the proposals of the non-permanent members of the Security Council and I understood Mr. Kuznetsov was having talks with High American Officials. Mr. Kosygin agreed that this was all useful. I added

/that

CONFIDENTIAL

that we were meanwhile taking such steps as we could vis-a-vis the Israelis even to the point of risking damage to our relations. Please see my immediately following telegram (not to all).

F.O. pass Immediate Washington 284, U.K. Mission New York 123 and Routine Paris 78, Tel Aviv 51 and Cairo 33.

Sir G. Harrison

[Repetition to Cairo referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to other posts].

[Copies sent to No. 10 Downing street].

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Eastern Dept.
Northern Dept.
J.R.D.
N.E.A.D.
S.E.A.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

77777